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ABSTRACT 
RACHANA RAO UMASHANKAR: Defending Sufism, Defining Islam: Asserting 
Islamic identity in India 
(Under the direction of Dr. James L. Peacock and Dr. Lauren G. Leve) 
 
Based on thirteen months of intensive fieldwork at two primary sites in India, this 
dissertation describes how adherents of shrine-based Sufism assert their identity as Indian 
Muslims in the contexts of public debates over religion and belonging in India, and of 
reformist critiques of their Islamic beliefs and practices.  Faced with opposition to their 
mode of Islam from reformist Muslim groups, and the challenges to their sense of 
national identity as members of a religious minority in India, I argue that adherents of 
shrine-based Sufism claim the sacred space of the Sufi shrine as a venue where both the 
core values of Islam and of India are given form and reproduced.  For these adherents, 
contemporary shrine-based Sufism is a dynamic and creative force that manifests 
essential aspects of Islam that are also fundamental Indian values, and which are critical 
to the health of the nation today.  The dissertation reveals that contested identities and 
internal religious debates can only be understood and interpreted within the broader 
framework of national and global debates over Islam and over the place of Islam in the 
Indian polity that shape them.  
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NOTE ON PSEUDONYMS AND ORTHOGRAPHY 
 
I have used pseudonyms throughout this dissertation for all my interlocutors, with 
only a few exceptions.  Some interlocutors are easily identifiable because of the positions 
they occupy within the Sufi community: as authors, leaders, and scholars.  These 
interlocutors participated in my research knowing this, and in many cases wanting to be 
identified as representatives of their larger community.  In order to honor their position 
within the community, and not to obscure their contribution, I have retained their real 
names.  
This dissertation includes terms and quotes in many different languages: Hindi-
Urdu, Kannada, Persian, and Arabic.  I have used a system of orthography that reflects 
the pronunciation of my interlocutors, rather than on standard, formal pronunciation.  
This bias is especially obvious for Islamic terms that have their roots in Arabic.  I have 
chosen to err on the side of spoken, colloquial usage of these terms.  My interlocutors 
were for the most part native speakers of Hindi-Urdu, and the transliteration I employ 
reflects their native accents, and not formal Arabic (fusha) pronunciation. The exception 
to this is when I discuss specifically theological debates in chapter 2, and when I quote 
from the quran in chapter 4.  Here, I use transliteration that is standard in the academic 
study of Islam in the United States.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Nooruddin Nizami Sahab was one of my main interlocutors at the shrine of the 
Sufi saint Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia in Delhi.  He was a hereditary custodian at the Sufi 
shrine and one of the first people I met there during my exploratory visit in the summer 
of 2006.  During this initial visit, I met with him for a few hours one evening and had a 
long conversation about the saint and his shrine.  We sat in one of the smaller courtyards 
of the shrine-complex, a little away from the hubbub that is characteristic of most 
evenings at this shrine.  He spoke about the charisma of the saint, his continued influence 
over the people of India despite the passage of the centuries, and of the importance of the 
sacred-space of the Sufi shrine.  Nooruddin Sahab was animated throughout the 
conversation, and seemed deeply affected by the saint and the shrine. 
At this early stage of my research, the Sufi response to reformist Muslim critique 
of shrine-based Sufism was of primary interest to me; and so I asked him about the 
oppositional stance of the Tablighi Jama’at, a reformist Muslim organization that 
opposed many of the practices and beliefs of shrine-based Sufism.  This is what he said:  
Fundamentalism is what has marred the name of Islam in the world…(But) the 
Tablighi Jama’at preaches this orthodoxy, this fundamentalism…they get Saudi 
aid, you know. The Quran commands us to be merciful towards people of all 
faiths.  And this ideal is found in the shrines of Sufi saints here. You won’t find 
this kind of respect in Saudi Arabia, which is the center of Islam. But in India, the 
value of every human being is recognized.  
Nooruddin Nizami’s complex narrative brought up many questions: Why did he equate 
reformist Islam with Islamic fundamentalism? What informs his reaction to these forms 
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of Islam? Why does he align shrine-based Sufism with the Indian nation? Why does he 
speak of Saudi Arabia negatively, while also calling it “the center of Islam”?  Where does 
he place India in the historical narrative of Islam? And conversely, where does he place 
Islam in the history of India?  And what links all these elements (differing modes of 
Islamic practice, the geographic valencing of the Muslim world, the Indian nation and 
Islam) in his response?  My conversation with Nooruddin Nizami and others during that 
first trip led me to ask how the social, religious, and political milieux of India influenced 
assertions and contestations of religious identity.   
This dissertation describes how adherents of shrine-based Sufism assert their 
identity as Muslims in the face of reformist claims that their beliefs and practices are un-
Islamic, and in the context of public debates over religion and belonging in India.  I also 
show that the positive narratives associated with shrine-based Sufism in the religio-
political rhetoric of the Indian nation-state form points of tension that undermine 
adherents’ assertion of a Muslim identity.  In what is a double-bind for adherents, their 
assertion of a Muslim identity in turn threatens to undermine their claim to Indianness.  
Viewed in this context, the responses of adherents of shrine-based Sufism to reformist 
critique form a complex narrative that asserts claims to both religious authenticity and 
national belonging.   
The responses of adherents of shrine-based Sufism, however, cannot be 
understood merely as strategic narratives deployed in order to negotiate a precarious 
socio-religious position (though the expediency of such a strategic deployment is evident 
in light of the politics of religion in the Subcontinent).  Through intensive and prolonged 
association with my interlocutors I found that adherents of shrine-based Sufism strongly 
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believed in their claim to these religious and national identities, and in fact expressed a 
view that shrine-based Sufism was essential to the existence and sustenance of both Islam 
and India.  Scholarly and reformist understandings of Sufism have predominantly defined 
contemporary shrine-based practice and beliefs as the product of a long-standing 
religious and cultural decline from a “Golden Age” of Sufism, which was characterized 
by great intellectual and doctrinal creativity. I argue that for contemporary adherents of 
shrine-based Sufism the sacred space of the Sufi shrine is where the core values of both 
Islam and the Indian nation are given form and reproduced in the world today.  For these 
adherents, contemporary shrine-based Sufism is a dynamic and creative force that 
manifests essential aspects of Islam that are also core Indian values, and which are 
critical to the health of the nation today.   
Thus, at a more macro level, this dissertation reveals that contested identities and 
internal debates can only be understood, and must be interpreted, within the broader 
framework of the national and global debates over Islam, and the place of Islam in the 
Indian polity that shapes them and influences the forms they take.  I base these 
conclusions on a year of intensive fieldwork carried out primarily at two major Sufi 
shrines in India.   
In the following pages that serve as an introduction to this dissertation I will 
elaborate on this discussion and engage broadly with the major scholarship that has 
informed my thinking on the Indian nation, on Sufi Islam, and on reformist Islam.  I will 
also give an account of my methods and field-sites.  
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CONSTRUCTING A MUSLIM IDENTITY IN INDIA 
At a very basic level, I am interested in how adherents of shrine-based Sufism 
construct their identity as Muslim subjects and as Indian citizens.  This identity-
construction occurs in a social circle and a political context where adherents of shrine-
based Sufism receive very different messages about what each of these two categories 
are, and how to be both.  How do they manage these messages, and how do they position 
themselves given the pressures that come with them?   
Adherents of shrine-based Sufism face intense criticism of and opposition to their 
practices and beliefs from reformist Muslim quarters, and in turn respond to these 
oppositional stances; we are looking at a tug-of-war between members of two disparate 
Muslim groups.  However, these larger questions are relevant because the internal 
struggles among Muslim groups are deeply informed by the prevailing socio-political 
narratives and shifting trends at a national and global level. The stances of adherents of 
shrine-based Sufism vis-à-vis reformist Muslim groups have to be viewed and understood 
as complex responses to 1) the need to assert their identity as Muslims in the face of 
reformist opposition, and 2) what such an assertion of Islamic identity means to their 
position as Indian citizens.   
In order to understand the ways in which adherents of shrine-based Sufism 
construct their identity as Muslims and as Indians, and position themselves within this 
larger context, it is essential that we first unpack the main categories that constitute their 
socio-religious and political milieu: 1) Sufism and the core beliefs and practices of  
adherents of shrine-based Sufism; 2) reformist Islam and the broad debates and trends 
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that have shaped its current forms; and 3) the Indian nation state, and the social, religious 
and political narratives that dominate it.   
SUFISM 
Very broadly speaking, Sufism is a mode of Islamic practice and belief centered 
on the core desire of the human being to become one with God.  It is often translated as 
Islamic mysticism, but its beliefs and practices are quite wide-reaching and encompass 
discussions that are as much of this world as of the other.  Sufi debates among Muslim 
philosophers over the centuries have included various speculations and assertions on the 
nature of God and the universe, and the means through which people can hope to achieve 
unity with God.   However contested these issues may be among Sufis, the goal of 
attaining unity with God remains a central goal of Sufism.  Sufi Muslims also 
acknowledge the difficulty of achieving this goal and traveling the path that leads to this 
ideal state, and very few are believed to have accomplished this journey.  These select 
few are known as Sufi saints
1
 (vali; pl. aulia).  The Sufi saints continue to be revered 
centuries after they have passed on, and the tombs in which they are enshrined form the 
loci of lay practice among millions of Muslims all over the world.   
Sufi practice among specialists is transmitted through Sufi orders, where the 
teachings of Sufism are passed on from master (pir) to disciple (murid).  A Sufi order 
(silsila) is essentially a chain of master-disciple relationships (pir-muridi) that traces its 
                                                          
1The word ‘saint’ is often used in the context of Sufism, but the notion of sainthood in Islam is not the same 
as that in Christianity.  Sufi masters are often considered to be saints during their lifetimes, and the honor 
comes from consensus among peers, disciples and adherents, rather than granted through an 
institutionalized system.  The consensus forms around the acknowledgement of a Sufi master’s divinely 
granted powers, and personal charisma.  Hagiographies of Sufi saints are replete with accounts of miracles: 
instances when saints display raw power by making walls walk and taming wild beasts, or narratives in 
which they possess uncanny powers of perception and foreknowledge.   
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point of origin to the Prophet Muhammad who is considered the first master; or even to 
Adam, the primordial master.  When an adherent wishes to begin the journey on the Sufi 
path he (or she)
2
 must be accepted as a disciple by a Sufi master.  If proven worthy, the 
disciple may in turn be granted the right to take on his own disciples, thus forming a link 
in the chain that is his Sufi order.  The word that I translate here as ‘Sufi order’, is silsila, 
which literally means ‘chain’ in Arabic.  There are many Sufi orders the world over with 
particular orders dominant in certain regions of the world.  The two shrines where I 
carried out the bulk of my research were the shrines of the saints Hazrat Nizamuddin 
Aulia (in New Delhi) and Khaja Bandanawaz Gesudaraz (in Gulbarga, a city in 
peninsular India), both of whom belonged to the Chishti order of Sufis (chishtiyya).   
Chishti Sufism is eponymous with the Sufi saint Shaikh Moinuddin Chishti, the 
founder of this order in India.  In their seminal work on this order of Sufism, Sufi Martyrs 
of Love (2002), Carl Ernst and Bruce Lawrence answer the question, “What is Chishti 
Sufism?” thus: 
It is both an experience and a memory.  It is the experience of remembering God 
so intensely that the Soul is destroyed and resurrected.  It is also the memory of 
those who remembered God, those who were devoted to discipline and prayer, but 
above all, to remembrance, whether they recited the divine name (zikr) or evoked 
his presence through song (sama’). [p. 2]  
Ernst and Lawrence have rightly identified the ritual remembrance of God (zikr) and 
ritual audition (sama’) as two very important aspects of Sufi practice.   
                                                          
2
Sufi orders have historically been male institutions. However, there are a few recorded instances of women 
being granted discipleship, but very few of women becoming Sufi masters in turn.  One of the most well-
known female saints was Rabia al-Basri (717-801 CE), who continues to be revered all over the world as a 
blessed, charismatic and powerful figure in Sufi Islam.   
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In order to distinguish the intense spiritual and meditative practices of specialists 
who actively strive to achieve oneness with God from that of lay Muslims who believe in 
the power and the piety of the saints, I identify the former as Sufism and the latter as 
shrine-based Sufism.  As the term suggests, shrine-based Sufism constitutes beliefs and 
practices that are centered on Sufi shrines as the seat of these saints.  It rests primarily on 
belief in the intercessory powers of Sufi saints, in the blessed nature of the sacred space 
of Sufi shrines, and in holding Sufi saints as an ideal of Islamic comportment and ethics.   
In India, Sufi saints and their shrines are an important part of the religious lives of 
both Muslims and non-Muslims.  How these saints and their sacred spaces fit into the 
larger ritual and belief patterns of religious life between Muslims and non-Muslims 
differ.  Among Muslims, practices and beliefs associated with Sufi saints and their 
shrines form a subset of Islam and are integral to their understanding of the nature of 
God, the world, and their place in it as Muslims.  (For non-Muslims, Sufi saints are 
charismatic spiritual figures who are supernaturally blessed with powers to heal and grant 
boons.)  To differentiate between Muslim practitioners and non-Muslim devotees, I 
characterize the former as adherents of shrine-based Sufism; and it is these adherents 
amongst whom I carried out my field-research in India.  The term used by adherents of 
shrine-based Sufism for themselves is ahl-e sunnat wa al jama’at, which is a Persio-
Arabic phrase meaning, “people of the Islamic way of life and community”, or ahl-e 
sunnat for short.  They are sometimes often referred to as barelvi, which is a term 
eponymous with the 19
th
 century scholar and pro-shrine reformist Ahmad Riza Khan 
Barelwi.   
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I present a detailed account of Chishti Sufi shrines, and the practices and beliefs 
of adherents of shrine-based Sufism in chapter 1.  However, it is important to note at this 
juncture the deep connection of Chishti Sufism with the Subcontinent.  Adherents 
identify Chishti Sufism as one of the oldest orders of Sufi Islam in India (if not the first).  
The connection to India is also reflected in the practices at Chishti Sufi shrines, which 
take on a markedly Subcontinental flavor.  Be it the accoutrements of ritual offerings to 
the saint or the mode of music through which God is remembered at shrines, there is an 
unmistakably Indian character to Islamic practice at these sacred spaces.  While adherents 
of shrine-based Sufism take ownership of the Indian character of their Islamic practice, 
this, as well as some other core beliefs and practices of shrine-based Sufism, have 
become the target of reformist critique.  I present the points of reformist opposition and 
their encounter with adherents of shrine-based Sufism in chapter 2.   
Till fairly recently, the scholarship on Sufism was dominated by analyses of texts, 
especially from the “Golden Age” of Sufism (13th-14th centuries).  This is in spite of the 
fact that we see more prolific production of texts by Sufis of a later era, resulting in what 
Carl Ernst and Bruce Lawrence (2002) have called a “historiographical disconnect” (p. 
1).  Scholarship over the past two decades has attempted to make-up for this bias in the 
study of Sufism.  There has been a concerted effort to shift the focus of scholarship to 
late-medieval and contemporary Sufism.   
Carl Ernst’s seminal work Eternal Garden (2004) was a major step in this 
direction.  In this work Ernst focuses on texts and sites that are off the beaten path, 
analyzing Persian texts that elaborate the teachings of a lesser-known 14
th
 century saint, 
Burhan al-Din Gharib, at his shrine in a small Deccan town of Khuldabad.  In Eternal 
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Garden, Ernst opens up texts for analysis from an era that has been neglected for long by 
scholars of Islam.  In addition, this work has especially informed my own research in that 
Ernst analyzes these texts not in isolation or only in relation to major Sufi treatises and 
Islamic doctrine, but within the larger context of Indian historiography, oral and written 
traditions of Chishti Sufism in South Asia, and the political and religious backdrop 
against which these texts were written.   
Part of this trend in scholarship, and another work that has informed this 
dissertation, is Ernst and Lawrence’s Sufi Martyrs of Love (2002), a major work in the 
study of Sufism in South Asia.  Here, the authors trace the history and contemporary 
practices of Chishti Sufism without recourse to the now-clichéd rhetoric of Sufism’s 
decline in the late-medieval era.  In fact, this book is a complex presentation and analysis 
of the continued impact and dynamism of South Asia’s most prominent Sufi order.  In the 
words of Ernst and Lawrence,  
Our thesis is that a Sufi order such as the Chishtiyya is more than a parasitical 
legitimation of power or a nostalgic reverence for bygone saints; it is instead a 
complex of spiritual practice, historical memory, and ethical models, which 
continues to evolve from its medieval Islamic origins in response to the political, 
ideological, and technological transformations of the contemporary world. [p. 1] 
The presentation of contemporary Sufism as a dynamic institution with active 
agents is a fairly new phenomenon.  The legacy of Orientalist scholarship, dominant 
ideologies from reformist quarters oppositional to shrine-based Sufism, and later 
narratives of liberal democracy and modernity purged of spiritual and religious 
“baggage” have dominated the study of Sufism for decades.  Part of the reaction to this 
legacy has been Katherine Pratt Ewing’s work Arguing Sainthood (1997).  In this work, 
she argues against an understanding of Sufism as entirely subject to hegemonic forces of 
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“Western epistemologies…and modes of domination” (pp. 3-4).  While I engage with this 
work later in this dissertation, I would like to note here that Ewing’s understanding of 
Sufis as dynamic agents who negotiate between various modes of religious and political 
subjecthood has been an important contribution to the study of Sufism in South Asia, 
where for long Sufism has primarily been studied via texts and not through ethnographic 
engagement with its adherents.   
More recently, Pnina Werbner (2003) and Anna Bigelow (2010) have added 
further to the growing body of anthropological and ethnographic approaches to Sufism. 
Anna Bigelow’s work, Sharing the Sacred, focuses on narratives of pluralism that have 
emerged out of the shrine of Shaykh Sadruddin Sadri Jahan in Maler Kotla (in Indian 
Punjab), and complements my own line of enquiry.  Where I look at what identity 
narratives of Muslims who adhere to shrine-based Sufism tell us about what it means to 
be Muslim and Indian today, Bigelow’s work looks at how these narratives serve to 
mediate relationships between Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims in a part of India that has 
been susceptible to inter-religious violence.  As with my own research, Bigelow 
approaches these narratives of pluralism as mirrors to larger questions of religious 
identity and national belonging.   
In contrast to both my research and Bigelow’s recent work, Werbenr’s book, 
Pilgrims of Love, is a close-up look at a Sufi cult that is secretive and insular in many 
ways, but one with a transnational following.  I have found Werbner’s thoughts on the 
complexities of doing ethnographic work in the anthropology of religion to be insightful, 
and I engage with these briefly in the methods section of this dissertation.    
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In this dissertation I examine the identity-narratives of contemporary adherents of 
shrine-based Sufism in the context of social and religio-political forces that have 
impacted the story of Islam in India.  My research adds to this movement towards 
presenting contemporary shrine-based Sufism as a dynamic mode of Islamic practice that 
must be understood within the larger social and political milieu that have informed its 
forms and character.   
REFORMIST ISLAM AND REFORMIST SUFISM 
Reformist Islam in reality refers to not one but a number of movements that 
emerged all over South Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East and North 
Africa starting around the early 18
th
 century, and having continued impact the world over 
through extant groups and organizations.  In many cases these reformist movements arose 
from the decay and destruction of Islamicate political entities (kingdoms and princely 
states in Asia and North Africa, and the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East and Eurasia), 
and from the dissonance and rupture caused by contact with colonial powers and colonial 
modes of knowledge.  Aspects of these early reformist movements germane to this 
discussion are the shifting locus of the center of the “Muslim World” to the Arabian 
Peninsula, and a focus on “purifying” Islamic practice among lay Muslims.  As the term 
reformist suggests, these movements were armed with a sense of urgency in remedying 
what was seen by many elites as the degraded and weakened state of Muslims and 
Islamicate culture.   
I have mentioned above that the “purification” of lay Muslim practice and belief 
was a primary goal of these reformist movements, and this remains true in the 
contemporary world.  Muslim practice focused on Sufi shrines and the cults of Sufi saints 
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is chief among the targets of reformist Islam, as many reformist groups consider these 
forms of practice to have deviated from the tenets central to Islam: monotheism (tawhid) 
and opposition to idol worship.   
Among the various reformist movements that continue to have an impact on the 
contemporary world, the Tablighi Jama’at is now one of the most extensive.  Begun in 
the early 20
th
 century in North India by Muhammad Ilyas, this organization has grown 
over the past century into one of the most influential reformist movements in the world 
today, with a huge following in South Asia and beyond.  The growth and impact of this 
movement can be credited to two distinct aspects of this organization: 1) its focus on 
changing lay Muslim practice and belief, especially among the rural and urban poor; and 
2) the use of lay Muslims as missionaries to carry out the reformist message of the 
Tablighi Jama’at.  These dual tactics have resulted in many millions of Muslims in India 
being drawn away from shrine-based Sufism, thus making this organization a cause for 
great anxiety and anger among adherents of shrine-based Sufism in South Asia.  For this 
reason, my dissertation focuses primarily on the Tablighi Jama’at as one of the main 
antagonists to which adherents of shrine-based Sufism respond.   
In chapter 2, I discuss these points of opposition in detail.  I also delineate the 
sources of religious authority claimed by reformist Muslims in leveling these charges 
against shrine-based Sufism.  Adherents of shrine-based Sufism self-identify as Muslims, 
and needless to say take these accusations of being un-Islamic very seriously.  The 
complex response that adherents give to reformist critique is presented in chapter 4.    
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As with the dearth of scholarship on modern and contemporary Sufism, 
scholarship on reformist groups also suffers from a lacuna in the study of the late-
medieval and the modern era.  Scholarship on the Tablighi Jama’at and similar Sufi 
reformist groups is especially lacking.  Barbara Metcalf (2006) has noted that this lacuna 
extends to reformist institutions, and their functioning, organizational set-up, and 
influence outside of a 21
st
 century political lens (p. 29).  Her work on Sufi reformist 
institutions such as Deoband and the Tablighi Jama’at (1982; 2006), and her special focus 
on Islamic education (2006; 2007) have gone a long way in filling this lacuna.  Especially 
relevant to this dissertation is Metcalf’s examination of the bureaucratization and 
privatization of religion in South Asia starting in the late 19
th
 century (2006: 30, 280).  
This trend within Muslim reformist groups has pitted them directly against shrine-based 
Sufism, where religion, ritual and sacred power are experienced and performed in the 
very public space of the Sufi shrine.  
A very important work that came out this past decade is an edited volume titled, 
Travellers in Faith (2000), which features exclusively essays on the growth and 
development of the Tablighi Jama’at as a transnational movement.  Especially 
informative for me is the essay by Muhammad Khalid Masud (who is also the editor of 
this volume), Ideology and Legitimacy.  Considering the general dearth of scholarship on 
the Tablighi Jama’at, this essay provides much-needed context and critical analysis of the 
Tablighi Jama’at’s history, methods, and ideology.  His problematization of the concepts 
of “revivalism” and “fundamentalism” as used by reformist groups is pertinent to this 
dissertation.  To use his own words:  
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Uses of the terms “revivalism” or “fundamentalism” lead one to believe that what 
is being revived are well-defined ideologies, principles, fundamentals or 
doctrines.  But in fact the ideologies presented by the revivalist or fundamentalist 
movements are new constructions, and that is why their legitimacy is contested 
like any other ideologies. [p. 79] 
Considering that reformist groups often levy the accusation that the beliefs and practices 
of shrine-based Sufism are heretical innovations (bid’at), it is important to note that these 
reformist groups are themselves very new entrants to the field and have also negotiated 
challenging ideological and theological terrain vis-à-vis oppositional co-religionists.  
This past decade has also seen scholarship on reformist and piety movements 
outside of the South Asian context.  Hirschkind’s The Ethical Soundscape (2006) and 
Mahmood’s Politics of Piety (2005) both stand out as works that present these 
movements as complex ones, with which adherents engage through layered motivations.  
I have found Hirschkind’s work especially useful in its presentation of lay engagement 
with Muslim reformist media as a form of aspirational religious practice.  Listening (both 
active and passive, in private and in public, in groups and alone) is a powerful form of 
engagement.  The aural environment of India, as with Egypt in the case of Hirschkind’s 
work, is awash with sacred voices and sounds that defy the characterization of the public 
square as a necessarily secular space, but that also do not preclude the diversity of 
religious voices in it.   
Over the past decade, and importantly, in a post-9/11 world, these scholars have 
done a great deal to humanize reformists, and to bring coherent discussions of their 
ideologies and goals to the fore.  However, much of the scholarship has focused on the 
workings of these organizations vis-à-vis secular political structures and against the 
backdrop of non-religious discourses in the public arena.  The interaction between 
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reformist groups and their non-reformist co-religionists has been largely ignored.  Where 
the oppositional stances of reformist groups are brought up, the discussion is presented 
largely in terms of the ideological stances of these groups and not as a point of tension, 
negotiation and conflict between various groups.   
Earlier ethnographic works have touched upon identity politics and identity 
formation within sects and groups vis-à-vis co-religionists who stand outside such 
bounded religious groups.  The Hindu, Muslim and animist traditions of South East Asia 
have drawn anthropological interest for decades, and the question of how to parse these 
traditions have especially intrigued ethnographers in this region.  Geertz, in his book, The 
Religion of Java (1960), structurally divided Javanese society into three groups: santri 
(Orthodox Muslims), priyayi (Hindu-influenced nobility), abangan (animists in rural 
areas), and concluded that most Javanese were Muslim only by name due to a variety of 
Javanese traditions and religious practices that Geertz identified as not being Muslim at 
all.  In this, Geertz echoed the contentions of the Muslim orthodoxy that “syncretic” 
Javanese traditions were antithetical to Islam.     
In his book Islam in Java (1989), Mark Woodward reiterates the criticism that 
Hodgson (1974) leveled at Geertz in that the latter tended to use the yardstick of the 
orthodoxy to measure the authenticity of Muslim belief and practice of the Javanese.  
Reflecting on his own initial attempts to “trace the ‘Hindu’ elements of the ideologies and 
ritual modalities” of Javanese Muslim practice, Woodward concludes that any 
resemblance that there are between the two are “trivial” and do not bear out on closer 
examination (pp. 2-3).  Woodward addresses an important issue: that of a truly 
anthropological approach to religion and religious practice; an approach to Muslim 
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practice, in which we examine the self-identification of groups, and use that as our 
starting point, rather than attempting to place these groups on a scale of authenticity from 
“syncretic” to “orthodox”.  As Woodword succinctly puts it, “religious discord is based 
not on the differential acceptance of Islam by Javanese of various social positions, but on 
the age-old Islamic question of how to balance the legalistic and mystical dimensions of 
the tradition” (p. 3).   Through this dissertation, I have attempted to add depth to this 
conversation by presenting points of Muslim reformist critique not merely as static 
positions on Islamic doctrine and practice, but as dynamic sites of contestation and 
identity-formation.   
NARRATIVES OF INDIAN MULTICULTURALIST SECULARISM  
Germane to understanding the dynamic responses of adherents of shrine-based 
Sufism are the narratives on religion and secularism that are such a marked aspect of the 
Indian nation-state.  The responses of adherents of shrine-based Sufism to reformist 
critique are not produced in a vacuum; they function within the socio-political milieu of 
the Indian nation-state, and all the accompanying implications for Muslims as a minority 
population in a part of the world where religion and politics have often been antagonistic, 
if not strange, bedfellows.   
The preamble to the Indian constitution defines India as a “sovereign, socialist, 
secular, democratic republic.”  I identify the kind of secularism that has developed in 
India since its independence as multiculturalist secularism, as it is quite different from 
the Western European or American models.  It is marked by the sharing of the public 
sphere by various religions as opposed to the exclusion of religion from the public 
sphere.  It is a form of secularism that acknowledges India’s religious and cultural 
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diversity and includes expressions of this diversity in its public manifestations.  Marked 
by phrases such as “Unity in Diversity” and an emphasis on “National Integration”, 
Indian multiculturalist secularism results in a favoring of religious identities that are fluid 
and have fuzzy edges, so to speak
3
.  While the term ‘syncretism’ has been much-
maligned in Euro-American scholarship, the narratives of the Indian nation-state present 
it as a positive attribute.  The corollary to this is that religious identities that are rigid and 
bounded are characterized as antithetical to the Indian ideal and threatening to the 
integrity of the nation.   
These conceptions of what is and what is not ideal religious subjecthood in India 
are spread through state-generated media such as public service messaging on TV and 
billboards, and in school texts; non-state media such as TV programming, commercial 
cinema, music and popular literature for children and adults.  In these media, many 
historical Muslim figures are presented as conforming to this standard of “syncretic” 
religious belief, and thus as an ideal of Indianness.  Shrine-based Sufism, with its cross-
religious following and its embrace of regional customs, is also upheld as the posterchild 
of Indian multiculturalist secularism.  In chapter 3, I discuss how the Indian national 
project, including the project of multiculturalist secularism, has resulted in the 
                                                          
3
The case of Indonesia and its experiments with secularism provides interesting parallels to and diversions 
from the Indian example.  Robert Hefner, in Civil Islam: Muslims and democratization in Indonesia (2000), 
provides a detailed examination of the past and continuing efforts to create ideals of religious and secular 
engagement in Indonesia’s public discourses and arenas. Lorraine Aragon, in Fields of the Lord (2000), 
discusses changing interpretations of Suharto’s pancasila philosophy in defining the role of religion in 
government, and conversely, the role of government in the regulation of religious behavior (p.310-319).   In 
an earlier essay, The Creativity of Tradition in Indonesian Religion (1986), Jaes Peacock provides us with 
an insight into the forms of social change produced by “syncretic mystical” praxis and “purist” praxis (p. 
349).  As he writes, “Indonesian polity has always been grounded in this syncretic mystical cosmology” (p. 
347).  Within the context of Hefner’s work detailing how a Muslim civil language is being crafted in 
contemporary Indonesia, and Aragon’s insights into how initial secular tenets have translated into state-use 
of churches, Peacock’s analysis of abangan or “syncretic mystical” praxis in shaping post-colonial 
Indonesia is useful in completing the picture.   
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construction of this ideal of religious subjecthood, and how certain Muslim figures and 
Sufism are co-opted into this project.   
Important figures whose ideas on secularism and the Indian nation have framed 
and informed this dissertation are Partha Chatterjee and Gyanendra Pandey.  Chatterjee 
has identified what he has called a “contradiction of secularism in India” (2007) in an 
essay of that name, and in another essay titled Secularism and Toleration (1997).  He 
argues that while there seems to be will among political leaders to separate religion from 
the workings of the state, the functioning of the state has not quite met this desire.  The 
Indian state continues to have its many arms elbow-deep in religious issues (Chatterjee 
2007: 143).  
What Chatterjee describes as a “contradiction”, however, I think of as a defining 
characteristic of Indian secularism.  He, however, is not satisfied with the notion that 
secularism takes on a different meaning in India than in Euro-America.  To him, the 
dilemmas that arise because of the way in which the purportedly secular Indian state 
engages with religious communities necessitate the conclusion that “Indian secularism” is 
not a concept that is stable and internally-reconciled enough to be regarded as a fully-
formed political entity in its own right (Chatterjee 1997: 241-248).  While I acknowledge 
that Chatterjee raises a pertinent point, I have not engaged with this particular quandary 
in this dissertation, as I believe that it has the danger of getting us caught up in the 
nuances of nomenclature and definitions.  For the purposes of this dissertation, I have 
discussed the nature of what I call India’s multiculturalist secularism.  This is not to say 
that I take a celebratory or absolutist view of secularism in India.  However, I do take the 
ways in which secularism functions in India as a given, and then proceed to engage with 
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the problematic national and religious subjecthoods that arise from India’s brand of 
secularism.   
One of the Chatterjee essays I have referenced above can be found in an important 
volume published under the title, The Crisis of Secularism in India (2007).  In this same 
volume can be found an essay by Gyanendra Pandey titled, The Secular State and the 
Limits of Dialogue (157-176).  Here, Pandey starts by lucidly defining the peculiarity of 
Indian multiculturalist secularism:  
The concept of secularism has in our time been somewhat detached from its 
filiation with the process of secularization and the expansion of the secular (as 
opposed to “sacred”) dimension of public life.  It has come instead to be linked 
more and more to the idea of the recognition and acceptance of difference.  The 
question of secularism has been posed as a question of pluralism, or of tolerance 
between diverse religious and cultural communities. [p. 156] 
In this sense secularism is conceived as an act of “parleying” (p. 156).  Pandey goes on to 
say, however, that in practice, this notion of secularism allows for toleration but not easy 
communication, as it is seldom clear who is to converse with whom in the resolution of 
religious issues.   
This notion of an unclear mode of, and arena for, dialogue has framed my 
understanding of the identity-narratives of adherents of shrine-based Sufism.  The desired 
Muslim subjecthood projected by the Indian nation state and by secularists and 
spiritualists within it necessitates a response from adherents.  But where is this response 
to be made?  To whom, and how?  There is no direct line of communication, and so we 
must glean the stance of adherents vis-à-vis multiculturalist secular appropriations of 
their mode of religious practice by looking at their responses to Muslim reformist 
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critique.  These are the complex scripts and dramatic asides that are a result of the “limits 
of dialogue” that Pandey writes of.   
FIELD SITES 
I carried out my field-research for this project from February 2009 to March 2010.  
The two primary sites of research were the shrine of Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia in Delhi, 
and that of Khaja Bandanawaz Gesudaraz in Gulbarga.  I began research at the latter site, 
living in Gulbarga from February 2009 to May 2009, and returning for an extended stay 
during the death anniversary celebrations of Saint Khaja Bandanawaz in November.  I 
spent the rest of my research time in Delhi at the shrine of Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia.  I 
give a brief overview of these two sites in the section below, while presenting a more 
detailed account in chapter 1. 
It is important to note at the outset that while I spent much of my time in the field 
at these two Sufi shrines, this dissertation is not an ethnography of the shrines per se, 
where the main purpose is a detailed description of a shrine and its activities (though I do 
give the reader an account of these).  In this dissertation I treat these shrines and the 
communities surrounding them as microcosms that reflect broader socio-religious and 
political trends (at a national and a global level).  My conversations with interlocutors 
and my observations at these field-sites give insights into the larger question of how the 
socio-cultural and political milieux of a nation-state affect intra-religious disputes.  
Having said that, my methods would certainly be considered ethnographic, and my 
experiences conducting research are also fairly typical of an anthropologist in the field.  I 
detail these methods in the section that follows.  
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My first site of research was the shrine of Khaja Bandanawaz Gesudaraz.  This 
site is the major Chishti Sufi shrine of southern India, and draws visitors from all over 
Southern India and beyond.  This saint and his shrine dominate the city of Gulbarga; 
streets, stores and organizations are named for him, and the shrine itself funds an 
educational trust that runs many institutions throughout the city.   
I chose this shrine as a site of research because of its regional significance and 
local influence. What kind of an impact (social and religious) did the shrine have on the 
lives of Muslims in Gulbarga?  Did the dominant presence of the shrine, through its 
secular educational institutions, influence the religious outlook of Gulbarga’s Muslims?  
Did it, for instance, make them less inclined to heed Sufi reformist critique of shrine 
practice?  Did the social contributions of the shrine to the city and particularly to its 
poorer Muslims have a favorable impact on how they viewed shrine-based Sufism?  
These were some of the questions I hoped would be answered through research here.  
The next major field-site was the shrine of Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia, which is the 
most important Sufi shrine in terms of popularity and historical significance in the city of 
Delhi.  It draws millions of visitors annually from all over the Subcontinent and central 
Asia.  The shrine is certainly an integral part of the spiritual and religious lives of many 
denizens of Delhi, and is often a part of people’s daily or weekly routines.  The complex 
mix of people who are drawn to this shrine and its continued significance in such a 
massive city were the main aspects of the shrine that drew me to it as a site for research.   
But aside from the importance that the shrine of Hazrat Nizamuddin Auliya holds 
for adherents of shrine-based Sufism in Delhi and beyond, the neighborhood of 
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Nizamuddin was of particular interest to me for another reason: at the head of the 
alleyway that leads to the shrine sits the headquarters of the Tablighi Jama’at, a reformist 
organization whose teachings often challenge the legitimacy of shrine-based Sufism as a 
form of Islamic practice.  The headquarters consist of a dormitory for men where 
reformist missionaries and young initiates stay, and a large mosque which draws many 
from the community for the five ritual prayers (namaz) each day.   
Young men join the Tablighi Jama’at4, which has now become a global 
movement and participate in missionary activities, preaching a way of life that they 
believe is rooted in Islam and that is guided by the life of the Prophet Muhammad.  The 
Jama’at claim over knowledge of Islamic practice and identity, of what it means to be 
Muslim, brings it in direct conflict with adherents of shrine-based Sufism who also make 
claims to religious legitimacy.  There occurs in that alleyway between the Tablighi 
Jama’at headquarters and the shrine of Hazrat Nizamuddin Auliya, contestations over 
sacred space, following, and religious knowledge that have a direct impact on those who 
adhere to shrine-based Sufism, on their religious self-definition, and their assertions of 
religious authenticity.  
METHODS 
Ethnographic fieldwork was my primary research method.   I spent approximately 
one year in India carrying out research for this project.  As I have detailed above, I 
                                                          
4 The Tablighi Jama’at is open to women as well. However, their role and level of involvement is 
considerably different.  Unlike male initiates, women do not engage in door-to-door missionary work, nor 
do they travel further afield to set up religious schools or Tablighi Jama’at centers.  Women initiates focus 
instead on proselytizing to female members of their family and immediate community.  They set up groups 
that meet in their homes for the purpose of prayer, reading of the Quran, and discussion of the prophetic 
sayings.  
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divided my time between the Khaja Bandanawaz shrine in Gulbarga, and the Hazrat 
Nizamuddin Auliya shrine in New Delhi.  But as with most attempts at ethnographic 
research, it became practically impossible to restrict myself exclusively to my chosen 
research sites.  During my time in India, I found that connections and conversations often 
led me to places I had not initially intended to go.  I found that keeping my eyes and ears 
open regardless of where I was made me aware of the broader ramifications of the 
questions I was asking.  I found answers in places I did not expect to find them, and I 
found that my questions gained more complexity and nuance from these unexpected 
encounters.     
Aside from the many months I spent at the Khaja Banganawaz shrine and the 
Hazrat Nizamuddin Auliya shrine, I also had the opportunity to visit a few smaller 
shrines and other sites related to Sufism.   Early during my fieldwork, I travelled to the 
small shrine of Baba Budhan in the highlands of the southern state of Karnataka with Dr. 
Anna Bigelow of North Carolina State University.  I travelled with her as a translator of 
Kannada, the language predominantly spoken in this region.  Over the past decade, the 
shrine has become a fraught location; its sacred space being contested by Sufi Muslims 
and by right-wing Hindu groups.  The trip was eye-opening in many ways, and I was able 
to meet members of the shrine community, secular advocates and activists, and right-
wing Hindu organizers who were all embroiled in protracted proceedings over shrine 
ownership.  I also visited the shrine of Bu Ali Shah Qalandar in Panipat (a town a few 
hours west of Delhi) with my Fulbright-Hays advisor Dr. Azizuddin Husain.  The visit to 
this shrine brought home to me the complicated politics of shrine-patronage when sacred 
space is shared among various religious communities.  
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A very interesting and productive detour for me was the southern Indian city of 
Bangalore, where I was able to engage with the International Sufi Centre and its founder, 
Dr. Peeran.  I attended the Centre’s monthly seminar, participated in group discussions 
that included members of the Centre and others who were interested in Sufism, and had 
many illuminating conversations about Sufism with Dr. Peeran.   
Most of my time, however, was spent at the two main sites of my research.  
Before I left for the field, I had presumed that my primary methods of data-collection 
would be extended interviews with individuals whom I had identified as valuable 
resources.  However, on arriving in Gulbarga in early 2009, I discovered that my 
recorder, my schedule of questions, and the consent forms with which I was armed would 
all be of little use to me during my stay.   The very act of signing a consent form, for 
instance, made my interlocutors quite suspicious, or at least wary, of my motives.  Was I 
working for the government (of the US, or of India)?  Was I a journalist in search of a 
sensational exposé?  Why did they have to sign something?  The written consent forms 
were official and bureaucratic in essence, and I had not anticipated the depth of suspicion 
that my interlocutors felt for all things bureaucratic.   
I also soon realized that my recorder made my interlocutors self-conscious and 
quite uncomfortable.  They identified the recorder and the formal interview as something 
reserved for “experts” and elites (intellectual, economic, social).   My interlocutors were 
quite ready to talk to me about Sufism, but when I would ask permission to tape our 
conversations, they would often demur.   “Oh, why are you recording this? I don’t know 
enough about Sufism.  I am just a believer, just an ordinary Muslim,” or some variation 
25 
 
on that theme was usually the response to my request to record.  These interlocutors 
would then defer to some higher authority with whom they thought I should talk instead.   
After my attempts at formal and informal recorded interviews were thwarted 
repeatedly, I decided that unrecorded informal conversations, and informal oral 
disclosure and consent would work much better.  The disadvantage of interviews and 
conversations with no audio record is the lack of complete oral narratives regarding the 
topic at hand.  The option to go back and listen to these, to be able to listen for tone of 
voice, for nuanced utterances etc. is of course invaluable.  However, even though I was 
not able to obtain audio recordings of my conversations with my interlocutors, I 
compensated for this by jotting notes throughout these, and then following up with 
detailed explications of these short notes.  After the first few weeks at the two shrines, 
most whom I regularly encountered there (shrine caretakers, librarians, preachers, 
teachers, students and adherents) recognized me as the student from the American 
university who was doing research on Sufism.  I no longer had to introduce myself and 
explain my presence in their midst, and I received fewer curious glances as I furiously 
jotted my notes.   
As an Indian fluent in Hindi, Urdu, and Kannada (of which I am a native speaker), 
I was able to interact with my interlocutors with relative linguistic ease.  I did not need an 
interpreter, and as a woman of South Asian origin, I did not become the focus of attention 
at any research site (which, many of my non-South Asian colleagues have told me, poses 
quite an impediment during fieldwork).  However, I did find that looking and talking like 
my interlocutors also had its disadvantages.  Many ethnographers have relayed how they 
often get “adopted” in the field by their interlocutors.  They are taken in by a family, 
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shown the ropes and eased into the routines of daily life.  To some extent, this has to do 
with the prestige that, in many communities, accrues from having a foreigner in-
residence.  Also, since the ethnographer is so obviously an outsider, it is presumed that 
he/she is in need of guidance and support.  I too was an outsider at my field-sites; both 
Gulbarga and Delhi were new to me, and the ritual and social life of shrine-communities 
was not one I had much familiarity with outside of the context of research.  However, I 
was often not perceived as a lost foreigner by my interlocutors.  They never presumed 
that I did not know my way around, that I needed introductions to and instructions on 
various aspects of living in their world.  And yet, I was a Hindu doing research among 
Muslims, and the difference in religion was obvious to my interlocutors (my name is a 
recognizably Hindu one).  There certainly must have been things (conversations, events, 
knowledge) that were off-limits to me, or at least not readily proffered.  Being both an 
outsider and an insider, in a sense, meant that I often had to map out intricate routes and 
networks of interaction.  I had to find ways to get invited to events, to be at the right 
place at the right time.   
Contributing to this initial angst was my expectation that I would have something 
perceivably productive or structured to do every day in the field.  Arriving at my field-
sites, I soon realized that my days stretched out interminably before me, and I had to 
often content myself with just being somewhere, rather than doing something.  That my 
physical presence somewhere with my radar on so to speak, was essentially productive, 
was a lesson hard-learned.   
 To allow for productive conversations, to get to know the people of the shrine, 
and to learn what they were learning, one of the first things I did was to enroll in the 
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religious school (madrassa) run by the Khaja Bandanawaz shrine in Gulbarga.  The 
religious school was a large hall located right next to the main tomb of the shrine.  It was 
primarily a boys’ school, where young boys received training in the memorization of the 
Quran (hifz) Quranic recitation (qir’a), and Quranic exegesis (tafsir) for more advanced 
students.  Annexed to this larger hall was a small room that served as the girls’ school, 
where girls and young women from the local community gathered everyday to memorize 
the Quran.  The school had two main male religious scholars (maulvi) and a few other 
male and female teachers who assisted them in their tasks.  The school followed a 
syllabus for Islamic education set by the Jami’a Nizamia, a prominent religious seminary 
located in the southern city of Hyderabad.   
Needless to say, I attended school with the female students in the annex.  As 
mentioned above, the school only offered memorization lessons to the female students.  
However, on my request, the chief custodian of the shrine was gracious enough to ask 
one of the school’s religious scholars (whom I will refer to henceforth as Maulvi Sahab) 
to give daily lectures on Quranic exegesis to me and other female students in attendance.  
This turned out to be a bonanza of data for me.  For one, it was very insightful to learn 
the ways in which adherents of shrine-based Sufism parse Quranic verses and prophetic 
sayings (hadis).   Much of the literature on exegesis I had read thus far had come from 
decidedly reformist quarters, and I was deeply interested to know what “the other side” 
had to say.  But more importantly, I found that the tangential narratives of Maulvi Sahab, 
the exchanges between the students and the teachers, and their collective and individual 
engagement with the texts and their faith, gave me a glimpse into a world to which I 
would have otherwise had little or no access.   
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On further reflection, I found that I valued greatly the interactions I had with the 
students and the teachers at the school; in some ways more than some of my individual 
and private conversations with interlocutors.  I am not implying that the fact that this was 
a religious school, and that one of my primary interlocutors here was a religious scholar 
lent authenticity to what was said there.  What I mean is that when I heard narratives in 
such group settings, where most who were listening were lay adherents of shrine-based 
Sufism, and I was the only outsider, I felt reassured that what I heard was not being said 
solely for my benefit.  A concern that plagues many ethnographers is the question, “How 
do I know that they are not merely telling me what they think I want to hear?”  While at 
the school, Maulvi Sahab would deliver his lectures to all the female students present 
there; he would pause for their questions, ask them questions, make eye-contact with 
them and engage with them thoroughly.  Although these lectures were occurring solely 
due to my requesting them, he never addressed them primarily to me; I was just one 
among the other students (and I daresay, one who did not know half as much as the others 
did on the topic at hand).  Sitting among the other students in the little school-room each 
day also allowed me to build a rapport with these young women and with Maulvi Sahab 
quite quickly.  Some of the female students at the school later confided to me that when 
they heard that a researcher from America was going to be joining them, they had 
expected someone quite glamorous and unapproachable!  But my daily presence at the 
school allowed for my relationship with them and the teacher to develop into one of 
friendship and mutual respect. 
A regular haunt during my months in Gulbarga was the Khaja Bandanawaz 
shrine’s library.  This tiny room in the back courtyard of the shrine complex is a veritable 
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treasure-trove; its collection includes rare copies of the Quran and important manuscripts 
of hagiographies, philosophical and theological commentary, and exegesis.  Keeping a 
close eye on this treasure was Altaf Sahab, a retired civil servant who now served as the 
shrine’s librarian.  I spent many hours in this little room with Altaf Sahab for company, 
reading the day’s newspapers and talking about our day.  My conversations with him, and 
a few others who stopped by the library, were often insightful.  Altaf Sahab’s kindly 
nature and amiability almost instantly put me at ease, and I felt very comfortable talking 
to him about nearly whatever was on my mind.  In those first lonely months in Gulbarga, 
Altaf Sahab’s welcoming smile and frank conversation became a source of both comfort 
and insight for me.   
Another welcoming presence at the Khajabandanawaz shrine was the shrine’s 
secretary, Ziauddin Sahab.  An efficient and kind man, it was his job to make sure that 
the shrine and all its services ran smoothly.   He was a very busy man on most days, but 
he would always invite me into his office and offer me a cup of tea if he saw me lingering 
outside.  These little visits to his office were eye-opening.  The intricacies of the shrine’s 
operations played out in front of me as I sat in a quiet corner of his office or at his table 
with my cup of tea.  During moments of respite between the various tasks that demanded 
his attention, Ziauddin Sahab would talk to me about the shrine, about the Saint and 
about Sufi Islam.  Like Altaf Sahab, Ziauddin Sahab was a lay adherent of shrine-based 
Sufism who nonetheless had an insider’s view of the shrine and shrine-based Sufism.  
They often offered to me glimpses of this unique vantage point, which helped in many 
ways to clarify some questions, and to raise others.  
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At the shrine of Hazrat Nizamuddin Auliya in New Delhi, my days were far less 
structured than in Gulbarga.  The shrine here does not have a religious school open to 
girls, and so that was not an option for me.  However, during an initial exploratory visit to 
this shrine a few years ago, I had made a few important contacts among the shrine’s 
hereditary caretakers.  These contacts proved invaluable to me as I began my research at 
this shrine.  One of my primary interlocutors at this shrine was Nooruddin Nizami Sahab, 
with whom I spent many evenings seated at the foot of the tomb of Hazrat Nizamuddin 
Auliya (and whom I quoted at the start of this introduction).  Another very important 
interlocutor was Amjad Nizami Sahab, an aged Sufi scholar and caretaker of the shrine of 
his father, a Sufi master in his own right.  Though I was not able to spend a lot of time 
with Amjad Nizami Sahab, the three long visits I had with him were very insightful, and 
gave me a fresh perspective on many of my research questions.   
In addition to these primary interlocutors, the lay visitors to these Sufi shrines 
proved to be invaluable resources.  Most of the lay visitors I encountered came from very 
poor rural or lower-income urban communities.  This was especially true of the shrine of 
Khaja Bandanawaz.  Both shrines, however, drew people from a wide demographic 
range, and interacting with these lay visitors allowed me to gain an insight into what the 
shrine meant to those not closely associated with its management or its heritage.    
When I first began fieldwork, it was with the intention of doing ethnography 
among both adherents of shrine-based Sufism as well as with Sufi reformists.  However, 
in the first few weeks in the field, it became apparent to me that this would be hard to 
achieve.  I began my fieldwork in Gulbarga, at the shrine of Khaja Bandanawaz 
Gesudaraz.  I had initially hoped to be introduced to, or to find contacts among Tablighi 
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Jama’at initiates in Gulbarga.  As a woman working in a largely sex-segregated 
environment, I knew that groups of male initiates and the Jama’at schools for boys would 
be off-limits to me.  However, the Tablighi Jama’at did have groups of female initiates 
who hosted small group sessions in their homes.  I hoped to eventually have some access 
to these. 
As I have discussed above, Gulbarga is a relatively small city, and the shrine-
community is a very densely populated neighborhood around the Sufi shrine.  I soon 
found that my comings and goings were clearly noted and commented on by everyone 
from the shrine’s secretary to the rickshaw drivers waiting outside the shrine’s walls.  I 
also realized that there was quite a bit of animosity and suspicion regarding the Tablighi 
Jama’at among adherents of shrine-based Sufism.  While my being a Hindu woman doing 
research on Sufi Islam was more a matter of positive curiosity among the people I 
initially encountered at the shrine, my association with an American institution did 
disconcert some people.  I was asked often enough if I had anything to do with the 
government of the United States, and why some institution in America would be 
interested in their Sufi shrine.  I tried my best to explain to them the nature of my 
research and its goals, and the nature of academic research in the United States.   
Even though I looked and spoke like my interlocutors did (dressing as they did, 
using the same language (Urdu) as them, and being an Indian myself) I was still an 
outsider.  And as an outsider who was attempting to build rapport and trust with members 
of the shrine community, it seemed to me that any association I developed with the 
Tablighi Jama’at would be noticed and would impede my progress.  For this reason, 
while in Gulbarga, I did not attempt to make any formal connections with members of the 
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Tablighi Jama’at.  When my research moved to Delhi, a decidedly larger environ than 
Gulbarga, I hoped there to make some connections with reformist groups.  But here, I 
found it very difficult to find introductions to Jama’at initiates or higher ups.  My 
attempts at trying to speak to officials at the Tablighi Jama’at headquarters were 
rebuffed; I was told that women were not allowed into any part of the building and I 
never made it past the threshold.   
While I was thus not able to carry out fieldwork for an extended period of time 
within the organization of the Tablighi Jama’at, I had no dearth of interlocutors whose 
ideologies were decidedly reformist in character, and who had been influenced by 
Jama’at missionizing.  The reach and the popularity of this and other reformist groups in 
India is quite extensive, and I was able to meet and engage with Muslims with reformist 
leanings and beliefs often enough.   It is a common experience for ethnographers that 
some of the most interesting “ethnographic moments” occur with chance encounters.   
I found that those who were not adherents of shrine-based Sufism generally did 
not belong to, or were not active members of, any one Muslim reformist group.  Most of 
the time, it was more that their beliefs and practices had been shaped by the reformist 
teachings of a number of groups and individuals.  I did find that with my younger male 
interlocutors, especially those of a lower economic class, the Tablighi Jama’at played 
more of a direct impact on their religiosity.  
Another important source of information regarding reformist ideology was 
various audio-visual and text media.  Reformist pamphlets, books, cassette and CD 
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sermons, TV shows and newspaper articles were all very useful in gaining an insight into 
reformist critique of shrine-based Sufi practice and belief.   
LANGUAGES, TEXTS, AND NARRATIVES 
Early in my graduate work at the UNC, I decided that my research as an 
ethnographer would be enhanced by a greater knowledge of Islamic (and especially Sufi) 
texts, religious and political history, and theology.  To this end, I undertook the study of 
Arabic and Persian.  I familiarized myself with the Quran in its original Arabic, with 
Persian Sufi poetry by Sufi masters such as Rumi, Hafez, and Sa’adi, and with the 
various hagiographies of South Asian saints.   
So when I set out to carry out ethnographic fieldwork in India, I felt well-
equipped with basic knowledge of the Quran, and of Sufi hagiographies and poetry.  Not 
only did knowledge of these texts and traditions prove to be invaluable to me, but the 
very fact of my knowing textual Persian and Arabic opened doors to me that I had not 
anticipated.  As a female Hindu student from the United States, I was a rank outsider to 
the world of Sufism.  I soon found that my linguistic skills and my familiarity with 
various sacred and theological texts lent me a measure of credibility as a scholar.  My 
interlocutors, many of whom were initially guarded in their responses, opened up to me 
once they realized that I was far from ignorant of Islamic and Sufi textual traditions.   
During my initial visits to Delhi a few years before I started my fieldwork, I found 
that ignorance of Islamic texts on my part was a serious impediment to being able to 
communicate with many people regarding Sufism and Islam.  I would introduce myself 
as someone doing research on Sufism, and this was often met with questions regarding 
religious texts.   My lack of knowledge of hagiographies, or Quranic verses seemed to put 
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people off, and they seemed dubious of my credibility as a scholar of anything pertaining 
to Islam.   
This was a problem I did not face during fieldwork, and I was quite surprised at 
how much of a difference my background research had made.  Not only were my 
interlocutors more open to talking to me about Sufism  in particular and Islam in general, 
but my knowledge of these texts and these languages allowed me to catch references that 
my interlocutors made that I otherwise would have missed.  References to Quranic or 
Sufi verses, and to narratives from hagiographies would have been lost to me had I not 
delved into these texts prior to the commencement of my research.  There were many 
instances when my interlocutors would begin to narrate an incident from the life of a 
saint: a narrative that I was familiar with.  My facial expression and body language 
bespoke this familiarity, or I would participate in the narration of the tale.  This 
familiarity on my part was met with pleasure and approval on the part of my interlocutors 
(whether they were scholars, ritual experts, shrine custodians or lay adherents), and 
allowed me to develop a rapport, and in some instances a relationship of affection and 
respect, with these members of the community.   
One particular relationship that stands out from all my field encounters was that 
which I was able to develop with the teacher, Maulvi Sahab, at the Khaja Bandanawaz 
shrine’s religious school.  As I have mentioned above, I sat with the female students daily 
in the little room annexed to the main religious school for boys, and Maulvi Sahab would 
join us to lecture on Quranic exegesis and commentary.  On the first day of my 
attendance, Maulvi Sahab began his lecture by pointedly saying that the Quran was a 
pure and sacred text and could not even be touched by a non-Muslim and without the 
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performance of ablutions.  Needless to say, I did not touch any of the Qurans in the room.  
As the days progressed, and Maulvi Sahab began to realize that I was no stranger to 
knowledge of Islam, I could see that his demeanor towards me warmed considerably.  He 
began to interact with me less as an ignorant, lay outsider and more as someone who, like 
him, was a scholar, a teacher, and a student.   
When I visited the shrine for the final time before returning to the United States, 
the Maulvi Sahab asked that I meet him in the boys’ school, a male bastion for certain.  I 
sat by him on the cool floor of the school room.  He beckoned to some of the older 
students in attendance and introduced me as “Rachana” (emphasizing my Hindu name), 
who had come from America to study Sufism.  He then handed me a beautiful leather-
bound Quran, which he said included the best Urdu translation of the text he knew of.  I 
opened it to the first book of the Quran, and as I read the text, a question about 
differences in how a particular word is pronounced and consequently translated occurred 
to me.  He answered my question, and then pausing, he said that this copy of the Quran 
was for me to keep.  I found his gesture deeply touching, and recognized it as an 
acknowledgement that our relationship had grown to one of warmth and mutual respect.  
In this and other ways, my familiarity with Islamic texts and Sufi narrative traditions 
broke down many of the barriers that my gender, my religion, and my institutional 
affiliation initially posed.   
My knowledge of Islamic texts, though, did pose a very interesting and 
unexpected dilemma for me.  On several occasions, my lay interlocutors approached me 
for advice and guidance on theological issues.  I was entirely unprepared for this 
response, and I honestly felt quite uncomfortable being put in a position to pass judgment 
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on Islamic practice and belief.  On these occasions, my interlocutors asked me if certain 
aspects of Sufi practice were un-Islamic, if Islamic reformist groups or adherents of 
shrine-based Sufism had the right end of the argument.  Firstly, in no way was my 
knowledge of Islamic theology and Sufi texts deep enough to be able to make such a call!  
And secondly, as an anthropologist, I did not feel like I was in an ethical position to 
comment in favor of one side or the other.  After all, I was in the field in order to learn 
about Islam and about Sufi practice and belief from my interlocutors: an anthropological 
approach to the study of religion.  To then be asked by these same interlocutors what was 
Islamic and what was un-Islamic left me feeling dissonant to say the least.  My usual 
response to such queries was to present to my questioners the complexities of the debate 
at hand.  This did not always satisfy them, but I did feel like I left them with more 
information to make their own judgments than they had come with.  But these encounters 
brought home to me how important textuality and language were to the construction of 
religious identity.  So much so, that lay Muslims felt the need to approach a non-Muslim 
with some textual knowledge of Islam to resolve a religious question.   
Thus far I have addressed how my knowledge of Islamic texts affected my 
engagement with interlocutors in the field.  Islamic texts and narratives have also 
informed this dissertation at another level.  Throughout this dissertation I have engaged 
not only with my dialogues with interlocutors, but also the narratives that saturate one’s 
experience in the field.  In a sense, I have approached a wide variety of media (school 
text books, advertising, state-produced propaganda, popular movies, sacred poetry and 
secular songs, miracle stories and fiery sermons) as texts and as audio-visual narratives.   
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I have also approached these narratives as “primary texts”, so to speak, and 
through secondary retellings.  For instance, I have not only looked at hagiographic 
narratives as they are published and broadcast, but also as they are recounted, and the 
settings and formats in which these recollections are conveyed.  Here, I would like to 
acknowledge Margaret Wiener’s work, Visible and Invisible Realms (1995), in which she 
engages not only with archival narratives of Bali’s colonial “encounter”, but importantly, 
with other retellings of this moment: visual, textual, and performative.  She challenges 
the dominant narratives of this encounter, which are almost always from either a colonial 
perspective, or an ethnocentric Euro-American one, by examining counter narratives and 
Balinese retellings of the advent of colonialism in Bali.  This dissertation is an attempt to 
present a similar countervailing perspective.  First, by closely examining narratives from 
reformist quarters and from secularist media in India I have attempted to unpack the 
biases inherent to these narratives; Second, I examine narratives deployed by adherents of 
shrine-based Sufism in a variety of forms to present the same moments of “encounter” 
from the counter-hegemonic perspective.  
POSITIONING MYSELF IN THE FIELD 
The idea of a “native anthropologist”, of course has been problematized.  Kirin 
Narayan (1993) is especially astute in observing: 
the loci along which we are aligned with or set apart from those whom we study 
are multiple and in flux.  Factors such as education, gender, sexual orientation, 
class, race, or sheer duration of contacts may at different times outweigh the 
cultural identity we associate with insider or outsider status” [pp. 671-672].   
There is of course the fact that anthropologists returning to their home countries, cultures 
or communities for research are removed from their interlocutors by virtue of class, their 
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status as scholars, and also just the voyeuristic position of observers and researchers. It is 
also true that anthropologists increasingly work in urban areas with members of social 
movements or religious organizations, where the sheer size of the field, the massive 
numbers of people who populate it, and the diverse membership of groups make it quite 
impossible for the ethnographer to identify as a native in a meaningful sense.   
I have mentioned above that I was both an outsider and insider while in the field.  
I am an Indian citizen with immediate family in India, but who grew up in the Middle 
East as an NRI, a Non-Resident Indian.  The transient nature of immigrant lives in the 
Middle East leads to India occupying the position of “home” for many like me who grew 
up in wholly South Asian communities in the oil-rich but labor-deficient countries of the 
Arabian Gulf.  But NRIs are not as easily embraced as insiders by those who live in 
India.  So there is certainly some amount of dissonance between my self-identity as an 
Indian and my labeling as an NRI.  However, my native fluency in various registers of a 
number of Indian languages has meant that most Indians cannot tell that I have spent 
most of my life outside India.   
My complex positioning as a Hindu of Indian origin who has come to India from 
the United States to do research among Muslims was one that was also the cause of some 
confusion among my interlocutors.  They did not know how to make sense of me, so to 
speak.  Why was I doing research in India if I was a student in the United States?  Why 
had I gone to study in the United States if only to return to India for research?  What 
interest did I, as a Hindu, have in doing research at the Sufi shrine, especially given that 
my research did not focus on the commonalities between Hinduism and Sufi Islam?  How 
was a South Indian Hindu fluent in Urdu?  Why did I know so much about Islam?  These 
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were all questions that I encountered while in the field.  Lay adherents whom I 
encountered at the shrines were often startled when I introduced myself, as my name is 
recognizably Hindu.   
I did not encounter any real pressure to convert to Islam during field work; but 
there was certainly unfamiliarity on the part of many interlocutors with the notion of a 
secular, academic study of religion, as opposed to one spurred on by a spiritual quest.  As 
one of my major interlocutors, Maulvi Abdul Rasheed Sahab, once told me, “Don’t 
research God—search for Him!”  I heard on more than one occasion the sentiment that I 
ought to convert to Islam since I already knew and understood it to such a great degree.  
It left me feeling awkward; I found it hard to explain that my interest was an academic 
one, without feeling like a voyeur.  On a few occasions, my interlocutors asked if I was 
by any chance a Brahmin.  When I said that my mother’s side of the family was, this 
seemed to satisfy my questioners.  They reasoned that it was in the nature of Brahmins to 
seek knowledge, and after all, in the old days, it was the Brahmins at the courts of kings 
and sultans who had knowledge of Sanskrit as well as Persian and Arabic.   
Saying that my interest in the topic of my research is a purely academic enterprise 
is perhaps disingenuous.  I come from a family of freedom fighters and revolutionaries 
who had risen up against the British.  Many of these family members had been Hindu 
nationalists in their anti-colonial stance, while my grandfather had been a Gandhian 
during the movement for independence.  Also, the demolition of the Babari Mosque in 
Ayodhya in 1992 at the hands of right-wing Hindu nationalists, and the devastating 
religious violence that followed, had created a strong impression on my mind as a 10-
year old becoming aware of the world around her.  All of these factors have resulted in a 
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very strong identification on my part as an Indian, and a deep investment in conversations 
regarding Indian citizenship and the politics of religious identity in India.   
Pnina Werbner (2003), in her work, Pilgrims of Love, ruminates on the problems 
that anthropologists and their interlocutors encounter at points of tension.  Many of the 
issues I have raised above (being in many ways both an insider and an outsider, being 
academically and not spiritually interested in Sufism, not always knowing how to 
negotiate power and powerlessness while in the field) are all issues that Werbner raises as 
causing these points of tension during the ethnographic process, which in our imagining 
of it is an empathetic enterprise.  One other point that she brings up is one that I have yet 
to discuss: how to negotiate and communicate conflict within the communities that we 
anthropologists engage with.  She writes,  
In a postcolonial world, [an anthropologist’s] multiple identities are never ignored 
by her hosts, just as she cannot ignore or gloss over the internal politics and 
conflicts within the group she studies.  It is the social anthropological analysis of 
local and transnational politics, rather than simply the cultural analysis of the 
plurality of cultural voices, that reveals the hidden, often painful truths of a social 
group. [pp. 301-302] 
Here, I have to admit that there are such conflicts and tensions that are part of many 
shrine-communities that I have not engaged with fully in this dissertation.  The 
custodianship of Sufi shrines can be fraught affairs that remain unresolved for 
generations; Sufi shrines can become sites of corruption and exploitation where the faith 
of adherents is milked for financial gain; the commercialization of Sufi sacred music can 
result in the questioning of the spiritual intent of ritual musicians; and contestations over 
the gendered spaces within shrine-complexes occur regularly.  All of these issues result in 
a great deal of disharmony within shrines communities.   
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I have not engaged with these points of tension for two reasons: First, I did not 
feel that these were immediately pertinent to the larger questions I pose in this 
dissertation.  Regardless of dissent and conflict within these shrine-communities, I found 
that in the face of reformist critique and the forces of Indian multiculturalist secularism, 
adherents of shrine-based Sufism deployed similar identity-narratives across the board. 
And second, having been a guest within these communities whose members gave 
generously of their time and insight, I found that I was uncomfortable with the idea of 
then detailing the tensions within these often-small networks of people, especially since 
that was not the premise of my research to begin with.  I cannot say that I am entirely 
comfortable with having “gloss(ed) over the internal politics and conflicts within the 
group”, to use Werbner’s words.  Looking ahead, I hope that I will be able to come to 
some resolution on this front; finding that balance between the empathetic ethnographer 
and the neutral, distant scholar.  
BROADENING THE FIELD-SITE 
In addition to traditional ethnographic methods, which involved formal and 
informal interactions with lay and specialist interlocutors, I also delved into audio-visual 
and textual data available to me while in the field.   English-language and Urdu-language 
newspapers are an excellent source of data regarding religio-political issues currently 
being debated in India.  English-language newspapers and magazines often feature op-ed 
pieces about Hindu-nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism, the nature of Indian secularism 
and religious politics.  State and non-state produced public-service messaging and 
advertising are equally important sources of such information.  They serve as reflections 
of the prevailing zeitgeist, especially among India’s youth.  
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The language-politics of India and Pakistan in the wake of the Subcontinent’s 
partition led to the construction of Hindi and Urdu as two separate languages
5
.  Within 
India, Hindi (though the national language) is primarily considered a “Hindu language”, 
with Urdu then being constructed as a “Muslim language”.  The results of pre-
independence and Partition-politics, these constructions have now been largely 
internalized by the respective language media and by their audience and readership
6
.  
Thus, Urdu language newspapers are primarily geared towards a Muslim readership.  
And although Urdu language TV channels can be understood by those who consider 
themselves Hindi-speakers, their programming also caters primarily to a Muslim 
audience.    
Urdu language newspapers, such as Inqelab and Roznama Rashtriya Sahara, carry 
extensive reporting on issues considered of interest to India’s Muslims and Islam-focused 
columns and supplements on Friday (a day sacred to Muslims).  Similarly, Urdu-
language channels such as DD-Urdu (a state-run TV channel) and ETV-Urdu feature talk 
shows on religious topics, and have special programming during the month of Ramadan 
                                                          
5
Spoken, colloquial Hindi and Urdu are practically identical both in terms of grammar and vocabulary.  It is 
only when one gets to the higher registers of formal and literary Hindi and Urdu that the former becomes 
more Sanskritized and the latter more Persianized and Arabized.  The scripts of the two are mutually 
unintelligible (Hindi using the Devnagari script, which is derived from Sanskrit; and Urdu using the 
Nastaliq script, derived from Arabic).  However, since the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, the 
division between Hindi and Urdu has intensified and the two nation-states have made an intense and 
concerted effort to develop these as two separate languages.  Urdu is now the national language of Pakistan, 
and Hindi the national language of India.  Interestingly, Bollywood cinema continues to resist the division 
of the two and continues to use the colloquial amalgam, which was often called ‘Hindustani’ in the 19th and 
early 20
th
 centuries (a term less-commonly used now). 
 
6
The content of Urdu language media includes a lot of articles and programming that is specifically 
religious in content.  Other non-religious items feature elements that are widely regarded as conforming to 
a Muslim aesthetic, such as the formal recitation of Urdu poetry.   
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and during Eid.  In addition to these generally secular media
7
, there are also two major 
channels, QTV and Peace TV, that are fashioned as Islamic channels.  These text and 
audio-visual media of course gave me a glimpse of what was of interest to a Muslim 
readership and audience, but it also provided me an insight into various sides of the 
debates over correct Islamic practice and belief, and the constructions of national and 
religious identity among Indian Muslims.   
Finally, I also relied on contemporary religious tracts and literature for 
information on the kinds of material used for missionary work and for spreading 
information about Sufi Islam.  The Khaja Bandanawaz shrine’s religious school produced 
a journal in Urdu that carried essays of religious scholars on topics pertaining to Islam in 
general and Sufi Islam in particular.  Similarly, the International Sufi Centre based in 
Bangalore also produced a journal in both English and in Urdu that also contained essays, 
treatises, poems and personal testimonials.  Reformist groups also produce a vast array of 
religious material in various languages.  Some of these are manuals for missionary 
groups, and others are religious tracts about issues such as personal conduct, ritual 
activity, marriage, food, and charity etc., geared towards lay Muslims.  In addition to 
these analog texts, both shrine-based Sufi groups and Islamic reformist groups have 
websites that are geared towards a more international audience.   Religious reformist 
groups especially produce audio sermons available on cassette and CD.  I sometimes got 
the opportunity to listen to the sermons that an auto-rickshaw driver or a shopkeeper was 
                                                          
7
I consider these secular media because the goal of these channels is primarily entertainment.  Though they 
may feature shows with religious themes, most of the programming consists of soap operas, the screening 
of movies, broadcast of concerts and poetry recitals, and talk shows.  
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listening to.  These encounters gave me the opportunity to not only access the content of 
these sermons, but also observe the responses of lay listeners.    
All of these audio, visual and textual materials gave depth and context to the 
conversations that I was having with my interlocutors.  They allowed me to see larger 
patterns in the micro-level conversations that I had on a daily basis.  Through these 
materials, I was able to situate what my interlocutors were telling me within larger 
debates that were occurring nationally, internationally, and in various parts of the 
country.   
DISCUSSIONS OF ISLAM AND SUFISM IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE 
Since the events of September 11, 2001 the question of how Muslims are to be 
represented has been raised both in the popular media and in academic circles.  Though 
the characterization of certain Muslims as good and others as bad in popular and 
academic media has persisted for at least a century now, the starkness of these 
representations has become quite evident over the past decade.  The stakes of 
constructing such representations have also been raised, as has the impetus to scrutinize 
them.  What has been especially interesting this decade, are the overlaid representations 
of Muslims in the popular media, in the analyses of public-policy think-tanks and state-
intelligence networks, and in discussions of these in academic scholarship.  
When it comes to directing American foreign and domestic policy, public-policy 
think-tanks and media pundits have for a while now identified “moderate” and “liberal” 
Muslims as a demographic worthy of attention.  The contention is that in the now 
seemingly interminable “War on Terror”, strengthening this segment of the Muslim 
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population will help curb the growth of “radical Islam”.  The key argument often made in 
these circles in support of this contention is that “moderate and liberal Muslims” are more 
in tune with the values of democracy and secularism; when living in democratic states, 
these “moderate” and “liberal” Muslims are more inclined to engage with the discourses 
of the public sphere and participate in democratic, civic institutions.  The converse of 
this, of course, is that Muslims who are not deemed “moderate” and “liberal” by these 
think-tanks and pundits do not similarly participate in and engage with the various 
instruments of democracy and secularism.   
Of particular interest to me is that public-policy institutions, as well as the popular 
media, have identified Sufi Muslims as worthy of support for some of the same reasons 
mentioned above.  They also often place reformist Muslim groups (Salafi and Wahhabi 
reformists in particular) as being averse to democratic institutions of state and civic 
society, and thus not likely to be looked on favorably.  This valencing can be seen not 
only in media generated within the United States, but also in India.  
This, of course is a rather simplistic assessment.  In this section, I take a two-
pronged approach to parsing this problem.  First, I ask if such a dichotomy is valid.  That 
is, is the presumption that Sufis are necessarily (as a category) compatible with 
“Western” democratic values while others are not, a tenable position?  Second, when it is 
suggested that adherents of Sufi Islam are “natural allies of the West” (Rand Corporation 
2006:73), I ask what the implications of such a statement are for these adherents 
themselves.  
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HOW IS A ‘SUFI’ DEFINED IN THE PUBLIC DISCOURSE? 
Before diving in, however I would like to pose the question, “Who is a Sufi?”  
What do the popular media and policy pundits mean when they speak of Sufis?  When 
speaking of political allies with compatible values, is ‘Sufi’ a meaningful category?   
The category of ‘Sufi’ is certainly quite broad.  It includes hereditary custodians 
of Sufi shrines who are charged with the upkeep and maintenance of the shrine complex 
and the generation of revenue; and then we have the millions of lay Muslims for whom 
the Sufi saints and their tombs constitute an important locus of daily Islamic practice and 
belief.  Aside from these folk, there are religious scholars who explore the intellectual 
and spiritual questions raised by various schools of Sufi philosophy, or parse questions of 
legality and legitimacy of various religious and secular practices. There are ritual 
specialists who are committed to the higher spiritual practices and goals of Sufi life; these 
specialists and scholars may or may not hold Sufi shrines as an important part of their 
belief and practice.  And then, significantly, we have a substantial number of reformists 
who self-identity as Sufi, but consider the shrine space and much of shrine practice to be 
a deviation from their conception of correct Islamic practice.  Within the South Asian 
context, adherents of the Deoband seminary and the Tablighi Jama’at are examples of 
this latter group.  In addition to these various groups, there also exists considerable 
regional variation in practice and belief among Sufis who hail from South Asia, South 
East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, and Europe and America.   
As we can see, there is quite an array of people who fit under this very broad 
umbrella term ‘Sufi’.  So when an influential Rand Corporation report claims that Sufis 
are “natural allies of the West” (2006:73), who are they talking about?  When William 
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Dalrymple (journalist, historian and self-professed Indophile) writes in a Time Asia 
article that Sufism is “The Real Islam” (2004:2), to what is he referring?8   
In his Time Asia article, titled The Real Islam (2004), Dalrymple begins by 
recounting his encounter with a Tablighi Jama’at missionary who denounces Sufism as 
magic (jadu).  He then speaks of a family he met at the shrine of Moinuddin Chishti in 
Ajmer whose son had miraculously been healed by the grace (barkat) of the saint where 
modern medicine had failed.  He then goes on to describe Sufism in some fashion:  
From the very beginning of Sufism, music, dance, poetry and meditation have 
been seen as crucial spiritual strides on the path of love, an invaluable aid toward 
attaining unity with God—true paradise.  Music, in particular, enables devotees to 
focus their whole being on the divine so intensely that the soul is both destroyed 
and resurrected.  At Sufi shrines, devotees are lifted by the music into a state of 
spiritual ecstasy.  Yet these heterodox methods of worship have divided Sufis 
from many of their Muslim brethren. [p. 3] 
This kind of a description, with its emphasis on Sufi music, dance (if it can be called that) 
and poetry is fairly representative of reportage in the popular media.  The description of 
Sufis is a little more nuanced in the Rand Corporation report mentioned above.  This is 
not surprising considering that the Rand Corporation is a public-policy think-tank, and its 
reports are not necessarily geared for lay consumption.  This is what the report, titled, 
Building Moderate Muslim Networks, has to say about Sufis:  
(Sufis) are often, but not always, conservative Muslims who uphold beliefs and 
traditions passed down through the centuries – 1,400 years of Islamic traditions 
and spirituality that are inimical to fundamentalist ideology…These traditions 
incorporate the veneration of saints (and the offering of prayers at the tombs) and 
other practices that are anathema to the Wahhabis.  They interpret the Islamic 
scriptures on the basis of the teachings of the schools of jurisprudence (mazhab) 
that were established in the early centuries of Islam; they do not engage in 
                                                          
8
I have examined these two sources here primarily because they have received wide publicity and 
reportage.  But reporting in the popular media that adheres to the same template as these two sources is 
abundant.  
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unmediated interpretation of the Quran and the hadis (the tradition of the Prophet 
Muhammad), as Salafists and modernists do.  Many traditionalists incorporate 
elements of Sufism – the tradition of Islamic mysticism that stresses emotive and 
personal experiences of the divine – into their practice of Islam. [73]  
 
As can be seen from these excerpts, the term ‘Sufi’ is being used not in the 
broadest sense of the term.  What is being connoted, is Sufi practice and belief that is 
centered on the Sufi shrine.  This is clear from the fact that Dalrymple, and others who 
write in this genre, focus their attentions on Sufi music and other forms of ritual 
remembrance (zikar), which are activities that are usually, but not always, performed in 
the sacred space in or around Sufi shrines.  The emphasis on a saint’s charisma and 
miracle stories associated with him also point to shrine-based Sufism.  With the Rand 
corporation report, the reference is obvious, as it speaks directly of the veneration of 
saints and their tombs.  
The consensus in these media is that adherents of shrine-based Sufism have 
values in common with denizens of Western democracies and their governments; values 
such as the support of human rights, participatory government, religious pluralism, etc.  It 
is also agreed that their socio-political stances and their supposed heterodoxy position 
them as allies to Western governments.  To put it bluntly, the message conveyed in these 
media is that from the perspective of the West, adherents of shrine-based Sufism are the 
“good Muslims”; the corollary to this being that “orthodox” Muslim groups are not.   
PROBLEMATIZING THE GOOD (SUFI) MUSLIM 
What often comes up in media representations of adherents of shrine-based 
Sufism is their commitment to pluralism.  The sacred space of the shrine, which has 
cross-religious appeal in many parts of the world, and the incorporation of regional 
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customs in shrine practice are aspects of shrine-based Sufism that are often brought up to 
support this claim.  It is also true that this claim to pluralism is not wholly an outside 
imposition.  I found that my interlocutors (ritual specialists, scholars and hereditary 
custodians of Sufi shrines, as well as lay adherents) often point to the shared sacred space 
of the shrine as reflecting a message of pluralism that they considered inherent to Islam.  
They also spoke of the Sufi shrine and Sufi beliefs as fulfilling the need for commonality 
in an increasingly fraught religious environment.   
Given that this rhetoric of pluralism can be heard at Sufi shrines from adherents of 
shrine-based Sufism, I pose this question: does the idea of pluralism denote the same 
things to these different groups of people?  When adherents of shrine-based Sufism in 
India use such narratives of pluralism, are their motivations and their understandings 
indeed the same as say, an inter-faith center in San Francisco?  I say no.  The term 
‘pluralism’ is often used by those who advocate for Sufis as “good Muslims” in the same 
vein as it is used to describe a wide range of Euro-American cultural institutions; but the 
use of the term often glosses over cosmologies, socio-political circumstances and 
histories that differ vastly among these groups.   
For instance, talk of pluralism at Sufi shrines is usually focused on shared sacred 
space among devotees of various faith-systems.  This cross-religious appeal of Sufi 
shrines and Sufi saints is a well-worn trope of most reporting on Sufism.  What gets left 
out of such discussions of pluralism at Sufi shrines are prickly issues such as the 
inaccessibility of many sacred spaces in a shrine to women, or the inequitable distribution 
of power and knowledge between lay adherents (who are for the most part poor and 
uneducated) and shrine custodians.  Throughout my fieldwork, my interlocutors narrated 
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to me innumerable miracle stories and tales of the saints’ charisma.  Many of these 
narratives were stories of skeptical non-Muslims embracing Islam after an encounter with 
a Sufi saint; or of non-Muslim ascetics (jogis) being defeated by the superior miracle-
working powers of Sufi saints.  Where do such tales of religious conversion and 
competition fit into over-arching themes of pluralism?  I am not insisting here that the 
ways in which adherents of shrine-based Sufism engage with pluralism are disingenuous 
because they do not abide by Euro-American notions of plurality.  What I am arguing is 
that issues of gender, class, and religious disparity are real issues that emerge from the 
socio-economic context in which a Sufi shrine and the people associated with it exist.  
But such context is entirely missing in most non-academic discussions of Sufism.   
In the popular media (not only in Euro-America, but in many other parts of the 
world), shrine-based Sufism has become a poster-child of pluralism.  To advocates who 
report on shrine-based Sufism (as outsiders, and not as practitioners), this mode of 
Islamic practice seems to fill political and social lacunae.  This process of lionization may 
come from an honest desire to present Islam in a positive light in a media environment 
that is otherwise quite hostile to it.  It may come from a desire to find commonality at a 
time when Muslims have been Othered in many parts of the world.  But such attempts, as 
well-intentioned as they may be, reduce complex cosmologies and worldviews to 
palatable warm fuzziness.   
For instance, the role that love plays in Sufi philosophy often draws much lay 
interest.  Most reportage on shrine-based Sufism in the popular media talks about how 
love is the emotion that forms the core of Sufi practice and belief.  This makes for great 
copy, of course, and translations of Sufi devotional poetry sell millions packaged as 
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verses on secular, romantic love.  But the Sufi notion love of the divine is not necessarily 
the same as love between human beings.  And indeed, this notion of love for the divine in 
Sufism is largely not a mellow, fraternal love.  It is ishq, or passionate love; it is an 
excessive love, a love that is all-consuming in its intensity, a love that is violent even, 
requiring the annihilation of the self into the being of another.  This is love at a 
cosmological scale.  But that is not the impression one is left with on reading most 
reporting on Sufism
9
.  Another issue that is often simplified or overlooked entirely is the 
tension that exists in the literature between the idea of a Sufi as a public figure and a 
private ascetic, or the differences in opinion that exists among various orders of Sufism 
over acceptable shrine practice. 
In addition to these over-simplifications of complex cosmological and socio-
religious concepts, there is also the issue of understanding the responses of adherents 
within the context of social dynamics and political legacies.  For instance, one of my 
interlocutors told me that a major significance of the Sufi shrine is that it provides a 
platform for inter-religious encounters through the joint expression of faith.  In the 
popular media, such statements are often reported only as a championing of pluralism.  
But it is important to plumb the sources of such statements.  What is the social, political 
and historical context for such a statement?  To what is it a response?  With whom is the 
speaker in dialogue?  Without such contextualizing questions, we are left with what 
appear to be mere rhetorical flourishes.   
                                                          
9
Sufi saints and poets have spoken of love and compassion for fellow human beings as essential.  But this 
concept is not the same as the notion of ecstatic or passionate love (ishq) which is core to Sufi philosophy 
and ascetic practice.   
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Anna Bigelow (2010), in her recent book, Sharing the Sacred, provides such 
contextualization.  She examines these narratives of pluralism deployed by devotees of 
the saint Shaykh Sadruddin Sadri Jahan in Maler Kotla, a town in Indian Punjab.  
Bigelow concludes that these narratives bind together a religiously diverse community in 
a part of the Subcontinent that has been witness to horrific inter-religious violence during 
the Partition.  In the face of the very real threat of inter-religious violence in present-day 
Malerkotla, these narratives set in motion what Bigelow characterizes as the 
“institutionalized peace system” in the community (237).  
Anna Bigelow’s work provides us with one example of the complex place of 
these narratives in the contemporary lives of a religiously plural community in India.  
The rhetoric of pluralism deployed by adherents of shrine-based Sufism is the legacy of 
innumerable historical contingencies and lived realities: the construction and 
deconstruction of South Asian religion during the colonial era, the Partition of India and 
the creation of Pakistan, the post-Partition relationship between the two countries, 
minority-politics and Hindu nationalism in India, the growth of Arab-centric Islamic 
reformist movements, the cross-religious appeal of Sufi shrines, the events of September 
11, 2001 and the ensuing “War on Terror”, attacks on Indian soil at the hands of Islamic 
militants, the kind of religious subjectivity favored in India, and the growing clout and 
proximity of anti-shrine Muslim groups.   
This list, while lengthy, is by no means exhaustive.  It is within this variegated 
landscape that we begin to see complex claims to authenticity and belonging embedded 
within these declarative statements about pluralism and shared sacred space.  This 
dissertation draws out some of these interwoven effects and processes.  
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MUSLIM ENGAGEMENT IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE  
Another associated claim that we often find in reportage on shrine-based Sufism 
is that this group of Muslims, along with liberal, moderate and secularist Muslims, are 
much more likely to be engaged in public discourses within democratic and secular 
nation states than more “orthodox” or “fundamentalist” Muslims.  Public-policy pundits 
and non-expert voices in the popular media often point to the rhetoric of pluralism and 
shared sacred space as exemplifying values compatible with democracy.  There is also a 
very strong notion in popular media sources that more puritanical modes of Islam, if I 
may use the term, are essentially anti-modern.   
Such characterizations begin to unravel when one looks closely at the activities 
and statements of many of these “orthodox” and “fundamentalist” Muslim groups.  For 
instance, examining the rambling addresses and presentations of the exceedingly popular 
Indian speaker, Zakhir Naik is revealing.  Closely associated with the Wahhabi group, the 
Jama’at-e Islami, Naik’s addresses are peppered with scientific and rationalist arguments 
for Islam’s superiority; arguments that I learnt, through subsequent encounters with 
members, were quite characteristic of Jama’at-e Islami rhetoric.   
In terms of engagement with discourses of democracy in the public arena, I can 
recall quite a few instances during my fieldwork when I encountered a strong showing in 
such discourse from presumed “orthodox” groups.  For instance, representatives from the 
Jama’at-e Islami participated in a three-day long forum discussion on the topic “What it 
Means to be a Muslim in India Today” held in New Delhi in 2009.  And in a dramatic 
series of events, the Jama’at-e Ulema’-e Hind (the governing body of religious scholars 
from throughout India that would be considered “orthodox” in their very conservative 
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stance on social and religious issues) was petitioned with the question of whether India 
was dar ul-harb. This body of traditional Muslim scholars released a fatwa that India was 
not dar ul-harb, but dar ul-aman
10
.  And the reasoning that the Jama’at-e Ulema’-e Hind 
gave for this was that India is a secular democracy, and all Muslims in India have an 
equal right to vote and participate in government.   
The point I am making here with the examples I have recounted above is that 
engagement in the public discourse of democracy, religious diversity, secularism and 
modernity is a phenomenon we see across the board
11
.  And so, to say that adherents of 
shrine-based Sufism have a particular proclivity for such engagement is misguided.   
Furthermore, and I would like to emphasize this point, even when we are 
speaking of the engagement of adherents of shrine-based Sufism in the public sphere, the 
richness of this engagement would be lost if it were reduced to an un-contextualized 
expression of pluralism.  It is a lack of context that has led many to jump to the 
conclusion that shrine-based Sufism is of considerable value to the policy goals of the 
United States, or is the embodiment of some desired mode of Islam, a cure-all for violent 
Islamism.  Such conclusions and presumptions considerably diminish the complexities of 
                                                          
10
dar ul-harb (realm of war) is a term in Islamic jurisprudence used to describe lands not under Islamic 
rule.  The term most often regarded as its antithesis is dar ul-islam (realm of Islam) (Algar, Hamid. 1993. 
Encyclopaedia Iranica. Dar al-Harb). The term dar ul-aman is less-commonly known. It is used to describe 
lands not under Islamic rule, but where Muslims are free to practice their religion (personal correspondence 
with Dr. Mona Hassan, Department of Religion, Duke University).  In a fatwa given in the 19
th
 century by 
Shah Abdul Aziz, India was declared dar ul-harb. This claim was made in response to the question of 
whether Muslims living in British-ruled India were under obligation to follow prohibitions against usury in 
Islamic law. The contemporary petition for a fatwa on the issue of India’s status was made by the Vishva 
Hindu Parishad, a Hindu Nationalist organization.  This petition can be understood best in the context of 
religious minority-politics and Hindu nationalism in India.  
 
11
For an excellent analysis of Muslim engagement in the public sphere in Indonesia, the largest Muslim 
country in the world, see Hefner, Robert W (2000) Civil Islam: Muslims and democratization in Indonesia. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
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expression and experience of these adherents.  To reduce intertwined historical legacies 
and contemporary realities with deep and broad ramifications to such glib phrases as 
“natural allies”, or “the real Islam” is not only misguided, but is an act of great disservice 
to complex agents with nuanced motivations and desires.   
It is clear from the above discussion that through this dissertation I am in dialogue 
with both those in academia who have engaged with Sufism and those speaking from the 
platform of popular media.  I am especially keen to engage with this latter demographic.  
I mentioned previously that my own background has made me personally vested in issues 
of citizenship and religious subjecthood in India.  In this light, I hope through my 
research to contribute to this very public conversation that continues to unfold in India 
today, the pivotal issues of which are of relevance to a much broader global conversation.   
In the chapters ahead I will address the specific argument that I presented at the 
outset:  that intra-religious conflict and the responses to it must be understood not only 
within the context of specific doctrinal and belief-based issues, but also the broader 
social, religious and political backdrop against which they play out.  In chapter 1 I give 
an overview of Sufi shrines, the practices and beliefs associated with these shrines, and 
aspects of shrine-based Sufism that draw a large following in South Asia.  In chapter 2, I 
present the encounter between Sufi reformists and adherents of shrine-based Sufism, and 
the pressures faced by the latter group to conform to a mode of Islamic practice very 
different from what they hold to be true.  In chapter 3, I examine how the construction of 
religious subjecthood in India contributes another dimension to the pressures faced by 
adherents of shrine-based Sufism in being Muslim, as well as to their identity as Indian 
citizens.  In chapter 4, I examine how these competing pressures to their religious 
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subjecthood inform the narratives deployed by adherents of shrine-based Sufism vis-à-vis 
reformist critique.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
I. SHRINE-BASED SUFISM AND THE SACRED SPACE OF THE SUFI 
SHRINE 
 
In the introduction, I presented a very broad definition of Sufism as a form of 
Islamic practice and belief that focuses on attaining oneness with God.  In this chapter, I 
will detail shrine-based Sufism as a lived practice by describing the physical space of 
Sufi shrines, and the various members of typical shrine communities.  This chapter also 
includes a description of my two major field-sites: the shrine of Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia 
in New Delhi, and the shrine of Khaja Bandanawaz in Gulbarga.  By placing the beliefs 
and practices of adherents of shrine-based Sufism within their socio-cultural milieu, this 
chapter highlights the importance of the sacred spaces of Sufi shrines to adherents, and 
the place that these shrines and their associated practices and beliefs have in the daily 
lives of Muslims in India.  
THE SUFI SHRINE 
THE SHRINE COMPLEX AND SURROUNDING LOCALES 
At a very broad level, the Sufi shrine is the mausoleum of a Sufi saint.  In addition 
to the tomb of the saint, a Sufi shrine may contain the tombs of his close relatives (such 
as his wife, children, and other descendents), and his prominent disciples.   Sufi shrines 
vary considerably in size and patronage.  Many villages across the subcontinent have tiny 
shrines.  A small shrine would be just the tomb of a locally known Sufi figure, housed in 
a rudimentary brick and mortar structure.  Such small shrines dot the Indian landscape, 
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and are patronized by the residents of the villages surrounding the shrine and any passing 
travelers.   Indian cities and towns are home to several hundreds of shrines, some barely 
known outside the neighborhood they inhabit, and others with regional, national and 
international patronage.  
The shrine-complexes of larger Sufi shrines have a religious school (madrassa) 
(that is often no more than a school-room), a mosque, adjoining facilities for the 
performance of ritual ablutions, and some kind of office or clerical space from where the 
hereditary custodians of the shrine manage the premises.  Some of the most prominent 
shrines in the Subcontinent (such as the shrines of Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia in Delhi, of 
Khaja Moinuddin Chishti in Ajmer and of Khaja Bandanawaz in Gulbarga) also have 
some kind of a library or archive with manuscripts and early prints of the Quran, 
exegetical writings, hagiographies and other documents such as deeds, titles, and 
proclamations of regional nobility.   
Visitors to Sufi shrines not only consider these sites sacred and spiritual spaces, 
but also spaces of healing and mediation.  And so a shrine complex will also house 
spaces other than the tomb of the Sufi saint that are important to shrine visitors.  Old 
wells or water-tanks, the tombs of specific relatives and disciples of the saint are 
examples of such sites.  Reputations and legends grow around the Sufi shrines, and 
specific spaces within the shrine become known for particular kinds of healing and 
mediation
12.  Thus, it may be that visitors believe that drinking the water of the shrine’s 
old well will heal their ailments, or that the space around the tomb of the saint or the 
saint’s disciple will exorcize malevolent spirits.   
                                                          
12
Pfleiderer (1981) provides us with a fascinating look at the healing of mental illnesses at the Mir Datar 
shrine in Mira Datar Dargah: The Psychiatry of a Muslim Shrine. 
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The shrine of Khaja Bandanawaz in Gulbarga, for instance, housed the tomb of 
his great nephew.  This nephew and the space surrounding his tomb had a reputation for 
exorcism and the easing of psychological trauma.  Evenings at this tomb were intense 
affairs that took me aback the first time I witnessed it.  Women from the city of Gulbarga, 
and even from surrounding villages, would come (or be brought) to this tomb for the 
treatment of some trauma.  Often wearing black robes and veils, they would wail, scream 
and cry out, pleading to be healed and saved.  They would often fling aside their veils, 
tear at their hair, and roll and spasm on the warm flagstone courtyard around the tomb.  
After the “episode” passed they would rise, gather their scattered veils and scarves, tidy 
themselves, say a prayer and leave.  Others believed that fastening a lock to the gateway 
and fence surrounding this tomb would seal the loose lips of gossiping relatives, or seal 
the malevolence of ill-intentioned relatives; needless to say, the fence and gate were 
adorned with thousands of tiny locks.  Another belief was that if one left water on the 
nephew’s tomb and then drank it, this blessed water would heal ailments.  This belief 
resulted in the rather strange scene of a tomb covered in water-filled Coke and Mountain 
Dew bottles. 
There is also a strong belief among lay Muslims in the subcontinent that certain 
verses of the Quran, and certain combinations of numbers, hold special powers of 
protection and healing.  The hereditary custodians at Sufi shrines dispense lockets (taviz) 
to visitors for a small fee.  These lockets often contain small pieces of paper with these 
Quranic verses and number-combinations, and are worn around the neck or arm of the 
person needing healing and protection.  The reputation of some Sufi saints and the 
lockets dispensed at their shrines is quite great, and very often non-Muslims will also 
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seek out Sufi shrines and purchase such amulets to guard against nightmares, the evil eye, 
infertility etc.   
Markets and neighborhoods often encompass Sufi shrines.  These are densely 
packed communities that have grown around the shrine complex.  These neighborhoods 
are predominantly lower-middle class/lower-income Muslim enclaves.  The markets 
often cater to the needs of shrine visitors.  Many stalls closer to the shrine complex sell 
ritual offerings to the saint.  The most common ritual offerings in India are small balls of 
sugar mixed in with rose and marigold petals, and sheets of cloth (varying in detail and 
cost) with gold-colored trimmings that are laid over the saint’s tomb.  Also very common 
in these stalls are short strings dyed with turmeric and vermillion that shrine visitors tie to 
the lattices at Sufi shrines as a mark of their appeal to the intercession of the saint.  Other 
offerings include incense sticks and coconuts at shrines in peninsular India.  Some shrine 
markets will carry shrine-specific offerings such as the locks I have mentioned above at 
the shrine of Khaja Bandanawaz.   
These markets also sell scriptural material.  Copies of the Quran are sold in a 
variety of sizes and formats, but also very common are slim booklets with specific books 
(surah) of the Quran, such as the opening book (fatiha) and the book Yasin, that 
adherents read at the shrine.  Hagiographies of major Sufis saints are also sold at these 
markets; they may be new editions of old Persian texts or translations of these and recent 
retellings in Urdu.  In addition to these texts specifically pertaining to Islamic and Sufi 
Muslim doctrine and scripture, booklets on appropriate Muslim conduct and 
comportment are also available at these markets, such as books on appropriate clothing 
and food, conduct behooving  married couples and unmarried men and women, or books 
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on the ideal conduct of the pious and devoted.  Non textual media are also sold at these 
shops.  They often include audio sermons in cassette, CD and DVD formats, formal 
recitations of the Quran by ritual reciters (qari) or gifted children, recordings of Qawwali 
(the form of ritual song offered at Sufi shrines to honor God, Muhammad, his family, and 
the saints) by famous performers, and other songs of piety and devotion recorded by less 
well-known Indian performers.  In addition to these shrine-specific ritual paraphernalia, 
shrine markets also carry items of general interest such as prayer rugs and prayer beads, 
skull-caps and veils, scented oils, and food.   
THE SACRED SPACE OF THE SUFI SHRINE, AND ITS VISITORS 
As mentioned above, at the heart of the shrine complex is the tomb of the Sufi 
saint.  The tomb itself is a raised stone structure, sarcophagus-like in appearance, carved 
with Quranic verses and Islamicate artistic motifs.  This tomb is often covered with 
offerings to the saint such as flower petals and decorative sheets that visitors have 
brought in.  Surrounding the tomb is a larger (usually domed) mausoleum that can be 
very ornately decorated.  These outer structures very rarely date to the time of the saint’s 
death, and more-commonly are built by royal or noble patrons or by members of the 
shrine-community at a later time.  As I have stated, shrine complexes are also home to 
tombs of minor Sufi figures and may or may not have elaborate mausoleums built over 
them.  The tomb of the saint and the auxiliary tombs form the core of the sacred space of 
the shrine.  The open courtyards within the shrine complex provide space for the large 
numbers of people who gather at these locations to pay their respects to the saint, to seek 
intercession, to pray, to heal and to be in the charismatic presence of the saint.  Visiting a 
Sufi saint at his mausoleum (weather as a once in a lifetime event, or on a daily basis) is 
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important to Muslims throughout India; this act of visitation is known as ziyarat.  For 
these adherents of shrine-based Sufism, visiting a local Sufi shrine may be a frequent 
occurrence, while many may hope to one day visit the most renowned Sufi shrines on the 
Subcontinent.  
It is important to note one major belief of shrine-based Sufism that places the Sufi 
shrine as a locus of religious fervor and spiritual longing among adherents.   A major 
concept in shrine-based Sufism is that of the ultimate destruction of the self in the 
presence God (fana).  The passing of a Sufi saint is not considered to be death (either of 
the body or the soul).  The saint, having attained union with God, is restored to life, and 
lives on in his grave.  It is a strongly held belief among adherents of shrine-based Sufism 
that the saint is present at his shrine; he is a living master (zinda pir), and he is perceptive 
of, and receptive to those who come to the shrine seeking spiritual or worldly relief.   The 
Sufi shrine is thus not merely a mausoleum of a Sufi saint; the saint continues to preside 
within the sanctum of the shrine, and the shrine is in a sense a living embodiment of the 
saint.  It is no wonder then, that Sufi shrines in South Asia are given the honorific of 
sharif, literally ‘noble’.  And so, the shrine of Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia is often referred 
to as “the noble shrine” (dargah sharif).  Sometimes, the entire city in which a very 
prominent shrine is located is granted the honorific of sharif, and is used as a 
metonymical reference to the shrine; thus, the shrine of Khaja Bandanawaz Gesudaraz in 
Gulbarga is often spoken of simply as gulbarga sharif.    
DAILY VISITORS TO THE SHRINE 
For shrines in the cities and towns of India, daily visitors number in the many 
hundreds and even thousands.  These visitors are representative of a broad swath of 
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Indian society, comprising of rich and poor, men and women, young and old, educated 
and uneducated, and Muslim and non-Muslim.  These visitors may be Muslim adherents 
of shrine-based Sufism who stop by the shrine regularly before or after work, or visit 
weekly to pay their respects to the saint.  Many visitors to the shrine are there for a 
specific reason: seeking a remedy for infertility, seeking healing from mental trauma, or 
protection from harm; and of these, non-Muslims may often equal (if not outnumber) 
Muslims at Sufi shrines.  Visitors who come for such remedial purposes will 
circumambulate the mausoleum of the saint, they will appeal to the saint for intercession 
and tie a colored string to the mausoleum structure to mark this appeal, and/or will 
purchase lockets for healing and protection; they may also make an offering of flowers, 
incense, sweets and/or a decorated sheet to the saint.  Beyond this, practice varies 
between Muslims and non-Muslims.   
Non-Muslims often perform rituals at the shrine which they are familiar with, and 
which they would perform at their own house of worship.  For instance, Hindus may 
offer a prayer directly to the saint with their hands folded and their eyes closed; they may, 
in addition, prostrate themselves before the saint or touch their hands to the ground 
before the tomb and then touch their forehead.  At shrines in Deccan India, I have seen 
Hindu visitors break coconuts at the foot of the tomb and offer the broken halves to the 
saint (this being a practice common at temples in this part of the Subcontinent). 
Muslims (whom I refer to as adherents of shrine-based Sufism) typically do not 
offer prayer directly to the saint.  They may bow before the tomb as a mark of reverence, 
and prayer may be recited for the Saint, in his honor, rather than to him.  Generally, 
Muslims direct many of the same kind of ritual acts toward the saint in his tomb as they 
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would a deceased person in a cemetery: praying for the soul of the deceased and reciting 
the opening book of the Quran (fatiha) at the grave.  However, due to his exalted status 
and belief in his living presence at the shrine, adherents accord him special reverence and 
make intercessory requests of him as well.   
Most Sufi shrines (that are not merely a small structure built over a saint’s tomb) 
also house a mosque.  These mosques are generally for male adherents only, though some 
may have a smaller annexed room for women.  Male adherents often stop by the shrine 
mosque for one or more of their daily prayers (namaz), and the gathering for the noon 
prayers (zohar) on Fridays is the largest in the week.   
As mentioned, visitors (Muslim and non-Muslim) often come to the shrine to seek 
healing and to alleviate personal hardships.  If it is believed that the saint has interceded 
on their behalf, visitors will often continue to visit the shrine at a regular frequency 
(annually, weekly or even daily) to remember and acknowledge the saint for this miracle 
(karishma/karamat).   
VISITATION TO MARK EVENTS 
Adherents of shrine-based Sufism also look to the Sufi shrine during major 
Muslim festivals such as Eid-al Fitr, the ritual end to the holy month of Ramadan; and 
Eid al-adha, the ritual end to the month of annual pilgrimage to Mecca (haj); and 
important ritual periods such as the holy month of Ramadan, and the month of mourning 
(muharram) that marks the martyrdom of Muhammad’s grandchildren, Hassan and 
Hussain.   
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Many shrines distribute food among shrine visitors, especially the poor, during 
these occasions.  For instance, during the entire month of Ramadan, the shrine of Hazrat 
Nizamuddin Aulia would fill to bursting point with adherents wanting to break the day’s 
fast in the auspicious presence of the saint.  In anticipation of the crowds, the shrine’s 
courtyard would be covered with plastic sheets for food to be served on.  Men would 
perform their ritual ablutions (vuzu) at the shrine’s facilities and begin to assemble within 
the shrine’s mosque and then spill out onto the courtyard, and would perform the evening 
prayer (maghrib) that marks the official end to the day’s fasting.  After the prayer, food 
(in the form of rice, meat, fruit or lentils) would be distributed to all present at the shrine.   
VISITATION DURING THE SAINT’S DEATH ANNIVERSARY  
Pilgrims also travel to Sufi shrines for the death anniversary of the Sufi saint 
(urs), one of the most important events in a shrine’s ritual calendar.  I will discuss the 
significance of saints’ death anniversaries in Sufi belief in greater detail later in this 
chapter.  In this section, I will discuss how these death anniversaries are generally marked 
at Sufi shrines in India.  For shrines of regional or national repute, the death anniversary 
of the saint is not only a significant event in ritual terms, but is also logistically the 
biggest event marked at the shrine.  This event is marked for anywhere from a couple of 
days to a whole week, depending on the shrine.  The number of people who perform 
pilgrimage to Sufi shrines for the occasion of the death anniversary of prominent saints is 
staggering, ranging from thousands at locally important shrines to millions at nationally 
renowned shrines.   
Since the death anniversary of a Sufi saint marks his union with God, this event is 
not marked with mourning.  There are of course, many rituals that are somber and 
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reverential in nature (such as the ritual cleaning and adorning of the saints tomb with 
flowers and sandalwood paste), many of the activities performed at these death 
anniversaries celebrate the saint’s life, his spiritual achievements, and his continued 
power and charisma.  The multitudes of Muslims who gather at a saint’s shrine for his 
death anniversary use this opportunity to pay their respects to and be in the presence of an 
exalted and blessed Muslim figure.  Many come to request the saint’s aid or to thank him 
for a successful act of intercession; others feel blessed and energized in the mere presence 
of the hundreds (and perhaps millions) of other pilgrims as they join in the celebration of 
the saint.   
Troupes of performers who specialize in the form of Sufi songs (qawwali) sung in 
remembrance of God, Muhammad and his family, and Sufi saints visit shrines during the 
death anniversaries of that particular saint.  Thus, while most Sufi shrines may have a 
Qawwali performance for the saint once a week or once a month, visitors to the shrine 
can witness these acts of lyrical offering nearly throughout the day during the period of 
the death anniversary.   
Many religious scholars and prominent preachers are invited to the shrine by its 
custodians to participate in the death anniversary rituals.  These guests usually contribute 
to the event by delivering sermons in a typically fiery style.  These sermons are usually 
delivered at the shrine’s mosque or an adjoining hall, and the few hundred who can fit in 
these structures attend.  However, many shrines broadcast these sermons to the masses in 
attendance through an array of speakers set up throughout the shrine complex. 
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These death anniversaries of prominent Sufi saints in India (such as Khaja 
Moinuddin Chishti or Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia) are of importance in non-religious terms 
as well.  To be seen at these Sufi shrines during this event is often expected of local 
politicians and bureaucrats.  Political figures often make an appearance at Sufi shrines 
and very publically make an offering to the Sufi saint.  
The mood of celebration during the death anniversary is echoed outside the shrine 
complex as well.  The neighborhoods and markets surrounding Sufi shrines take on a 
fair-like atmosphere.  Lights are festooned everywhere, stalls and carts selling all manner 
of ritual and non-ritual goods spring up, and Sufi music blares from shops selling 
cassettes and CDs.   
Aside from these additional ritual and non-ritual occurrences, general shrine 
activities continue (such as the five daily prayers, the ritual opening and closing of the 
sanctum etc.), except that the number of those who participate increases by many fold.  
When I attended the death anniversary of Khaja Bandanawaz at his shrine in Gulbarga, 
the noon prayer on Friday was attended by so many men that the crowd flowed out of the 
shrine’s large inner and outer courtyards and into the streets of the neighborhood and 
market for several yards.   
THE PEOPLE OF THE SUFI SHRINE 
In the previous section I have given an account of the visitors to Sufi shrines and 
the various occasions that would bring them there.  In this section I will give an overview 
of those who are, in a sense, permanent fixtures at Sufi shrines.   
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HEREDITARY CUSTODIANS 
At the heart of the day to day functioning of Sufi shrines are the shrine’s 
custodians.  At locally and nationally prominent shrines, these custodians claim descent 
from the saint.  They may be direct descendents or may trace their ancestry to a sibling of 
the saint.  The custodianship of the shrine is passed on from generation to generation, 
through a line of descent directly from the saint.  However, as is the case of the hereditary 
custodians at the shrine of Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia (who was celibate), descent may be 
traced to a close relative of the saint if the saint did not have any offspring.  The chief 
hereditary custodian of a Sufi shrine is called the sajjada nashin or the gaddi nashin.  
After centuries of this institution, the transfer of custodianship from generation to 
generation is not always smooth, and the position of chief custodian may be contested 
among several male descendents of the saint.  Whoever the current chief custodian may 
be, however, many members of his immediate and extended family may also be present 
at the shrine nearly every day.  These people are known as khadim, which literally means 
‘servant’ as they serve the saint and the institution of the shrine.  This is a position of 
esteem, however, and I refer to these members of the shrine community as ‘hereditary 
custodians’.   
It is customary for offerings to the saint to be made via these hereditary 
custodians.  Shrine visitors hand their offerings to a hereditary custodian, who will then 
place the offering on the saint’s tomb.  It is also these hereditary custodians who dispense 
amulets, lockets and other objects considered to have healing powers (such as flowers or 
sandalwood that have been laid on the tomb) to visitors seeking such intervention.  At 
many Sufi shrines, hereditary custodians also manage the income and expenditures of the 
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shrines.  These hereditary custodians also have other duties such as officiating rituals 
during important shrine events such as the death anniversary of the saint or the breaking 
of the fast during Ramadan, or the recitation of prayers that mark the daily opening and 
closing of the Sufi shrine.   
RELIGIOUS SPECIALISTS 
As mentioned above, most Sufi shrines of a reasonable size have mosques 
annexed to them.  A shrine mosque may have its own resident preacher.  Shrine mosques 
will often run a religious school staffed by one or more teachers and scholars depending 
on the numbers attending.  These mosques may also have an expert on Islamic 
jurisprudence (mufti) on hand (or the mosque’s preacher may serve this function), who 
addresses questions that adherents may have regarding proper and improper conduct and 
practice by dispensing religious rulings (fatawa). 
At larger and well-run shrines (as with the shrine of Khaja Bandanawaz), the 
shrine’s religious school may be affiliated to a larger seminary, and follow a syllabus set 
by this larger seminary.  Male students attending such a religious school would be able to 
pursue further education at seminaries and train to be preachers and religious scholars.   
RITUAL SUFI MUSICIANS 
Larger Sufi shrines with a substantial following will have resident ritual 
musicians.  An important part of Sufi practice is the act of ritual audition (sama), in 
which adherents listen to poetry or chanting in order to attain a meditative and ecstatic 
state.  What is listened to and the nature of the audition varies all over the world.  One of 
the hallmarks of South Asian Sufi shrine practice is the form of Sufi ritual music known 
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as Qawwali.  A performer of Qawwali is known as a qawwal.  Typically, Qawwali is 
performed by a group of ritual musicians consisting of one or two lead singers, several 
accompanying singers, a musician who plays the harmonium, and another who plays a 
percussive instrument (usually a tabla or a dhol).  These ritual musicians perform the 
poetry of Sufi poets such as Amir Khusro and Bulle Shah that combines verses in 
Hindavi, Persian, Arabic, and sometimes Punjabi and Sindhi.  Custom varies with each 
shrine.  At some shrines like Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia, the Qawwals perform each 
evening; at many other shrines, the ritual performance is restricted to Thursday evenings.   
These musicians often come from families of musicians dedicated to the singing 
of Sufi ritual music, and often Qawwali groups include many members of the same 
family.  Not all Sufi shrines have resident ritual musicians.  Smaller shrines rely on 
travelling Qawwali troupes who visit to mark special ritual events at the shrine
13
.   
SHRINE FUNCTIONARIES AND CARETAKERS  
So far I have listed members of the shrine community who are in some way 
connected to the ritual life and religious services of the shrine.  In addition to these, a Sufi 
shrine also often employs (formally or informally) a number of people who aid in the day 
to day running of the shrine.  Formal employees of larger shrines (who are hired for a 
monthly wage) may include a secretary or treasurer, or even a librarian for a shrine’s 
collection of books and manuscripts.  Regionally prominent shrines sometimes also 
employ security guards who will stand by the entrance of the shrine or patrol the 
                                                          
13
Regula Qureshi is an important source for anyone interested in a musicological approach to the study of 
Qawwali.  Her essay, His Master's Voice? Exploring Qawwali and 'Gramophone Culture' in South Asia 
(1999) is especially interesting to me for its analysis of Qawwali as a genre in flux between the sacred and 
the profane.   
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premises; their presence, I have found, is often nominal and it is rare to see them exerting 
their authority on the shrine’s visitors.   
Sufi shrines will also have informal employees.  These are people who are not 
necessarily hired formally as staff at Sufi shrines, but make their living by providing 
services at the shrine and to shrine visitors.  The sweepers who see to the cleaning of the 
premises, the men who fan visitors in the courtyards during the hot summer months, and 
the men and women who keep an eye on visitors’ shoes at the threshold of the shrine are 
examples of such informal employees at Sufi shrines.  In addition to members of the 
shrine community whom I have listed above, there are of course the storekeepers in the 
markets that surround the shrine.  There are also the large number of beggars and 
religious mendicants who are inevitably found at and around religious spaces in India.   
A DAY IN THE LIFE OF A SUFI SHRINE 
I have discussed previously in this chapter the various occasions that are 
important to the ritual calendar of Sufi shrines.  To recap, these are the death anniversary 
of the saint (urs), the month of Ramadan, Eid al-Fitr (which marks the end of Ramadan), 
the month of Muharram (when Muslims mourn the deaths of Muhammad’s grandsons), 
Prophet Muhammad’s birthday (eid milad unnabi), and Eid al-Adha (which marks the 
end of Hajj, the month for pilgrimage to Mecca).  In this section I will give an account of 
daily life at Sufi shrines.   
As mentioned above, most shrine complexes have mosques on, or annexed to the 
premises.  A typical day at a Sufi shrine begins with the dawn prayers (fajr).  It is also 
around this time that caretakers sweep and wash out the courtyard of the shrine in 
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preparation for visitations to the shrine.  The ritual opening of the shrine is performed by 
the hereditary custodians of the shrine (usually led by the chief custodian).  This ritual 
opening takes the form of a prayer in praise of God and Muhammad, which marks the 
waking of the saint in his tomb.  As the prayer is recited, custodians deck the tomb of the 
saint with a decorated sheet, and make the first offerings of flowers, sugar balls and 
incense at the tomb.   
Visitors begin to trickle into the shrine very early in the day.  Many of these early 
visitors are often folks who visit daily and stop by the shrine on their way to work.  At 
Sufi shrines in India’s towns and cities, a steady stream of visitors come in throughout the 
day.  There are spikes during the times of prayer (namaz) during the day: noon, 
afternoon, sunset, and at nightfall.  During the very hot summer days in North and 
Deccan India, most visitors choose to visit after sundown when the stone courtyards of 
the shrines have cooled somewhat.   
Visitors to the shrine may stop at the stores outside the shrine to buy an offering 
of rose-petals and sugar-balls, or even a decorated sheet for infrequent visitors.  But 
making these offerings is not a prerequisite to visiting the saint, and many do come 
empty-handed.  Visitors then leave their shoes at the gateways or sidewalls of the shrine 
in the safe-keeping of the minder of shoes.  They then enter the shrine complex barefoot.  
The tomb of the saint is the first stop for these visitors, where they make their offerings, 
requests and prayers.  Most visitors (both adherents of shrine-based Sufism as well as 
non-Muslims and casual visitors) will not leave immediately after paying their respects.  
Most will sit awhile in the stone courtyards and pray and meditate in murmurs or in 
silence.  Adherents of shrine-based Sufism, especially female adherents, sit outside the 
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inner sanctum of the tomb
14
 and read certain books of the Quran while facing in the 
direction of the tomb.  Visitors are also found paying their respects at other tombs 
throughout the shrine complex and making their offerings there.   
Thursday evenings are ritually important at Sufi shrines as sundown on Thursdays 
marks the beginning of Friday (jumma), the holy day of the week, and many more 
adherents of shrine-based Sufism will visit their local Sufi shrine then.  At larger Sufi 
shrines with resident ritual musicians, Thursday evening is also when the ritual musicians 
offer their songs to the saint.  Sufi ritual music in the form of Qawwali is very popular in 
South Asia, and visitors flock to Sufi shrines to participate in this uniquely South Asian 
form of ritual audition.  Very prominent shrines, such as the shrine of Hazrat Nizamuddin 
Aulia, which draws many hundreds of visitors everyday, feature the ritual offering of 
music every evening.  The ritual musicians set up at sundown after the evening prayers.  
As their songs are an offering to the saint who is considered their primary audience, they 
sit on the courtyard facing the tomb.  Shrine visitors sit around these ritual musicians, but 
never with their backs to the tomb as this is considered a sign of disrespect.   
At larger shrines where visitors number in the thousands, the crowd is usually 
managed by shrine custodians or by a member of the musicians’ troupe who will ask 
visitors to hurry with their offerings or to move along in their circumambulation of the 
tomb, will reseat members of the audience, make room for more visitors, or chide visitors 
seated with their backs to the tomb.   
                                                          
14
Women are often not allowed inside the inner sanctum of the tomb. This is not a hard and fast rule, 
however, and women are allowed in at some Sufi shrines.   
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Depending on the crowds on any given evening, ritual musicians may sing till the 
prayers at around nightfall (isha).  In general, even on days when there is no offering of 
Qawwali, the number of visitors begins to dwindle by this last prayer of the day.  After 
these prayers have been offered, shrine custodians will begin the end-of-day rituals that 
mark the ritual closing of the shrine.  This is usually a mirror image of the opening rituals 
in the morning: custodians recite a prayer, request the blessings of the saint, clear the 
tomb of the day’s offerings, and close the door to the tomb.   
CONTEMPORARY SHRINE PRACTICE IN INDIA 
Sufi shrines in South Asia are loci of religious and spiritual activity at a massive 
scale.  As mentioned above, prominent Sufi shrines draw steady streams of adherents on 
a daily basis, and attract pilgrims in the hundreds of thousands during certain annual 
events such as the death anniversary rituals of the saint (urs).  Pilgrimage to Sufi shrines 
(ziyarat) is an important and at times essential part of the ritual calendars of adherents 
throughout South Asia.   
SHRINE VISITATION 
Ritual visitation to a Sufi shrine is known as ziyarat.  The reasons why Muslim 
adherents pay their respects to saints at their shrines vary, and are often a combination of 
various points of belief and circumstances.  As mentioned above, there is a strong belief 
among adherents that Sufi saints are alive in their shrines.  Visiting a Sufi shrine is thus 
not merely a visit to a memorial, but an act of bringing oneself into the living presence of 
the saint.  Certain attributes of the saint in his elevated position also play into the draw of 
the shrine.  Many of my interlocutors told me that Sufi saints were blessed from birth and 
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that the grace of God (barkat) continues to shower upon them.  Visiting the saint at his 
shrine then brings one into close proximity to such an individual, and thus, by 
association, also to that divine grace.   
Many adherents also believe in the intercessory powers of the saint.  The word 
that is by convention translated as ‘saint’ is vali.  vali literally means ‘friend’;  a saint is 
one who is a friend of God (vali allah).  In this position, it is believed that saints have 
God’s ear, so to speak, and thus have the ability to put in a good word (sifarish karna) or 
intercede (shafa’at karna) on behalf of supplicants.  Thus, adherents of shrine-based 
Sufism will often visit shrines when they wish to seek deliverance from specific personal 
problems such as marital disputes, the inability to have children etc.  When visiting 
shrines for the resolution of problems, it is quite common for adherents to pledge to 
perform some deed (mannat manana) in return for his intercession.  I encountered many 
adherents at Sufi shrines who had been blessed with a child they believed to be the direct 
result of a saint’s intercession, and thus paid their respects to the saint at least once every 
year; sometimes traveling great distances to do so.  Such visitations then often become 
part of a family’s ritual tradition.  
I have mentioned previously how the life and deeds of Sufi saints are often 
recounted by adherents.  The charisma and the miracles of the saint aside, the piety and 
devotion of Sufi saints is also a point of great admiration among adherents of shrine-
based Sufism.  Thus, it is not just the power to perform miracles, but also the power of a 
saint’s intense piety that draws people to his shrine.  Many of my interlocutors spoke of 
how they hoped that through their proximity to such a pious individual, some of that piety 
would rub off on them as well.   
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Local Sufi shrines are very much a part of the daily lives of the community or the 
neighborhood that grows around it.  The mosques that are part of a shrine complex serve 
as an important site for prayer (namaz) by Muslim men
15
; Sufi shrines may offer religious 
education for a neighborhood’s boys and girls through a shrine-run religious school; the 
shrine may offer a moment of respite in the otherwise hectic schedules of adherents, 
especially in urban areas; and the power of the saint may provide an opportunity for the 
resolution of personal problems.  Though the reasons for shrine visitations are various 
and varied, the presence of the saint at the shrine remains the core of belief and practice 
for adherents.   
THE PLACE OF SHRINE-BASED SUFISM IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA 
The majority of Muslims in India adhere to shrine-based Sufism.  The sheer 
numbers of Muslims who visit Sufi shrines across India on a daily basis would attest to 
this estimation.  In general, for the vast majority of Muslims in India, unless they have 
been drawn by anti-shrine reformist groups, shrine-visitation forms an integral part of 
their religious and ritual lives as a matter of course.  The reason this is true can be best 
understood if we look to the history of Islam and Sufi-Islam in South Asia.   
There is not a lot of literature on the sociological context in which Islam spread 
throughout South Asia (Eaton 1996: 113-134).  It is my estimation, however, that 
“shrine-based Sufism” as an epistemological category has become necessary only fairly 
recently. The questioning of Sufi practice and belief as legitimately Islamic is certainly 
not a new phenomenon.  The persecution and subsequent execution of the Sufi figure 
Mansur al-Hallaj in the 10
th
 century for his utterance, “I am the Truth!” (ana al’haqq) is 
                                                          
15
For the most part, Muslim women pray at home.  
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renowned among Muslims in South and Central Asia.  And as Ernst (2004) has pointed 
out, “some of the earliest prose treatises concerning Sufism were apologetic works 
designed to show that Sufism was not in conflict with the Islamic religious sciences, but 
complemented and perfected them” (p. 8).  However, it is after anti-shrine Sufi reformist 
groups (many of whom also claim a Sufi identity) emerged in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
century that we find an anti-shrine position spreading among lay-folk.  Discussions about 
the appropriateness or inappropriateness of practice centered on Sufi shrines had for long 
been restricted to religious scholars and political elites.  It is fairly recently that these 
conversations have begun to permeate among lay Muslims. 
Whatever the historical evidence for the ways in which Islam permeated 
throughout the region, there was one narrative that I heard most often among adherents of 
shrine-based Sufism and among Sufi reformists.  Most of my interlocutors strongly felt 
that Islam owed its presence in South Asia to the Sufi orders that brought the Islamic 
faith to the Subcontinent’s masses.  According to this narrative, while much of South 
Asia was ruled by a Muslim elite for centuries, these elites were concerned more with 
matters of politics than with faith; nor were the lives and goals of the political elite pious.  
I was often told by various interlocutors that the message of Islam was brought to the 
people of the Subcontinent by Sufi masters.  Often cited as fundamental to the spread of 
Islam were the pious lives that Sufi masters led, their obvious charisma and power, the 
succor and aid offered by their hospices to all regardless of religion, their ability to 
communicate Islamic values and beliefs through poetry and music, the incorporation of 
local language, iconography, and custom in shrine-practice, and the imperative for Sufi 
disciples to take their message to even the most remote reaches of the region.   
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Academics have challenged the notion that Sufi hospices and shrines in South 
Asia were sites of active conversion to Islam (Ernst 1997: 138-139; Eaton 1996: 72-73). 
However, it is my experience that Sufism’s role in bringing Islam to South Asia is 
definitely a matter of pride for my interlocutors.  I would like to call to attention two 
points that would provide some context for my interlocutors’ narratives.  First, it is 
important to note that the predominant narrative of Islam’s introduction in India is one 
marked with violence.  Popular narratives in India often point to conversion “at the end of 
a sword”; images of rape, pillage and forced conversion meted out by “Muslim invaders” 
permeate literature, cinema and oral histories.  As Ernst (2004) has noted, 
there are many conflicting modern views on the nature of the entrance of Islam in 
India, but most of these views derive from much later political preoccupations, 
such as Mughal imperialism, British colonialism, Indian or Pakistani nationalism, 
and other ideological concerns foreign to the medieval period. [p. 3]  
The responsibility for the dominant narrative of Islam’s violent spread in the frontiers of 
India rests with Orientalist scholarship, as well as with Muslim hagiographers who 
sought to embellish the role of Sufis as destroyers of temples and as those “who had 
made a decisive break between (a) Hindu past and (a) Muslim future”, what Eaton (1996) 
calls “hagiographical reconstruction” (72-73).  These narratives have been passed down 
into popular understandings of early Islam in India, where the predominant narrative is 
one of Muslim violence and aggression.  In view of these obviously negative and 
damaging narratives, it is no wonder that my interlocutors stressed the role of Sufism in 
the nonviolent spread of Islam in India.   
Second, I feel that a distinction certainly needs to be made between conversion as 
a formal mechanism for the change in professed religion, and conversion as a process of 
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embodying a different mode of practice and belief.  When my interlocutors spoke of the 
role of Sufism in the spread of Islam in South Asia, the word they most commonly used 
to speak of this process can be translated as ‘to make one’s own’ (apnana).  Their 
narratives were replete with images of non-Muslims adopting Islam or of them 
“accepting” (manana) the truth of the oneness of God.  This is a considerably different 
sentiment, and a different lens through which to view the profession of faith.  These 
narratives give to those who became Muslims a measure of agency that the predominant 
conversion-narratives have thus far denied them.   
THE CROSS-RELIGIOUS APPEAL OF SUFI SHRINES 
The tradition of shrine-visitation is not restricted to Muslims in India; a significant 
number of Hindus and Sikhs in India too consider Sufi shrines an important aspect of 
their belief and ritual worship.  This cross-religious appeal of Sufi shrines is quite evident 
daily at any major Sufi shrine in India.  One of my interlocutors at the shrine of Hazrat 
Nizamuddin Aulia, a hereditary custodian of the shrine, once estimated that on any given 
day at a popular shrine such as this, nearly 50% of the folks at the shrine might be Hindu.  
Maulvi Sahab, a teacher at the religious school at the shrine of Khaja Bandanawaz, said 
during a lecture to the school’s female students that at some of the smaller rural Sufi 
shrines more Hindus than Muslims attend the death-anniversary rituals of the Sufi saints 
(he was lamenting the encroachment of anti-shrine reformist ideology among Indian 
Muslims).  The significance of non-Muslim patronage to Sufi shrines across India speaks 
to a great extent to the importance of Sufi saints to the religious landscape of India in 
general, where spiritual and religious leaders are very important to the practice and 
beliefs of Indians, regardless of their proclaimed religious identities.     
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However, as is clear from the context of Maulvi Sahab’s lecture above, a 
significant aspect of the demographic constitution of shrine patronage is the slowly 
diminishing numbers of Muslim adherents: folk who have been drawn away from shrine 
practice and belief by anti-shrine reformist ideology.  During my interactions with 
adherents of shrine-based Sufism, I found that in general, my interlocutors did not 
begrudge the devotion non-Muslims felt towards Sufi saints.  On the contrary, to them 
this cross-religious appeal of Sufi shrines was emblematic of the immanent charisma and 
power of the living saint (zinda pir) at the shrine.  There have been instances where 
shrines have been transformed entirely due to an overwhelming presence of Hindu 
devotees compared to Muslim adherents, or by Hindu nationalist groups who have 
claimed ownership of shrines as being “originally” Hindu.  But I found that my 
interlocutors’ responses to such cases were quite nuanced; there was an 
acknowledgement of the danger posed by so much attention from a non-Muslim presence 
at Sufi shrines, but this was largely in relation to the activities of Hindu nationalist groups 
and not to devoted non-Muslim pilgrims.  My interlocutors often identified a drop in the 
numbers of adherents of shrine-based Sufism among Muslims due to reformist activity as 
the main threat to the integrity of Sufi shrines in India. I will discuss this in greater detail 
in the next chapter.  
A poignant reminder of this complex relationship between Sufi shrines and their 
religiously varied patronage came with a visit to the shrine of Bu Ali Shah Qalandar in 
the town of Panipat, a few hours outside Delhi.  I visited this shrine with my Fulbright-
Hays advisor, Dr. Husain, a historian with the Jamia Millia Islamia who was carrying out 
research on the shrines of Panipat.  Though Bu Ali Shah Qalandar was a Sufi saint of the 
81 
 
13
th
 century, most of this shrine was built in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries by Mughal 
patrons.  The shrine was clearly in need of repair.  Some renovation work was being 
carried out, but it was obviously shoddy, and the new unskilled work of the masons stood 
out in stark contrast to the refined craftsmanship of the medieval artisanst.  The lane that 
led up to the shrine too left much to be desired, with unpaved and rutted streets and pigs 
wallowing in the open sewers. 
As we approached the shrine, Dr. Husain mentioned that the native Muslims of 
Panipat had been forcibly evacuated to Pakistan during the time of India’s partition to 
make room for the influx of Sikhs and Hindus from across the border.  The hereditary 
custodians of the shrine too no longer lived in Panipat, and the shrine was maintained and 
run by a member of the Waqf Board
16
.  This Waqf Board representative was away on 
pilgrimage to Mecca when we visited the shrine, and we sat in a small room annexed to 
the tomb with one of his subordinates.  As we sat in the dim room sipping the obligatory 
cup of sweet tea, Dr. Husain asked the attendant if any native Muslims of Panipat still 
lived in the city.  No, was the response.  Most of the Muslims in the city were from 
neighboring cities and states, and so was he.  All the Muslims who now lived in Panipat 
were abjectly poor, the attendant told us, and the shrine was able to carry on only thanks 
to the non-Muslims who patronized it.  “It is because of them [non-Muslims] that the 
shrine has survived,” he said; “they come with so much faith and give so much”, he 
                                                          
16
In India, communal Muslim property (such as tombs, grave yards, and certain historic monuments and 
lands) meant for public use is managed by an institution known as the Waqf Board.  There is a Sunni Waqf 
Board and a Shia Waqf Board.  This is a government-appointed panel of Muslims.  Generally, Sufi shrines 
have remained outside the purview of the Waqf Board, being run and maintained by hereditary custodians 
who claim descent from the particular Sufi saint in question.  Many historical monuments (such as the Taj 
Mahal), fall outside the jurisdiction of the Waqf Board, and are instead managed by the Archaeological 
Survey of India.  These exceptions to the Waqf Board’s purview remain points of contention, and 
occasionally come up for legal review.   
82 
 
added.  I asked if most of the Muslims in Panipat paid their respects at the shrine.  To 
this, the attendant smiled wryly and said that the Muslims of Panipat were of two kinds: 
“Some come with faith, and say a prayer to God before the tomb. Sure, we have some of 
them.  But then, there are others who say all sorts of things!”  He reiterated that it was the 
Hindus of Panipat who kept the shrine going, and added, “The Muslims here just raise 
issues.”  
THE TWO FIELD-SITES  
In this section, I will introduce my field-sites, my primary interlocutors there, and 
my experiences with them.   
GULBARGA AND THE KHAJA BANDANAWAZ SHRINE 
I started my fieldwork at the shrine of Khaja Bandanawaz Gesudaraz in Gulbarga.  
For most of the year Gulbarga is a hot, dry and dusty city of nearly half a million people 
that sits at the heart of the Deccan Plateau in peninsular India.  Historically, Gulbarga 
was established as the capital of the nascent Bahmani kingdom in the 14
th
 century, when 
a rebellious governor of a Deccan province wrested control from the Delhi Sultanate.  
The Bahmani sultanate was one of the first Islamicate kingdoms in peninsular or Deccan 
India, and Gulbarga to this day bears the legacy of this Islamicate past: the older parts of 
the city are strewn with crumbling tombs and edifices from the medieval Islamicate era, 
and though the city retains a Hindu majority, it has a significantly large Muslim minority.  
Gulbarga is religiously segregated in the same way that most Indian cities and towns are, 
with various Muslim and Hindu enclaves scattered throughout the city.  However, the 
people of Gulbarga are quick to point out that in spite of the large numbers that both 
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religions boast, the city has never witnessed devastating Hindu-Muslim violence like 
some other religiously diverse cities in India have.  
The 14
th
 century shrine of Khaja Bandanawaz Gesudaraz is another reminder of 
Gulbarga’s Islamicate legacy.  Partly built in the 15th century during the lifetime of the 
saint, the shrine complex is grand in scale and boasts large domed tombs, tall archways 
and open courtyards.  Like the typical Sufi shrines that I have described in the previous 
sections, this complex too houses not only the tomb of the saint, but also tombs of his 
relatives and descendants, a mosque, a religious school (madrassa), and auxiliary 
buildings that often serve administrative purposes.  This shrine complex is exceptional in 
that it is also home to a library with an impressive collection of manuscripts and books.   
Just beyond the arched entrance to the shrine lies a market that, like markets that 
service shrines all over India, sells books of prayers in Urdu and Arabic; copies of the 
Quran bound in various styles; hagiographies of prominent Sufi saints and other 
important Islamic figures; CDs and cassettes of Quranic recitations, sermons, and sacred 
Sufi music; as well as sweets, perfumes and prayer rugs.  The small stalls that line the 
bazaar also carry various ritual items commonly offered in reverence to the saint by 
visitors to the shrine.   
On any given day visitors from the city brave the heat to pay their respects to the 
saint and to pray at the shrine’s mosque.  On Fridays it is nearly impossible to find a way 
into the shrine past the flanks of hundreds of men (perhaps even a thousand) who come to 
the shrine complex for the all-important noon prayer; their overflowing numbers spill out 
well past the gates of the shrine and up to the main market street.   
84 
 
The city of Gulbarga is also home to a large temple-complex that is dedicated to 
the 18
th
 century Hindu saint, Sri Sharanabasaweshwara.  These two institutions, the Sri 
Sharanabasaweshwara temple and shrine of Khaja Bandanawaz, dominate the religious 
and secular lives of Gulbarga’s people.  Walking through any part of Gulbarga, one is 
struck by the regularity with which stores, schools, and various for-profit and non-profit 
institutions are named after either saint.  The shrine of Khaja Bandanawaz itself has a 
subsidiary educational trust, which runs institutions ranging from primary schools for 
abjectly poor children, to medical and engineering colleges which draws students from all 
over India.  This sense of the inescapable presence of Khaja Bandanawaz in Gulbarga 
was one of the main reasons that I chose this shrine as a site for my research.   
In addition to these considerations, the religious importance of the Khaja 
Bandanawaz shrine in peninsular India was also a factor in my choosing it as a site for 
research.  Throughout the year, pilgrims come to the shrine from Gulbarga district and 
also from further afield: mostly from the countryside or from other South Indian cities.  
The true scope of the saint’s popularity and the religious importance of this shrine can be 
appreciated at the time of the death-anniversary rituals of the saint (urs), when hundreds 
of thousands of pilgrims gather at this shrine from all over India.  A measure of how 
many pilgrims come to the shrine for the saint’s death anniversary is the fact that the 
Indian Railways offers a special express from the large Deccan city of Hyderabad 
(another major Muslim center in India) to Gulbarga especially for this event.  
Aside from these pilgrims who journey from all over India during the time of the 
death anniversary, daily visitors include Muslim adherents and Hindus from Gulbarga 
and the surrounding rural areas.   
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THE SHRINE OF HAZRAT NIZAMDDUIN AULIA IN NEW DELHI 
The shrine of Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia in New Delhi is located at the heart of a 
bustling neighborhood of narrow alleyways, and closely-packed residential structures and 
store-fronts that also bears the name of the saint.  The shrine of Khaja Bandanawaz is 
breathtaking in its size and vastness; the shrine complex of Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia, 
though much smaller, is notable for its striking black and white inlayed stone courtyard, 
the beautiful cusped onion dome of the saint’s tomb, and its fine laced marble lattices.  
Though Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia was a saint of the 14
th
 century, the main structures in 
this shrine complex, including his tomb, were constructed much later in the 16
th
 century 
by the shrine’s Mughal patrons.   
The shrine complex is accessible through a tiny archway, leading up to which is a 
mad tangle of tiny store-fronts that sell all the accoutrements of shrine-visitation found at 
typical shrine markets described above.  Also found here are bronze hookahs and lamps; 
wall-hangings of Quarnic verses in calligraphy; and calendar art featuring various Sufi 
shrines, Mecca, Medina and portraits of Sufi saints.  The archway itself is flanked by a 
non-functional metal-detector: an artifact, if you will, that got put in as a security measure 
after the shrine of Khaja Moinuddin Chishti (another major Sufi shrine in India) was 
bombed a few years ago.   
The city of Delhi, now India’s capital, has served as the capital of various 
preceding empires and as the hub of art, literature and trade in North India.  It is now a 
city of nearly 14 million, drawing hundreds of thousands of immigrants annually from all 
over India.  Delhi is home to at least three Sufi shrines of regional importance and 
hundreds of much smaller ones.  Chief among these Sufi shrines is the shrine of Hazrat 
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Nizamuddin Aulia, which is regarded by most adherents as one of the two most important 
shrines in the Subcontinent (the other being the shrine of Khaja Moinuddin Chishti in 
Ajmer).  Two neighborhoods (the one that surrounds the shrine, and the much more 
affluent area of Nizamuddin East) are named after the saint, as is the nearby railway 
terminus.  Politicians often visit the shrine during the time of elections, movie stars 
frequent it to aid their career, and even foreign dignitaries come in to pay their respects.  
It is no surprise that one of the first excursions by the then newly-appointed US 
ambassador to India was to this shrine.  The inclusion of the shrine in the Lonely Planet 
guide to India as a must-see place in New Delhi has meant that it is now not uncommon 
to see backpackers and frazzled tourists from around the world at the shrine at any time 
of the day.   
These occasional visitors aside, most of the visitors one sees at the shrine on any 
day, and at any time of day, are local folk from all over Delhi and a sizeable number of 
pilgrims from all over the Subcontinent.  The fame of the shrine and stories of the saint’s 
power have drawn these pilgrims to the shrine for the past several hundred years.  These 
days a major attraction of the shrine, to both the pilgrim and the casual visitor, is the 
offering of sacred songs (qawwali) made at the shrine by professional singers (qawwal).  
As mentioned in the previous section, at the shrine of Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia (like 
many popular Sufi shrines) these musical offerings are made every evening.  As I visited 
this shrine nearly every evening during my fieldwork, I soon began to recognize familiar 
faces among these listeners: folk I would see at the shrine several times a week, paying 
their respects to the saint and sitting a while to listen to often-heard songs of his praise.   
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The shrine is certainly an integral part of the spiritual and religious lives of many 
residents of Delhi, and is often a part of people’s daily or weekly routines.  The complex 
mix of people who are drawn to the shrine of Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia, and its continued 
significance in such a massive city, were the main aspects of the shrine that drew me to it 
as a site for research.   
THE TWO SAINTS AND THE CHISHTI SUFI ORDER 
Sufi shrines are only ever as important as the saints whom they enshrine.   Sufi 
saints often live storied lives, and their legacies persist as lived realities centuries after the 
contemporary political formations around them decay and disappear.  Delving into the 
biographies of the two saints, Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia and Khaja Bandanawaz, would 
help us in some measure understand the significance of their shrines, and of shrine-based 
Sufism, to the religious and cultural lives of Indian Muslims.   
Born to a noble family from Bada’un, the young Hazrat Nizamuddin lived first in 
Lahore, and then was sent to Delhi for his formal education.  He then traveled to Ajodhan 
(modern-day Pakpattan in Pakistan) to seek discipleship under the Sufi master, Shaikh 
Farid al-Din Ganj-e Shakkar, which he received.  Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia returned to 
Delhi to establish his own Sufi hospice, and on his death was buried close to it.  Hazrat 
Nizamuddin Aulia is considered by most adherents of shrine-based Sufism to be among 
the most important Sufi saints of South Asia.  Thus, his shrine in New Delhi draws 
millions of pilgrims every year.  Many South Asian adherents, Muslims and non-
Muslims, often undertake religious tours, stopping at various shrines all over India.  The 
shrine of Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia is a major stop in this religious circuit both during the 
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time of the saint’s death anniversary (the most important ritual event in any shrine’s 
calendar), and during the rest of the year.   
Khaja Bandanawaz Gesudaraz was born and raised primarily in Delhi.  It was in 
Delhi that he became the disciple of the Chishti saint, Nasir al-Din Chiragh Dehli.  On his 
master’s death, he took on the stewardship of the Sufi hospice.  He remained in Delhi for 
forty-four years, and decided to move to Deccan India only at the age of 80.  Eventually, 
Khaja Bandanawaz set up a hospice in Gulbarga on the invitation of the Sultan there.  It 
was in Gulbarga that the saint passed away, and where he lies buried.  Khaja Bandanawaz 
is less well-known than Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia is all over the Subcontinent, however 
his shrine is very significant in peninsular India.  It is one of the largest and perhaps the 
most popular Sufi shrines in Deccan India.  As mentioned above, pilgrims to his shrine 
gather in great numbers from all over India, particularly from the South, during his death 
anniversary.  A steady stream of visitors can be seen at the shrine during the rest of the 
year.   
  Both Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia and Khaja Bandanawaz belong to the Chishti 
order of Sufis.  Many Sufi orders can be found in South Asia, such as the Naqshbandiyya 
order, the Qadiri order, and the Suhrawardiya order, but the Chishti order of Sufism is the 
most prominent in the region, boasting the most adherents, and the most popular shrines 
and forms of Sufi practice.  In the previous section describing typical Sufi shrines and the 
practices seen there, I mentioned the importance of the offering of ritual song and music, 
especially in the form of Qawwali.  While many other Sufi orders practice the ritual 
remembrance of God (zikar), the incorporation of ritual audition (sama) in the form of 
sacred music into the performance of this ritual remembrance is a distinct characteristic 
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Khaja Moinuddin Chishti 
(1141-1230 CE) 
Ajmer, India 
Shaikh Qutubuddin Bakhtiar Kaki  
(1173-1235 CE) 
Delhi, India 
Shaikh Fariduddin Ganj-e Shakar 
(1188-1280 CE) 
Pakpattan, Pakistan 
Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia 
(1238-1325 CE) 
Delhi, India  
Shaikh Nasiruddin Chiragh-e Dehli 
(1247-1356 CE) 
Delhi, India 
Khaja Bandanawaz Gesudaraz 
(1321-1422 CE) 
Gulbarga, India 
of Chishti Sufi practice (Ernst and Lawrence 2002: 4).  This order gets its name from 
Khaja Moinuddin Chishti, one of the preeminent Sufi saints of South Asia, who is also 
credited with bringing Sufi Islam to the Indian Subcontinent.  He, in turn, gets his name 
from the town of Chisht in Afghanistan from where he came.  Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia 
is twice removed in spiritual descent from Khaja Moinuddin Chishti, and Khaja 
Bandanawaz is once removed in spiritual descent from Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia.  Below 
is a chart showing the line of spiritual descent of the first six masters of the Chishti Sufi 
order (Figure 1.1).  The chart traces the lineage through the most prominent line, and 
displays the site of theirs shrines.  As mentioned in the introduction, this spiritual lineage, 
as with other Sufi orders, is traced back to Muhammad.  Also below is a map of South 
Asia displaying the sites of these Sufi masters’ shrines (Figure 1.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.2. 
As with other Sufi saints, adherents of shrine-based Sufism narrate many accounts 
of the power and charisma of these two prominent Sufi figures.  I heard narratives 
detailing how these saints restored blindness, healed other ailments, were able to glean 
the good or evil intent of those in their presence, and had visions of Muhammad and 
revelations about the nature of God and the universe
17
.  
Aside from these miracle stories, which focus on the divine sources of a saint’s 
power and position, hagiographies and popular narratives often also draw attention to the 
political and social powers wielded by these saints.  I was often told stories of Sufi saints 
                                                          
17
A rich and detailed translation of the hagiographic narratives and utterances (malfuzat) of the Naqshbandi 
order is provided by Simon Digby (2001) in Sufis and Soldiers in Awrangzeb’s Deccan.  This text is replete 
with fascinating tales of the power, piety and charisma of the Deccan saint Baba Palangposh.   
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confronting the might of empires, and prevailing.  These are not narratives where secular 
political institutions compete with clerical or institutionalized religious structures for 
authority and power.  They are often narratives of kings and sultans feeling utterly 
threatened by Sufi saints who do not need their patronage, or who pay no heed to them.  
These narratives also reflect what Ernst and Lawrence (2002) identify as a marked aspect 
of Chishti Sufism: the conceptualization of political power as corruptive and the need to 
avoid its symbols and manifestations (p. 4).  
  Two stories about Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia stand out among the many such 
narratives that I heard at Sufi shrines.  The one is quite famous and often repeated.  The 
tale is told that the then sultan of Delhi, Ghiyasuddin Tughlaq, felt slighted by Hazrat 
Nizamuddin’s insubordination.  The sultan was away on a military expedition at the time 
and resolved to deal with the defiant Sufi on his return to Delhi.  On hearing of this 
threat, Hazrat Nizamuddin said, “Delhi is yet far away!” (hanoz dehli dur ast). 18  His 
words proved prescient, as sultan Ghiyasuddin Tughlaq never made it to Delhi, dying en 
route.  So famous is this tale, that Hazrat Nizamuddin’s words (uttered in Persian) are 
still used by speakers of Hindi-Urdu when speaking of eventualities.  
Another intriguing tale narrates Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia’s resistance to Sultan 
Alla’uddin Khilji’s overtures.  Impressed by Hazrat Nizamuddin, the sultan had sent a 
missive to the saint saying that he would visit him at his hospice.  Hazrat Nizamuddin 
wrote back to the sultan that visiting him was not necessary, and that he was occupied in 
prayer and meditation.  In spite of this clear message, the sultan insisted on an audience 
with the saint.  To this, Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia very bluntly responded: “The home of 
                                                          
18
 تسا رود یلهد زونه  
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this weak one has two doors, and if the emperor enters through one door, I will leave 
through the other.” I had read of this incident in the compilation of hagiographies, akhbar 
al-akhyar (Dihlavi 2004) before I began fieldwork, and then heard it several times from 
adherents in the field.  
The social importance of the Sufi saint and his hospice (khanqah) are given 
considerable attention in the hagiographies and oral narratives that I encountered.  While 
I was at the shrine of Khaja Bandanawaz Gesudaraz the chief religious teacher at the 
shrine’s religious school spoke to me extensively about Sufism, the saint and the shrine.  
Addressing me and a room-full of young female students at the shrine’s religious school 
for girls, he told us about how Khaja Bandanawaz had enjoined his followers to be like 
the tree that stood at the heart of his hospice’s courtyard: withstanding the intense heat, 
but providing shade for so many. “Be like the tree!” he said to us, and gestured at the 
very tree that still stood in the blazing hot courtyard outside.   
The hospices of Sufi saints acted as loci of both social and spiritual activity during 
their lifetimes.  They functioned as caravanserais for weary travelers, provided care for 
the sick, fed the hungry, and dispensed religious education and spiritual knowledge to 
those who sought it.  These hospices would have drawn considerable numbers of people: 
lay folk in need of its services, as well as disciples of the saint.  The hospices of eminent 
Sufi masters would thus have been far from secluded sanctuaries for those with other-
worldly persuasions, and yet were home to spiritual masters who strove for ultimate 
union with God.    
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A hagiography of Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia, in akhbar al-akhyar (Dihlavi 2004) 
provides an intriguing presentation of this tension between the other-worldly goals of a 
Sufi’s life, and the worldly responsibilities that accompanied his social position.  The 
author of this hagiography tells us that once Hazrat Nizamuddin had gained renown as a 
Sufi master of the highest order, his hospice began to attract quite a few visitors.  The 
saint felt that these daily interactions with lay-folk and hospice-related activities 
distracted him and detracted from his larger spiritual goals. One day he thought to 
himself that he would leave the hustle-bustle of hospice life and retire to the forest, to a 
secluded life of meditation and austerity.  This, he reasoned, would enable him to focus 
all his energies on the contemplation of God.  The very day that the thought occurred to 
him, Hazrat Nizamuddin encountered a handsome youth emerging from the mosque at 
the time of the afternoon prayer.  The saint knew immediately that this was no ordinary 
youth; that this was a vision of the Prophet Muhammad.  Hazrat Nizamuddin invited the 
youth to his home and offered him a meal, which the youth refused to eat.  Eventually, 
the youth said to the Sufi that he was aware of the latter’s resolve to leave his hospice.  
But, he said, to leave behind the people and the responsibilities of the hospice and to 
meditate on God in seclusion was easy enough.  To be fully immersed in the 
contemplation of God in spite of the crowds and the worldly responsibilities of a Sufi 
master was the true test of devotion.  And so Hazrat Nizamuddin continued to live at the 
hospice, and as the hagiographical narratives tell us, it is at his hospice that he left this 
world and entered into union with God (fana).  Throughout my fieldwork I was told such 
stories about Sufi saints by lay adherents of shrine-based Sufism, and by specialists. 
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These narratives were also recounted with great gusto at various ritual and celebratory 
events, where they received a massive audience.   
While these hagiographical narratives are focused on the lives of Sufi saints and 
their work through their hospices, the tension between the goals of this world and that 
continue to persist with regard to Sufi shrines in contemporary India, centuries after the 
time of these saints.  It is this straddling of two worlds (this and the other) that often 
places Sufi shrines in contemporary South Asia in a maelstrom of debate, contestation 
and opposition.  Contemporary Sufi shrines do provide social services to the general 
public to a greater or lesser extent; the education trust run by the custodians of the Khaja 
Bandanawaz shrine is an example of a more successful attempt at continuing this 
tradition of the Sufi hospice.  But at a minimum, most well-established Sufi shrines 
provide food at no charge to the poor who gather there.  As with most religiously 
important sites, there do exist institutions around many Sufi shrines that seek to 
commercially exploit the faith of visiting lay adherents.  In short, Sufi shrines in 
contemporary India are complex social sites, and are loci of spiritual fulfillment, religious 
devotion, commercial opportunism, education and employment for thousands of lay and 
specialist adherents.  And the oppositional responses to Sufi shrines are equally varied.  
The other-worldly aspects of Sufi practice and belief draws the ire of many reformist 
groups who claim that it shifts focus away from a Muslim’s social and institutional 
responsibilities; other reformists find the a-spiritual and a-religious concerns of Sufi 
shrines and their custodians to be exceedingly problematic.  I will discuss these specific 
points of contention in greater detail in chapter 2.  I have discussed above various aspects 
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of a Sufi saint’s life that make his hospice (during his lifetime) and his shrine (after his 
death) so vital to the religious lives of millions of Muslims across South Asia.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
II. ALLEYWAY ENCOUNTERS: SUFI REFORMISM AND THE 
CRITIQUE OF SHRINE PRACTICE 
 
In this chapter, I give a detailed account of the reformist ideologies that stand in 
opposition to the beliefs and practices of shrine-based Sufism.  I focus especially on the 
Tablighi Jama’at, a Muslim reformist group that poses the biggest and most imminent 
threat to shrine-based Sufism in India.  I present the origins of this organization, and the 
ideological lineages and proselytizing practices that give it such purchase in spreading 
reformist Muslim views among lay adherents of shrine-based Sufism in India today.  I 
also present the specific points of tension between reformist ideology and shrine-based 
Sufism, and the encounter between members and lay adherents of these two groups.  
THE TABLIGHI JAMA’AT AND SUFI REFORMISM 
The Tablighi Jama’at is primarily an apolitical missionary movement that began 
in South Asia, and that has now transformed into a global phenomenon.  It was founded 
in 1927 in Mewat (south Delhi) by Muhammad Ilyas, who is variously characterized in 
the literature as a scholar of Islam (Haq 1972) or a Sufi scholar (Ahmad 1995: 165).  
Ilyas received a religious education at the Dar al’Ulum Deoband (often contracted to 
Deoband), one of India’s foremost Islamic seminaries19, and later “lived in seclusion at 
the Sufi sanctuary of Nizamuddin at (Delhi)” (Gaborieau 2000: 38).  This combination of 
                                                          
19The Dar ul’Ulum Deoband is a seminary with reformist strictures that are by and large oppositional to the 
lay practices and beliefs of shrine-based Sufism.  The other leading seminary in India is the Jamia Nizamia 
in Hyderabad, which generally tends to stand for the practices and beliefs of shrine-based Sufism.  These 
are generalizations, however.  As religious seminaries with many prominent scholars, opinions within these 
institutions differ on a number of theological points.  
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a textual and doctrinal education at Deoband and a period of spiritual and mystical 
learning at the shrine of Nizamuddin Auliya is significant, and had a great impact on the 
missionary goals of the Tablighi Jama’at and its interactions with the shrine-community.   
THE LINEAGES OF MUSLIM REFORMISM IN SOUTH ASIA 
Forming the backdrop to Ilays’ education was the growing polarization of the 
Hindu and Muslim communities in the Subcontinent, and the burgeoning movement for 
independence from British rule.  The 1920s saw the birth of the Shuddhi Movement by 
the Arya Samaj, a major Hindu reformist organization of the time.  The goal of this 
movement was to (re)convert Muslims to Hinduism (a practice that, till the inception of 
this movement, was largely unknown in the Subcontinent).  The prime target of these 
(re)conversions were people who self-identified as Muslim, but who continued to practice 
Indic and Hindu rituals and life-ways (Haq: 31; Ahmad: 165).   
Muhammad Ilyas established the Tablighi Jama’at in response to the spread of the 
Shuddhi movement.  Through his nascent organization, Ilyas hoped to bring these 
“‘borderline’ Muslims” (Ahmad: 165) firmly and clearly into the fold of Islam by the 
removal of assimilative practices and the promotion of “true Islam” (Haq: 5). Ilyas soon 
realized that the setting up of religious schools towards this end was having little impact.  
He thus founded the Tablighi Jama’at as a cadre of dedicated Muslim youths who were 
willing to contribute their time and energy towards preaching “true Islam” to the Muslim 
masses (Ahmad: 166; Metcalf 2006: 272).  
At this point it becomes important to define the term tabligh and its changing 
context in the Subcontinent.  The term, Arabic in origin, translates to “to call” or “to 
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communicate” and is closely related to the term da’wa or “invitation”.  For the purpose of 
clarity, I use the term “invitational proselytizing” for tabligh.  The primary understanding 
of the term had for long been to equate it not with any process of active conversion.  The 
role of the proselytizer, as implied by the literal meaning of the term, was to merely 
communicate the message of Islam; whereas the onus of conversion to Islam fell on the 
individual who was bring “called” or “invited” (Masud 1995: 162).  Furthermore, the act 
of invitational proselytizing was largely the domain of only those who had a command 
over the Arabic language, had knowledge of Islamic texts and Islamic jurisprudence, and 
who were trained specifically for the performance of such “calling” or “inviting”. 
This broad, less-aggressive understanding of the term tabligh has undergone a 
marked change in reformist Islamic circles.  In the 19
th
 century, the Subcontinent saw the 
growth of missionary Christian activity, which was seen as a threat and as an 
encroachment by both Hindu and Muslim communities in the region.  Against this 
setting, the 19
th
 century Muslim intellectual, Mansurpuri defined tabligh as a message 
being sent from one “nation” to another (Masud 1995: 162), thus emphasizing the 
political as well as the religious differences between communities that were exclusive 
enough in character and practice to be termed as separate nations.  This definition also 
then incorporates the same sense of goal-oriented proselytizing as Christian missionary 
work.  Barabara Metcalf (2006) has likened the organizational style of the Tablighi 
Jama’at to that of Alcoholics Anonymous where “the heart of Tablighi Jama’t strategy 
was the belief that the best way t learn is to teach and encourage others” (p. 272). 
In the context of the Indian Subcontinent, these “nations” would signify either the 
growing European (Christian) presence there, or the existing Hindu population.   This is 
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an intriguing prospect, as for centuries, Christians (and Jews) within the Islamicate 
Empire were considered to be “people of the book” (ahl al-kitab), and a part of the same 
religious lineage as Islam; while in India, Hindus had also begun to be granted a similar 
(if not the same) acknowledged status.  Mansurpuri’s characterization of tabligh as a 
message transmitted across nations as applied within the Subcontinent marks a change in 
the intended recipient of such invitational proselytizing.  Mansurpuri also proclaimed that 
the act of proselytizing was the duty of all Muslims, and not necessarily of religious 
scholars (p. 162).  This too, marks a shift in the understanding of tabligh.  Mansurpuri’s 
assertion allowed for invitational proselytizing to be practiced by lay Muslims, and in 
turn allowed the act to be aimed at a large section of the population who were previously 
unreachable through proselytizing carried out by religious scholars.  
There was a further transformation of this term with the birth of the Tablighi 
Jama’at in the 1920s20.  Ilyas’ stated aim in establishing the Jama’at was to prevent 
Muslims in the subcontinent from being converted to Hinduism by the Arya Samaj.  He 
redirected the focus of invitational proselytizing from non-Muslims to Muslims.  That is, 
invitational proselytizing was now directed inward; missionaries would preach the 
Jama’at conception of correct Islamic practice and belief to fellow Muslims, and would 
seek to transform their own lives in congruence with these.  For Ilyas, invitational 
proselytizing was no longer an attempt to reveal the word of God to non-Muslims, but to 
reiterate Islamic law, practice and belief (but specifically, the Jama’at interpretation of 
these) to Muslims.  As mentioned above, the focus of this newly defined tabligh was 
                                                          
20
The name, Tablighi Jama’at, translates to “Organization for Invitational Proselytizing”.  
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“borderline Muslims”.  Also included in his vision of reform were Sufi shrines, to whose 
many assimilative practices he was opposed (Ahmad: 168).   
 In tracing the history of the movement as accepted by the Tablighi Jama’at, the 
communal tensions of the 1920s are not the sole point of origin for their reformist goals 
vis-à-vis shrine-based Sufism.  The Tablighi Jama’at traces this reformist strain (as with 
many Islamic reformist movements of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries) back to the millenarian 
movement of Ahmad Sirhindi and his Naqshbandi
21
 Sufi connections.  Also in this 
lineage are the reformist successors of the 18
th
 century thinker and scholar Shah 
Waliullah, as well as the more recent political revivalism led by Sayyed Ahmad Shahid 
Barelwi in the 19
th
 century (Masud: 164; Haq: 10-16).  
The opposition to assimilative practices in South Asian Islam has a long history, 
one that is emphasized by reformist groups such as the Tablighi Jama’at.  These groups 
often identify Ahmad Sirhindi as taking one of the first concrete steps to counteract 
assimilative trends, which he considered deviant and innovate.  The Chishtiyya, the first 
order of Sufis to be established in the Subcontinent had, by the time of the Mughal 
emperor Akbar (1542-1605 CE), already incorporated many Indic traditions and motifs 
into shrine practice.  Akbar is noted for the founding of an esoteric religious movement, 
which he called din-e ilahi.  In response to Akbar’s religious experiments, Sirhindi is 
characterized in reformist narratives as broadly rejecting assimilative Chishtiyya 
practices as well.  Here, the relationship between the Chishti order of Sufism and Akbar 
is emphasized, as is the loss of favor in the Mughal court for the Naqshbandi order, which 
Sirhindi embraced.  In these reformist narratives, Sirhindi’s attack on Akbar’s religious 
                                                          
21
The Naqshbandiyya is a Sufi order with its origins in Central Asia.  It is one of the many predominant 
Sufi orders extant in India today.  
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experiments is also seen as addressing the growing influence of the Chishti order, and his 
disapproval of what he considered their “un-Islamic” practices.  In such a 
characterization of Sirhindi’s critique, the Naqshbandi order is presented as emphasizing 
a strict adherence to Islamic law (shari’a),  and to silent performance of the ritual 
remembrance of God (zikr-e khafi).  Reformist narratives position these stances as 
creating a rift between the two orders – Naqshbandi and Chishti – in the Subcontinent 
(Haq: 10-15).   
Reformist historical narratives also present Sirhindi’s apparent division of the 
Islamic philosophical concepts of wahdat al-wajud and wahdat al-shuhud as two 
diametrically opposed ideas as a significant one.  Sirhindi’s critique of the former is seen 
as an attack against the Chishti order
22
.  In this historical narrative, the latter school of 
thought – wahdat al-shuhud – is presented as one espoused by Sirhindi and his ilk.  These 
narratives also present it as being more in line with the Islamic precept of strict 
monotheism (Haq: 10-16).   
This marked opposition between the Naqshbandi order and the Chishti order is 
contested in the scholarship.  Damrel (2000) has shown that opposition to the vocal, ritual 
remembrance of God, and to ritual audition (sama’) were not stances common to all those 
who followed the Naqshbandi order (p. 188-189). Moreover, Damrel also suggests that 
Sirhindi’s hard-line attitudes against non-Muslims were more likely influenced by 
similarly inclined Chishtis (such as Shaikh Gangohi), rather than by his own Naqshbandi 
Sufi master or his Naqshbandi contemporaries (p. 187).  Scholars have also suggested 
                                                          
22
The school of philosophy known as wahdat al-wajud was formulated and expounded by the 12
th
-13
th
 
century Sufi philosopher Ibn ‘Arabi.  In South Asia, this school of thought is commonly associated with the 
Chisthi order.  Many religious scholars of the time saw wahdat al-wajud to be uncomfortably close to 
notions of pantheism, and thus questioned its validity within the fold of Islam.  
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that Sirhindi’s understanding of the  two philosophical concepts of wahdat-al wujud  and 
wahdat al-shuhud was far more nuanced than is reflected in much of the historiography 
(Friedmann 1971: 60; Damrel: 190), and these two schools of thought are by no means 
wholly accepted or rejected by any given Sufi order.  There is in fact evidence of debate 
within the Chishti order regarding the validity of these schools of thought (Hussaini 
1982).  
I have discussed these narratives on theology and philosophy here because 
reformist narratives use these to bring into question the validity of Chishti Sufi practice 
and belief.  Such narratives result in a very problematic dichotomy with 
Naqshbandi/reformist Muslims, and adherence to Islamic law and ritual on one side, and 
Chishti Sufism, the iconoclastic religious innovations of Akbar and non-compliance with 
Islamic law and belief on the other.  Though the field is quite messy with differences of 
opinion across members of different orders and groups in the later medieval period in 
India, reformist narratives paint these divisions as being stark.  
The second thread of the Tablighi Jama’at’s doctrinal ancestry leads to the 18th 
century thinker, Shah Waliullah, and importantly, to his reformist heirs.  As I mentioned 
above, reformist narratives present the activities of religious experimenters like Akbar 
and reactionaries such as Sirhindi as having deepened the rift between Chishti Sufis and 
the scholars of Islamic law and jurisprudence, and thus ossifying notions of a separation 
of Chishti Sufis from Islamic practice and belief.  Shah Waliullah attempted to minimize 
this divide by emphasizing the interpretive quality of the Quran and the prophetic sayings 
(ijtihad) (Haq: 36).  He also felt that it was not some general notion of civilizational 
decline that had led to a feeling malaise among Muslims in his time, but instead that the 
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closing of the door to an interpretive approach to religious texts was to blame.  However, 
his approach was taken only so far by his intellectual successors.  To them, the flexibility 
allowed for by this approach was only permissible to the degree approved of by 
traditional religious scholars of the time.  This was the stance taken by Shah Waliullah’s 
son, Shah Abdul Aziz Barelwi, a scholar of prophetic sayings (hadis), and his successor 
in turn, Sayyed Ahmad Shahid Barelwi.   
In comparison to his successors, Shah Wiliullah’s position on the practices and 
beliefs of shrine-based Sufism can be considered quite moderate (Baljon 1989), and 
contemporary reformist positions are more in line with the theological and ritual stances 
of Shah Waliullah’s successors than with those of Shah Waliullah himself.  However, this 
disjuncture between the position held by Shah Waliullah and his successors does not 
prevent the Tablighi Jama’at, along with many other reformist groups, from claiming 
Shah Waliullah as a source of their criticism of shrine-based Sufism.  The stature of Shah 
Waliullah as an Islamic scholar and thinker lends credence to those who claim to be part 
of his intellectual and theological lineage.   
Looking more closely at this lineage, it is perhaps more the mark of the later 
thinker and Muslim leader, Sayyed Ahmad Barelwi, which can be seen on the Tablighi 
Jama’at and on other 20th century reformist movements.  Sayyad Ahmad Barelwi’s views 
did certainly bear the imprint of Shah Waliullah and his son Abdul Aziz.  Firstly, Shah 
Waliullah’s emphasis on the interpretive approach to Islamic texts (ijtihad) drove in the 
message that the individual, lay Muslim’s efforts are key to the revival, reform and 
rejuvenation of Islam; secondly, Abdul Aziz Barelwi’s emphasis on the prophetic sayings 
(hadis) and on core daily ritual practices (such as prayer, clothing etc.) is echoed in the 
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conception of “correct” Muslim practice and belief among contemporary reformist 
movements.   
The religio-political climate of 18
th
 century India also affected the approach of 
Sayyed Ahmad Barelwi.  In reaction to the professional methods used by Christian 
missionaries, he began to employ such strategies as missionary tours of South Asia, 
pamphleteering, and the establishment of journals aimed at religious reform.  In addition 
to this, in the Northwestern regions of British India his reformist movement transformed 
into an anti-British and anti-Sikh religio-political struggle (Ahmad: 165).  These 
developments of the reformist movement under Sayyed Ahmad Barelwi were unique in 
that 1) for perhaps the first time, he defined Muslims in the Subcontinent as a politically 
and socially distinct group, and 2) he was able to employ the media-technologies of the 
19
th
 century for the purposes of religious and political proselytizing.  The direct influence 
of these significant aspects of Sayyed Ahmad’s movement can be seen on the Tablighi 
Jama’at and on other reformist groups.  Though the Tablighi Jama’at, the Dar ul-‘Ulum 
Deoband, and nearly all other Muslim reformist institutions in India today are staunchly 
a-political, they proselytize to Muslims with the goal of awakening their consciousness as 
a distinct group, and use modern media to do so.  
The legacy of these 18
th
 and 19
th
 century reformist thinkers and leaders among 
contemporary reformist groups in India is evident in one other significant way:  the sense 
of urgency to take the message of Islam first and foremost to Muslims themselves, while 
relegating proselytizing among non-Muslims to the back-burner.  It is this reflective, 
grass-roots based, Islam-centric reformist ideology that clearly defines the doctrinal 
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ancestry and the ideological lineage of the Tablighi Jama’at and other reformist groups in 
India today.   
THE GOAL OF SUFI REFORMISM 
Before I delve into the objectives of the Tablighi Jama’at, I would like to clarify 
my use of the terms “Sufi reformism” or “Sufi reformist”.  In this dissertation, I have 
used these terms to connote Muslim reformist movements that have been oppositional to 
shrine-based Sufism and that have sought to reform Sufism while simultaneously 
claiming a Sufi identity.  However, it is very important to note that religious scholars, the 
clergy, and ritual specialists who are adherents of shrine-based Sufism (that is, who self-
identify as the ahl-e sunnat wa al jamat), in many respects, consider themselves to be 
reformists as well.  Here, I echo Usha Sanyal’s (2005) words: 
While critics might argue that the Ahl-e Sunnat were too accommodating of local 
practice, too local, and too parochial to be considered “reformist” – unlike the 
Deobandis or the Ahl-e Hadith or the Nadwa, for example – I would argue that 
the Ahl-e Sunnat movement was reformist in the self-consciousness of its 
practice, and in its insistence on following the sunna of the Prophet al all times.  
In paying attention to every detail of their comportment on a daily basis, members 
of the Ahl-e Sunnat were no different from followers of rival movements at the 
time.  What set them apart from the other movements was their interpretation of 
what, in practice, was entailed by following the Prophet’s example.  [pp. 128-129]  
Muhammad Ilyas’ educational and religious background also illuminates the 
nature of the movement that he so successfully initiated.  Ilyas received his religious 
education from the Deoband school and from Abdul Aziz Barelwi.  After completing his 
education, Ilyas spent a few years in meditative seclusion at the shrine of Hazrat 
Nizamuddin Auliya in New Delhi.  This perhaps embodies the most fascinating aspect of 
the genesis of the Tablighi Jama’at.  Like most religious thinkers of his time and before, 
Ilyas was a Sufi initiate and was willing to explore the various arenas of thought and 
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philosophy offered by various Sufi orders.  In Muhammad Ilyas we find the coming 
together of Sufi spirituality, the spirit of Islamic reformation, and an apolitical stance.  
It is in the claim to this ancestry, with such figures as Shah Waliullah and his 
reformist successors, and Muhammad Ilyas, that the Tablighi Jama’at places its religious 
authority; authority it then uses to levy aggressive critique on shrine-based Sufism today.  
It is also what makes the Tablighi Jama’at unique as a reformist organization.  Most other 
Islamic reformist organizations that level attacks against shrine-based Sufism, such as the 
Jama’at-e Islami or the Ahl-e Hadis, do so while simultaneously distancing themselves 
from Sufism in most of its forms.  While these reformists may have had early Sufi 
affiliations, their organizations not only deride shrine-based Sufism and its lay practices 
and beliefs, but also deny any legitimacy to Sufism in general.  It is in this context that 
the Tablighi Jama’at stands out.  The Tablighi Jama’at’s criticism of shrine-based Sufism 
comes from a doctrinal and spiritual base within the Sufi fold.  
Masud (2000) has pointed out that the political stance of the Tablighi Jama’at is 
more complex than is made out to be in much of the literature, and that its ideological 
lineages are more tenuous as well.  He points out that the Tablighi Jama’at’s initial non-
sectarian position largely failed because many of its early patrons being were a part of the 
Dar ul-‘Ulum Deoabnd, and Hanafi movements such as the Nadwatul ‘Ulama (p. 95).  He 
also writes that the Jama’at’s self-identification as apolitical “should not be taken to mean 
that the Jama’at has no political vision” (p. 97).  He elaborates: “In a very broad sense, 
the Tablighi Jama’at’s work is, in fact, political.  Making Muslims conscious of their 
separate identity and aware of their social obligations from a religious perspective” (what 
he terms as “Umma consciousness”) “ultimately serves a political purpose” (p. 99).   
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The Tablighi Jama’at is able to claim authority and legitimacy for its rhetoric 
against Sufi shrines at several levels.  First, is the fact that Muhammad Ilyas as well as 
other influential figures for the movement, such as Shah Waliullah and Ahmad Sirhindi 
and the Deoband school, were greatly influenced by Sufi thought and philosophy.  
Sirhindi’s strong ties with the Naqshbandi order, Shah Waliullah’s deep knowledge of 
Sufism, and Ilays’ days spent in seclusion at the shrine of Nizamuddin Auliya all allow 
the Tablighi Jama’at to claim authority over knowledge of what it means to be Sufi.  
These factors give its critique of shrine-based Sufism immense leverage among lay 
Muslims, especially of the educated classes.   
Secondly, the Tablighi Jama’at’s doctrinal emphasis on the prophetic sayings 
(hadis) gives them further weight among lay Muslims in their anti-shrine rhetoric.  The 
Tablighi Jama’at distributes some literature on the teachings of the Deoband seminary 
and is considered to have grown under the larger umbrella of the Deoband movement 
(Metcalf 2006: 266).  The majority of the Tablighi Jama’at’s proselytizing script consists 
of anecdotes and morality tales, which have little or no direct sources in the Quran or the 
in the prophetic sayings (Gaborieau: 38), but are presented as being drawn from the life 
and example of Muhammad
23
.  However, their association with the Deoband seminary is 
quite strong, and their rhetorical claim over knowledge of the prophetic sayings (through 
the personages of Muhammad Zakariya and Abdul Aziz Barelwi) allows them to define 
and preach Islamic practice to lay Muslims, especially among the unlettered classes for 
                                                          
23Muhammad Khalid Masud (2000) provides a thorough outline of the canon of Tablighi Jama’at literature 
and their early reception (p. 80-85).   
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whom oral narratives have immense purchase
24
.  With this claim to religious authority 
backing them, Tablighi Jama’at missionaries place the practices and beliefs of shrine-
based Sufism outside the realm of “true” Islam, as defined by them.   
Thirdly, the Tablighi Jama’at defines the reform of Sufism to be one of its goals.  
Unlike many reformist groups, especially those with Wahhabi and Salafi roots, who wish 
to obliterate most forms of Sufism and Sufi practice, the denial and rejection of Sufism is 
not the stated aim of Tablighi Jama’at missionaries.  The goal of them is to revive “true” 
Islamic spirituality inherent to Sufism, which they believe has long disappeared in the 
popular practice of Sufism.  Needless to say, this “true” and “correct” mode of Islamic 
belief and practice is based on their reformist interpretations of Islamic doctrine.    
Both the Tablighi Jama’at’s focus on prophetic sayings as the key to Islamic 
comportment and their self-identification as Sufis is a legacy of their roots in the 
Deobandi school of thought.  As Metcalf (2006) notes, both are important aspects of the 
Deobandi curriculum and the beliefs of their most prominent scholars and teachers (p. 
269).  However, “the place of Sufism [for Tablighis] was more complex.  Although what 
were seen as deviant customs around holy men were discouraged, Sufism in no sense 
disappeared.  Indeed, among Tablighis, the holiness associated with the Sufi pir was in 
many ways defused into the charismatic body of the jama’at so that the missionary group 
itself became a channel for divine intervention” (p. 274).   
                                                          
24
This aspect of Tablighi Jama’t teaching has been strongly informed by the Deoband approach to religious 
education.  As Metcalf (2006) has noted, the Deoband school from the start has laid more emphasis on 
Prophetic sayings (hadis), daily rituals and personal comportment (p. 266).  In addition, Deoband “de-
emphasized the so-called rational sciences, logic and philosophy” (p. 36).  
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Adherents of shrine-based Sufism do counter the outright denial of Sufism’s 
legitimacy by other reformist groups.  Ritual experts do this by staking a superior claim 
to doctrinal and theological knowledge, while lay practitioners look to the authority, 
wisdom and charisma of Sufi saints.  The Tablighi Jama’at’s insistence on the 
reformation of shrine-based Sufism as insiders is often harder to counter, however.  Their 
Sufi reformist goal, coupled with the claimed authority over knowledge of Sufism, the 
Quran and the prophetic sayings, makes it a movement that is a constant and unbending 
adversary to adherents of shrine-based Sufism today.    
THE TABLIGHI JAMA’AT’S REACH AND GROWTH 
The Tablighi Jama’at is a movement that has grown immeasurably in following 
since its inception in the 1920s.  As it grew from its small-town origins in Mewat, the 
Jama’at set up its headquarters in the Nizamuddin neighborhood in New Delhi, the place 
where its founder had undergone spiritual seclusion in his formative years.  Other 
important centers have now emerged in Tungi in Bangladesh, and in Raiwind in Pakistan.  
In addition, there are now many centers outside the Subcontinent.  A reflection of the 
Jama’at following is the fact that the annual Tablighi Jama’at gathering at Raiwind is 
now estimated to be the second largest religious gathering of Muslims, second only to the 
Hajj (Ahmad: 165; Metcalf: 671).  Significantly, Sufi shrines such as the shrine of 
Nizamuddin Auliya and the shrine of Khaja Moinuddin Chishti in Ajmer draw a 
comparable number of visitors during their death anniversary events (urs).  
The global reach of the Tablighi Jama’at movement was made clear to me during 
my many visits to the shrine of Hazrat Nizamuddin Auliya.  As I have previously 
described, I had to pass by the Tablighi Jama’at mosque and headquarters on my way to 
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this Sufi shrine.  The alleys around the mosque and the headquarters are full of sundry 
stores and restaurants that cater primarily to a clientele of Tablighi Jama’at initiates.  On 
any given day, I saw initiates here from all over India, and also from South East Asia and 
from the Middle East.  Signboards for these stalls and shops, which were previously in 
Urdu and/or English, now had added signs in Arabic for the convenience of the 
alleyway’s global visitors.  Significantly, this new global clientele did not consist 
primarily of members of the religious elite.  They were for the most part there as initiates, 
as low-rung missionaries who had come to visit the headquarters of the international 
movement of which they were a part.  
Unlike many reformist movements in other countries of the Subcontinent, the 
Tablighi Jama’at, along with other Indian reformist groups, has remained apolitical.  The 
members of this organization do not actively participate in local or regional party politics, 
nor do these groups endorse any political party or movement.  This allows it to function 
unimpeded, for the most part, by government interference (Metcalf: 672).  In India, 
interreligious violence over the past two decades, the events of 9/11, terrorist attacks by 
radical Islamist groups, and the spread of Hindu nationalism have unfortunately led to 
increased hostility and harassment from the police and internal security agencies towards 
Muslims.  However, this ratcheting of animosity and attention has been experienced by 
Muslims all over India, of all religious and political inclinations.   
In Pakistan, the following of the Tablighi Jama’at does form a viable and 
dependable political base for many conservative, reformist political parties, and it has 
received monetary and ideological support from several administrations there.  The 
political clout of the Tablighi Jama’at in the region cannot therefore be underestimated 
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(Ahmad: 168; Gaborieau: 39).  This political and religious clout, as well as the Tablighi 
Jama’at’s immense grass-roots following, has brought it (very consciously and visibly) at 
loggerheads with visitors to Sufi shrines and their caretakers.  The rivaled following of 
Sufi saints in the region has made for a less than amicable encounter between these two 
groups.   
POINTS OF REFORMIST CRITIQUE 
While varying on specific theological issues, Sufi reformist groups are generally 
in consensus on some aspects of shrine practice and belief.  Chief amongst these are the 
veneration of Sufi saints, belief in a saints’ intercessory powers, and various ritual 
practices that accompany these beliefs.  The general argument is that veneration of Sufi 
saints to the extent that it is seen at Sufi shrines places the believer on the slippery slope 
to idolatry (but parasti) and polytheism (shirk).  Many adherents of shrine-based Sufism 
bow towards the saint’s tomb, and this, say reformists, is antithetical to the monotheistic 
tenets of Islam.  The belief that Sufi saints are able to speak to God on behalf of a 
petitioning believer, too is considered “un-Islamic” as reformists believe that this unduly 
elevates the position of Sufi saints.  Reformists believe that the marking of saints’ death 
anniversaries (urs), offering ritual music (qawwali) at Sufi shrines, the presentations of 
various tokens of faith and veneration (such as colored sheets, flowers and incense) to the 
saint are all heretical innovations (bid’at) and are in variance with “correct” Islamic 
practice and belief.   
The pressure from reformist groups centers on the appropriateness (or 
inappropriateness) of shrine-based Sufi practice and belief within the fold of Islam.  As 
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discussed previously in this chapter, these reformist groups by no means constitute a 
monolithic bloc; they often differ considerably on certain theological stances.  But they 
do agree on their opposition to many beliefs and practices of shrine-based Sufism.  These 
beliefs and practices are seen as heretical innovations (bid’at) that have become 
enmeshed with Sufi practice through contact with Hindus.  Reformists consider these 
practices and beliefs to have pre-Islamic, Indic roots, and are thus judged to be outside 
the fold of Islam.  I have briefly discussed some of these contested beliefs and practices, 
such as bowing before the tomb of the saint (sajda), belief in the intercessory powers of 
the saint (shifa’at), or appealing to the saint to use these powers to resolve personal 
problems (mannat manana) in previous chapters.  At best, reformist groups characterize 
these beliefs and practices as superstition.  At the other end of the spectrum, many 
reformist groups assert that adherence to these practices and beliefs is tantamount to 
engaging in polytheism (shirk) and idolatry (but parasti).  These are very serious 
accusations that are not taken lightly by adherents of shrine-based Sufism.   
There is also a perception among some reformist groups that adherents of shrine-
based Sufism pay little or no heed to Islamic law (shariat) and what are known as the five 
pillars of Islam—the profession of faith (shahada), prayer five times a day (namaz), 
fasting during the month of Ramadan (roza), apportioning a part of one’s income to 
charity (zakat), and pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj).  Even if contemporary adherents of 
shrine-based Sufism do themselves follow these prescriptions, reformist groups often 
claim that adherents valorize Sufi saints and charismatic figures who do not.   
While shrine-based Sufism includes adherents from all strata of society, and with 
quite varied philosophical persuasions and religious motivations, many reformists I spoke 
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to associated shrine-based Sufism primarily with wandering religious mendicants (fakir), 
and with antinomian sects (such as the Qalandars) who they perceive as reclusive and to 
live at the fringes of Islamic society.  My reformist interlocutors also felt that those drawn 
to shrine-based Sufism were people committed to other-worldly goals or held these as 
ideal.  Their perception was that the complete surrendering of one’s life to the attainment 
of union with God (fana), one of the important tenets of Sufism, was achieved only to the 
detriment of one’s worldly responsibilities.  To many reformists I spoke to, this supposed 
abnegation of worldly duties was antithetical to core Islamic values.  They claimed that 
the idealization of detachment from worldly concerns was not compatible with the 
teachings of the Quran and the prophet Muhammad. These aspects of Sufism, they told 
me, had been borrowed from Hindu ascetic traditions.   
My reformist interlocutors disapproved quite strongly of this perceived act of 
“borrowing” from traditions that they saw as polytheistic and wholly other-worldly in 
their concerns.  Many of my reformist interlocutors believed that certain practices and 
beliefs of shrine-based Sufism had no basis in the Quran, the sayings of the Prophet 
Muhammad (hadis), or in the biographical narratives of his life (sirat).  This, to them, 
was reason enough to invalidate these aspects of Sufism.  In their view, in order to reform 
shrine-based Sufism, to return it to the fold of Islam, these “new” and “incompatible” 
practices and beliefs had to be purged; and so long as they continued, adherents of shrine-
based Sufism remained precariously on the slippery slope to polytheism, heretical 
innovation, and idolatry.   
I must point out here that the cross-religious appeal of Sufi shrines was not the 
point of contention for these reformists.  My reformist interlocutors did not argue against 
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the shared sacred space of Sufi shrines per se.  It was the kind of practice and belief that 
Muslim adherents followed there that irked them.  It seemed to matter little to Tablighi 
Jama’at members that Hindus visited Sufi shrines; but they felt very strongly that Muslim 
adherents should desist from what they considered un-Islamic practices and beliefs.  Pete 
van der Veer (1992) has also noted this in his analysis of “a Sufi Saint’s day in Surat” in 
Gujarat (p. 545).  
ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN ADHERENTS OF SHRINE-BASED SUFISM AND 
REFORMISTS 
Attempts at reforming Islamic practice are often overt and can be quite 
adversarial.  I personally observed a few such encounters and also heard testimony from 
adherents of shrine-based Sufism who had been proselytized to.  Some attempts at 
proselytizing were formal and involved structured missionary activities.  For instance, 
one of my interlocutors, Mushtaq, told me of groups of Tablighi Jama’at initiates who 
travelled through rural areas in the western Indian state of Rajasthan.  He came from a 
community of Mir Mirasi singers, who self-identify as one of the first communities in the 
north to convert to Islam nearly 800 years ago.  Sufi poetry and the verses of the poet-
saints of the Bhakti movement (such as Kabir and Gorakhnath) form the core of Mir 
Mirasi repertoire.  Members of this community traditionally have been adherents of 
shrine-based Sufism.  As Mushtaq elegantly stated, “The Sufi saints have cast their 
cooling shade over our community.” 
However, this has been changing in the past decade, said Mushtaq.  His village 
and others in the district have experienced heavy proselytizing by Tablighi Jama’at 
missionaries.  These missionaries come in small groups and attempt to convince locals 
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that their mode of practice and belief is un-Islamic (islam ke khilaf).  These missionaries 
encourage villagers to pray five times a day, dress in particular ways, and dissuade them 
from visiting Sufi shrines and singing.   “The things they say!” Mushtaq once exclaimed.  
“I couldn’t tell you some of the things they say…It’s so terrible!” When I nudged him to 
tell me he reluctantly continued, “They say that going to a Sufi shrine is a sin on par with 
marrying your mother! And they say that if you listen to music you will have molten 
glass poured down your ears in hell.”  
Mushtaq said that the members of his community are Muslim through their 
inherited tradition (paramparik musalman), but many are “forgetting their culture” (apni 
sankriti bhul rahe hain).  He said that the villagers in his district are mostly illiterate, and 
when missionaries and preachers come to them and say that what they are doing is un-
Islamic, that there is textual proof of this, the missionaries are readily believed.  There 
was some resistance from certain villagers, he said, who bluntly tell the missionaries, 
“You speak a different language; we speak a different language” (apki bhasha alag hai, 
hamari bhasha alag).  The resistance was confined to a few though, and Mushtaq felt that 
the missionary groups were quite disciplined and firm (mazbut) and were gaining ground.  
He said that as a consequence of the growing clout of the Tablighi Jama’at, he has not 
been able to sing publically in his own village for the past six years.  
Another of my interlocutors in Gulbarga, Nikhad, was a student at the girls’ 
religious school at the Sufi shrine that I attended each day.  Walking back to her home for 
lunch one day, she pointed out the squat building in her neighborhood where local 
Tablighi Jama’at initiates organized their weekly gatherings (ijtima). She came from a 
family that was distantly related to the chief custodian (sajjada nashin) of the Khaja 
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Bandanwaz shrine, and her father was a Sufi disciple himself.  She too went to the 
religious school at the Sufi shrine daily for lessons in committing the Quran to memory 
(hifz).  The shrine was clearly an important part of her and her family’s religiosity. As we 
walked to her home, I asked her about the Tablighi Jama’at.  She said, “They come from 
outside, set up their assembly halls and instigate people.” I asked her what these 
missionaries said that was so inflammatory. She frowned and replied, “They teach the 
boys that going to the shrine is forbidden by Islam, and that Khaja Bandanawaz was just 
an ordinary human being like the rest of us (voh am admi the)”.  We were in a 
neighborhood that was quite literally at the doorstep of the Sufi shrine, and so I wondered 
about how much of an impact the Tablighi Jama’at had on the community.  Nikhad said 
that now most of the families in the neighborhood had been drawn in by the Tablighi 
Jama’at’s missionary activity and seldom went to the shrine.  Though in Gulbarga on the 
whole, she said that there was more of an even split between adherents and non-
adherents.  
A more confrontational instance of reformist activity can be encountered at the 
death anniversary (urs) of Nizamuddin Auliya.  This is an event that draws millions of 
pilgrims from all over South Asia, turning the neighborhood around the Nizamuddin 
Auliya shrine into a churning mass of humanity.  As I have mentioned previously, the 
death anniversary of a saint is one of the most important and sacred events on a shrine’s 
calendar.  It marks the death of the saint, or, in Sufi terms, the union of the saint with 
God. Often on these occasions, reformists from the Barelvi community rent out the 
auditorium at the Ghalib Academy (which stands between the Tablighi Jama’at 
headquarters and the Nizamuddin Auliya shrine), and proceed to lecture and preach 
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against the “un-Islamic” practices at the shrine.  The practices specifically objected to 
include the celebratory and fair-like atmosphere at and around the shrine, and the practice 
of making vows to perform certain sacrifices or fulfilling certain tasks in return for the 
intercession of the saint (mannat manana)
25
.  Needless to say, passions run high at these 
events.  
Aside from these more structured and planned confrontations, there are many 
encounters that erupt spontaneously.  These are not always as self-consciously aggressive 
as some of the instances I have cited above, but nonetheless elicit anger, discomfort and 
concern among adherents of shrine-based Sufism.   
I have recounted in the introduction of how, while I was in Gulbarga during the 
death anniversary of Khaja Bandanawaz, a young college student with whom I had got 
acquainted approached me looking quite disconcerted.  Her family members were 
adherents of shrine-based Sufism, and her mother worked for one of the academic 
institutions run by the Sufi shrine. She knew of my research interests and so she started to 
ask me questions about Sufism:  What is an urs (death anniversary)? Why is it marked 
the way it is?  Some people say that going to the shrine is wrong, that it’s polytheism 
(shirk); that one can ask for intervention directly from God. Is this true? But why is it 
wrong to think of the saints as intercessors? Why is it wrong to ask for the blessings of 
                                                          
25
This is especially interesting because generally in India, the Barelvi community is considered to be pro-
Sufi shrine.  The term ‘Barelvi’ comes from the 19th century reformist, Ahmad Raza Khan Barelvi, who 
was a staunch supporter of shrine-based Sufism. Those who adhere to shrine-based Sufism refer to 
themselves as ahl-e sunnat wa al-jamat (people of the Islamic way of life and community), or eponymously 
as Barelvis.  Just as the Dar ul-Ulum Deoband is the preeminent seminary among Sufi reformist Muslims in 
India, the Jamaia Nizamia seminary in Hyderabad is the seat of religious scholars who are in favor of 
shrine-based Sufism.  However, it speaks to the diversity of thought and opinion in these seminaries that 
there is no consensus on whether all or only certain shrine-based practices and beliefs should be endorsed.   
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saints when we always ask our elders for their blessings? The questions came tumbling 
out.   
She was clearly troubled by all these conflicting messages and had come to me to 
untangle them.  I asked her why she was suddenly assailed by these doubts.  She told me 
that she had gone to the shrine to pay her respects to the saint on the occasion of his death 
anniversary when her friend from college had texted her about her whereabouts.  When 
she had responded that she was at the shrine, he had immediately written back, cautioning 
her against going there.  “He wrote, ‘Don’t you know that going to shrines is against 
Islam?’”, she said. He had repeatedly texted her admonishing her for being there, telling 
her that Sufi shrines were a heretical innovation (bid’at) and that going there amounted to 
practicing polytheism (shirk).  These serious accusations, which flew in the face of the 
kind of Islam she had grown up practicing and which her elders practiced, were deeply 
disturbing to her.   
I overheard or was privy to similar conversations and arguments among 
acquaintances, friends and family throughout my fieldwork.  The folks participating in 
these conversations represented quite a demographic range: I have heard arguments over 
the validity of pilgrimage to shrines at up-market coffee shops in the swanky 
neighborhoods of South Delhi, and listened in on discussions over the legitimacy of 
various shrine practices at hole-in-the-wall tea stalls in the alleyways of lower-income 
ghettos.  To a great extent, the credit for this wide-ranging and extensive conversation 
goes to the Tablighi Jama’at.  Their grass-roots missionary activity, based on mobilizing 
initiates from varying socio-economic backgrounds, has resulted in such discussions 
being par for course at every strata of urban and rural India.   
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It is not uncommon at all for opinion on these topics to vary within members of a 
family.  One of my first reformist interlocutors was a woman I happened to meet on my 
way to Gulbarga.  Ameera was a very well-educated woman who was the principal of a 
girl’s college in Gulbarga. My first encounter with her was on a train ride.  When I told 
her that I was headed to Gulbarga to do research on Sufism at the shrine of Khaja 
Bandanawaz, she told me that “we Muslims” believed that the Sufi shrine was “only a 
grave”.  She told me that while many people did go to the shrine and indulge in various 
rituals there, most of these were not “correct Islam”.  She said that in “true Islam we 
believe that Sufi saints are respected and revered people who have been blessed by God.  
We believe that God showers his grace (barkat) on them, and so the belief is that if we go 
close to them some of this grace will fall on us as well.”  But the shrine was just a grave, 
she reiterated, and as it was “forbidden for women to enter graveyards in Islam”, she 
never entered the shrine.  She just paid her respects to the saint from outside just like she 
would do for the dead at any grave.  Her narrative spoke of points of unresolved tension: 
on the one hand, she reiterated how the shrine was just a grave and nothing more; but on 
the other, she spoke of the saints being blessed and the sites of their burial being 
exceptional spaces.   
I kept up my acquaintance with Ameera throughout my time in Gulbarga, and the 
tension I perceived in her above narrative revealed itself on other occasions.  I once asked 
her which group or person she felt had the firmest grasp of what correct Islamic practice 
and belief was.  She said that the chief custodian of the Khaja Bandanawaz Sufi shrine, 
Hussaini Sahab, was the most knowledgeable person when it came to Sufism.  She 
emphasized that he had been educated in America and that he had “correct knowledge” of 
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Sufism.  But in general, she felt that the speaker and preacher, Dr. Zakir Naik, was the 
most informed person when it came to Islam in general.  “He has had debates with 
prominent people from different religions, and he has won all those debates,” she 
declared.  This response was intriguing to me because while Hussaini Sahab was an 
inseparable part of the institution of shrine-based Sufism, Dr. Zakir Naik (a hugely 
popular speaker on topics pertaining to Islam) is staunchly anti-shrine in his stance and 
has Wahhabi and Salafi affiliations.   
I found that this kind of complicated relationship with the Sufi shrine is common 
among Muslims in India.  Sufism certainly continued to hold some draw for most of my 
reformist interlocutors, perhaps because they were raised in that tradition; but there was 
an underlying sense of unease about Sufi shrines themselves, and towards the rituals, the 
beliefs and the pomp associated with them.  Much of this disquiet came from association 
with or influence of reformist thinkers, speakers, or strongly anti-shrine family members.  
Ameera once told me that her sons were quite clear on where they stood in terms of the 
Sufi shrine.  With a smile on her face, her eyes sparkling, and in tones of admiration and 
pride, she spoke of her son’s fervor: “My son says that any Muslim who even steps into a 
Sufi shrine is no longer a Muslim!”  She had similar admiration for the anti-shrine (and 
quite anti-Sufi) stances of the Wahhabis she had encountered in Saudi Arabia during her 
recent Hajj.  Since Saudi Arabia has strong affiliations with Wahhabi clerics, it is the 
latter’s ideologies that govern the maintenance and running of the holy sites of Mecca 
and Medina.  Ameera spoke of how the security guards at the mosque in Medina were 
trained in “correct” Islamic practice, and how these guards would make people who were 
praying in the direction of the tombs turn to face the Ka’ba in Mecca.    
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Speaking to her and to others like her, I got the impression that to many Muslims 
in India these days, reformist Islam has a certain aspirational quality.  While some of my 
interlocutors displayed a certain reluctance to abandon the kind of Islam practiced by 
their ancestors in India in its entirety, there was also a certain charisma and pietic purity 
that they associated with anti-shrine reformism, and especially for Wahhabi Islam that is 
so strongly associated with the Arabian Peninsula.  I will discuss the importance of the 
Arabian Peninsula to Muslims later in this chapter.  For now, suffice to say that for many 
Muslims in India who are ambivalent on where they stand with regard to Sufism, and 
especially shrine-based Sufism, the Sufi reformism of the Tablighi Jama’at and the Dar 
ul-Ulum Deoband seminary offers a certain middle ground.  The stances of these groups 
allows them to consider Sufi saints as respected and blessed figures in Islamic history 
who are worthy of emulation, but also allows them to distance themselves from shrine-
based practice and beliefs.  But fundamental to this complex relationship is the seed of 
doubt towards shrine-based Sufism that reformists are able to sow in the minds of those 
who are not fervently this or that; something that is achieved by tapping into the desire of 
many lay Muslims to be better believers and better practitioners of their faith.  
The influence of reformist family members and friends in persuading or 
dissuading adherents of shrine-based Sufism in certain directions cannot be 
underestimated.  These informal and unplanned encounters are certainly not structured to 
the same extent as reformist-sponsored events and literature.  But when the validity of 
one’s religious practice and beliefs is so strongly and persistently questioned by those 
with whom you have sustained relationships, it becomes a deeply effective tool in 
furthering reformist ideology.  
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Defining Sufism in particular and Islam in general, thus no longer remains the 
domain of theologians, religious scholars, and philosophers.  These debates make their 
way into the homes of lay Muslims through family members and friends committed to 
different modes of Islamic practice.  The voice of religious scholars too has a much wider 
reach now than ever before.  Urdu-language newspapers often give quite a few column 
inches to religious-themed articles, especially in their Friday editions, while Urdu TV 
channels regularly allow viewers to call in with questions for the religious scholars 
featured on various Q&A shows; these scholars then issue rulings (fatwa) on these 
religious queries on air.  While most Urdu-language newspapers and TV channels are 
largely secular in their general content with a few religious-themed features, there are at 
least two TV channels dedicated wholly to Islamic programming.  One of these, QTV, is 
a Pakistan-based channel that is more sympathetic to shrine-based Sufism.  The other, 
Peace TV, is the brain-child of the reformist speaker, Dr. Zakir Naik.  Both channels 
closely compete for Indian viewership and bring these debates over proper and improper 
belief and practice to the homes of lay Muslims all over India.  
While most encounters are between dissenting lay adherents, television has 
allowed these lay adherents to become somewhat acquainted with theological arguments 
and proofs supporting various modes of Islamic practice.  This isn’t always an even 
contest, though.  Reformist groups, by the nature of their goals, are often missionary, and 
employ various proselytizing techniques.  They are also better organized in structured 
groups with planned outreach programs, printed literature for lay readership and in some 
cases, a more solid financial base to fund these activities.  
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Due to the role of Sufi hospices and shrines in the spread of Islam in India, shrine-
based Sufism has been the predominant form of Islam practiced in the Subcontinent.  In 
my estimation, adherents of shrine-based Sufism still constitute a substantial majority of 
Muslims in India.  However, due to the above-mentioned encounters with reformist 
ideology and active proselytizing by reformist groups, a sustained majority can no longer 
be presumed.  Adherents of shrine-based Sufism are well aware of the growing influence 
and clout of reformist groups as they are confronted with instances of alternate modes of 
Islamic practice on a daily basis.   
Reformist reaction to adherents of shrine-based Sufism and shrine practice vary 
considerably on finer theological points.  I have had conversations with reformists from 
the Deoband seminary, the Tablighi Jama’at and the Jama’at-e Islami Hind, and their 
opposition to shrine-based Sufism has varied in terms of their theological stances and 
their emotional responses.  Interlocutors from some groups have told me that they are not 
opposed to Sufism or even Sufi shrines, but feel that practice at shrines has deviated from 
proper Islamic conduct and need to be brought back on track, so to speak.  Other 
reformists see nothing to redeem Sufi shrines. Clearly, there is quite a distance between 
these two responses.  However, as has been discussed earlier in this chapter, there are 
many specific shrine practices and beliefs to which reformists across the board object.  
And the point of objection is that to reformists, these practices go against the grain of 
“true” Islam.  
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THE GEOGRAPHIC VALENCING OF THE MUSLIM WORLD 
Reformist groups position themselves on a theological and doctrinal high ground 
in their engagement with adherents of shrine-based Sufism: both lay adherents and 
specialists of shrine-based Sufism are spoken of as having incomplete knowledge or a 
misguided notion of both Sufism and Islam.  The accusation that Sufism is bid’at, a 
heretical innovation, with practice and belief borrowed from South Asia’s non-Muslim 
inhabitants is common enough.  The corollary to this accusation is that reformists 
represent “pure” Islam, the “original” Islam that was practiced in the Arabian Peninsula 
at the time of Muhammad.   
While adherents of shrine-based Sufism reject this self-representation by 
reformists, many Indian Muslims who do not have any strong emotional or religious 
commitments to either group are often convinced of this claim to purity of practice and 
belief.  One such interlocutor spoke to me of her father’s Wahhabi perspective, 
something he had acquired after spending years in the Arabian Gulf.  She said of her 
father’s Wahhabi leanings and his opposition to Sufi shrines: “He doesn’t believe in 
doing anything innovative; just what the Quran says”.  Her remark is very telling. It not 
only places shrine-based Sufism as being without a basis in the Quran, it also imagines it 
as something new and thus removed from the sacred time and space of Islam’s origins.   
Implicit in her statement is the weight given to the link that Wahhabi and Salafi 
Islam have with the part of the Arabian Peninsula known as the Hijaz, home to the two 
holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Wahhabi and Salafi reformist groups have quite a bit of 
draw over Muslims in India.  This attraction often rests on the supposition that because 
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their ideology originated in the Hijaz, the place of Islam’s origin, they have a claim to 
authenticity of belief and purity of practice that other non-Arabian modes of Islam do not 
have.  That Wahhabi Islam traces its origins to 18
th
 century Arabia, while shrine-based 
Sufism is centuries older, is of little consequence in this valenced view of the Muslim 
world.  For many, Wahhabi and Salafi Islam’s origins and entrenchment in the Arabian 
Peninsula give it the patina of authenticity, while shrine-based Sufism’s irrevocable links 
with South Asia automatically render it an innovation.   
There is a clear link here between the valencing of time and space that deems one 
mode of practice as authentic and the other as inauthentic.  McClintock, in her book 
Imperial Leather (1995), gives us the concept of “anachronistic space” with reference to 
colonial imaginings of Europe and the colonized world.  She writes,  
According to the colonial version of this trope, imperial progress across the space 
of empire is figured as a journey backward in time to an anachronistic moment of 
prehistory.  By extension, the return journey to Europe is seen as rehearsing the 
evolutionary logic of historical progress, forward and upward to the apogee of the 
Enlightenment in the European metropolis.  Geographical difference across space 
is figured as a historical difference across time. [p. 40].   
This is a useful concept in understanding the valenced geography of the “Muslim world”.  
In this instance, however, the privileging of time is reversed, where the old possesses the 
luster of authenticity, while the new is a deviation from the authentic.  And in this 
valenced view of the world, to travel from the Hijaz outward is to journey from the old to 
the new; from true Islamic practice and belief to heretical innovation.  Here, the 
religiosity emerging from the center, the Hijaz, is seen as if in isolation, having remained 
untouched by 1400 years of history and historic change; and Islam in Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa constitutes the periphery, having experienced a change in degree so vast 
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that it is very nearly a change in kind.  Epithets of purity, authenticity, rootedness and 
Truth are privileges of the center, while the appellations of heresy, innovation, corruption 
and deviation are meted out to the periphery.  For adherents of shrine-based Sufism in 
India, whose practice and belief are inextricably linked to both Islam and the 
Subcontinent, this valenced and anachronistic view of space is problematic to say the 
least.   
However, this valenced conception of the Muslim world, with the Hijaz at its 
center, was not always the prevalent view of the Muslim elite.  For centuries, Muslim 
scholars and the ruling class nurtured the intellectual and cultural life of Islam outside of 
the Hijaz: in Andalusia, Turkey, the Levant, Persia and India.  Under Persio-Turkic and 
Mughal rule, India very soon grew into an intellectual and artistic hub in the Islamicate 
world.  This privileging of the Subcontinent in the geography of the Muslim world 
would, however, experience a sea-change during the course of the 19
th
 century.   
This time-period saw the intensification of the colonial hold over much of the 
subcontinent, and the accompanying stresses from an exploitative power-relationship.  In 
India, the resulting Revolt of 1857 was a massive, but short-lived, uprising of lay-folk 
and the gentry against the ultimately victorious East India Company in the Gangetic 
plain.  The revolt was followed by a brutal show of force by the British in India, where 
much of the oppression was directed at Muslims (lay and elite) who were singled out as 
primarily responsible for the uprising.  The abortive revolt also marked the bloody end of 
the Mughal Empire, whose borders had receded to encompass not much more than the 
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city of Delhi.
26
   The fall of the Mughal Empire, the violence meted out to lay Muslim 
subjects by the British, and the growing colonial discourse of the general decline of Islam 
and Muslims in South Asia no doubt weighed heavily on Muslim intellectuals of the 
time.  
In response to this rhetoric of decline and the grave existential crisis that had 
gripped the intelligentsia of North India, many Muslim thinkers of the time looked to the 
Arabian Peninsula as a source of unerring authority, intellectual revival and active 
religious discourse.  While the influence of the Hijaz on South Asian Muslim intellectual 
life began much earlier in the mid-18
th
 century, this trend continued to grow through the 
19
th
 century and early 20
th
 century.  The 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries also saw an upsurge in 
socio-religious reform movements in South Asia among Hindus, Zoroastrians and Sikhs, 
and the reformist zeal among Muslim groups was part of this broader moment of self-
reflection in the face of colonial contact (Metcalf 2006: 270).  Among Muslims, reformist 
thinkers were inspired by the growing strength of Wahhabi Islam in the Arabian 
Peninsula, and often travelled to the Hijaz and were in dialogue with scholars at 
seminaries in Mecca and Medina, contacts which, Zaman (1997) notes, reinforced the 
“memories and myths of origin somewhere in the Middle East” (p. 273-274).   
Socio-religious reform was a cause taken up by Muslim intellectual and ruling 
elites of a variety of sects and orders.  Among them were both proponents of shrine-based 
Sufism and those opposed to it.  Most of these reformist leaders were involved in 
animated discourse and intense debate over issues of practice and belief with intellectuals 
                                                          
26
A detailed account of the revolt, the events leading up to it and its aftermath can be found in Seema 
Alavi’s (1998) book The Sepoys and the Company: Tradition and Transition in Northern India 1770-1830.  
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in the Hijaz; and this was true regardless of whether these thinkers were Sufis, Wahhabis 
or Salafis.  As Zaman (1997) writes:  
Many Muslims have… thought of themselves all along as the descendants of 
people who came to India from outside, and they have sought prestige and local 
influence on the basis of claims to foreign descent.  The sense that as Muslims 
they are part of the greater Muslim world, and memories of historical contacts 
with, or origins in, the Arab Middle East, Iran, and Central Asia, do form part of 
the communal identity of Indian Muslims and they have done so in the past. [p. 
273] 
 
Considering the socio-political context of 19
th
-century South Asia, it is easy to see 
that the draw of the Hijaz for South Asian Muslims was not only an intellectual one, but 
also a deeply emotional one: as a seat of renewed intellectual vigor and as a reminder of 
Islam’s origins.  This sentiment is resonantly rendered in the following verses of 
Muhammed Iqbal, one of South Asia’s foremost Sufi thinkers of the modern era:  
phir utha valvala-e yad-e mughilan-e arab 
phir khincha daman-e dil suye bayaban-e arab
27
 
Once more rises the tumultuous memory of the thorn-bushes of Arabia! 
Once more are my heart-strings pulled towards the deserts of Arabia! 
ajami kham hai to kya, mai to hejazi hai meri 
naghma hindi hai to kya, lay to hejazi hai meri
28
 
So what if my pitcher is not of Arabia? My wine is of the Hijaz; 
So what if it’s an Indian song I sing? My melody is of the Hijaz! 29 
 
                                                          
27
 برع نابایب ؤس لد نماد اچنیھک رھپ / برع نلایغم دای ۂلولو اھٹا رھپ   
28
 یریم ےہ یزاجح وت یل ،ایک وت ےہ یدنہ ہمغن / یریم ےہ یزاجح وت یم ،ایک وت ےہ مخ یمجع 
 
29
 These verses are found in Iqbal’s seminal work shikwa aur jawab-e shikwa, in which the poet first rants 
against God on the abject state of Muslims in the contemporary world, and then responds in the voice of 
God to these complaints.  
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By the close of the 19
th
 century, the geography of the Muslim world had witnessed a 
major shift in focus, from a worldview centered in Indo-Persia to one ensconced in the 
Hijaz.  
Needless to say, this attachment to the Hijaz did not always translate into 
agreement with the Wahhabi mode of Islam prevalent there.  One of shrine-based 
Sufism’s most prominent advocates in South Asia was Ahmad Riza Khan Barelvi, whose 
defense of shrine-based Sufism, hussam al-haramain ‘ ala manhar al-kufr wa al-main, 
was in fact written in the Hijaz as a rebuttal to dissenting Wahhabi scholars (Sanyal 2005: 
103-107).   
The shift in focus was certainly not always a straightforward one.  Zaman (1997), 
in examining the ideologies of the early 20
th
 century reformist, Sayyid Abul Hasan Ali 
Nadwi, has pointed out that the geopolitical orientation of many Muslim thinkers was 
complex, displaying “both the attachment to the Middle East and a highly developed 
sense of India’s cultural contribution to it” (p. 275).  However, with the growth of 
Wahhabi and Salafi reformist movements in South Asia in the 20
th
 century, and with the 
growing number of Muslims who are immersed in Wahhabi modes of Islamic practice 
through migration to the oil-rich Gulf states, the shift in focus away from South Asia and 
towards the Hijaz has often translated into the delegitimizing of South Asian modes of 
Islamic practice and belief; and this view has been taken up by many Sufi reformists as 
well (who do not self-identify as Wahhabi and Salafi).  To many lay Muslims in India, 
both emotional and intellectual alignment with the Hijaz has now become emblematic of 
true faith and proper practice.   
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In contrast to this trend, I found that scholars and leaders among adherents of 
shrine-based Sufism resist this valenced configuration of the world, and attempt to assert 
South Asian Sufism as a legitimate and essential form of Islamic practice, and India as 
sacred ground in the Muslim World.  Ernst and Lawrence (2002) have argued that, “for 
the devotee…the origin of Chishti Sufism is less important than its experience.  Its path 
to God is experienced in Mecca and Ajmer at the same time that it is experienced in 
Jerusalem and Baghdad” (p. 2).   I would add, however, that the geography of Chishti 
Sufism and Sufism’s origins has become increasingly important in a religious and 
political environment where the validity of shrine-based Sufism as a form of Islamic 
practice is called into question, and where questions of Muslim identity are now tied 
irrevocably to notions of regional and national belonging.       
To summarize the premises of this chapter: pressure from reformist groups thus 
makes itself felt at many levels. There is the charge that adherents of shrine-based are 
“un-Islamic”, not “good Muslims”, or are not Muslim enough.  Adherents are confronted 
with this from theological quarters through exposure to and engagement with reformist 
religious scholars, and from encounters with family members, friends and neighbors who 
are drawn to various reformist groups.  This leads to the more concrete pressure to give 
up certain shrine practices and beliefs, or to give up shrine visitations altogether.  Both 
these pressures are backed by a), various theological and scriptural arguments that often 
invalidate any practice or belief that does not have direct and explicit doctrinal sanction; 
and b), by reformist claims to religious authority that are bolstered by a valenced view of 
the “Muslim world” with its center in the Hijaz and the rest of the world as its periphery.  
131 
 
These demands to conform to a certain form of Islamic practice and belief are 
based on particular modes of religious interpretation.  However, they are couched in the 
language of inalienable authenticity and an unshakable claim to the Truth.  In responding 
to this kind of critique and pressure, adherents of shrine-based Sufism find ways to 
counter the argument at all the levels at which it is deployed: in theological and doctrinal 
terms, in terms of legitimate sacred spaces, and in terms of the valenced geography of 
global Islam. I will discuss these responses in greater detail in chapter 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
III. RELIGIOUS AMBIGUITY AND COMMUNAL HARMONY:   
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE “GOOD MUSLIM” IN POST-
INDEPENDENCE INDIA. 
 
In this chapter, I examine the mode of religious subjecthood that is favored by the 
Indian nation-state, and how ideal Muslim subjecthood in particular is imagined.  
Through a detailed examination of the treatment of Muslim figures in state- and non-state 
media, I show how the figure of the “syncretic” Muslim, whose religiosity is not rigid 
and bounded, is positioned as the ideal Indian Muslim.   
Religious subjecthood in India favors any religious identity that is ambiguous, 
amorphous, “syncretic” or “composite”.  When markers of various religions are found 
overlapping in the practice or belief of a particular community, it is talked about with 
admiration and positive interest in the popular media and to some extent in South Asian 
academic scholarship, among the intelligentsia and by the opinion-makers in politics, 
entertainment, art and literature.  I characterize these folks as “secularists” as their 
positive attitude towards composite customs and practices stems from a notion that such 
“syncretism” advances the cause of Indian secularism and national unity.  There are also 
the “spiritualists” who are found in these strata of India’s intellectual elite.  These 
spiritualists often paint a picture of religion and faith in the broadest of brush-strokes, 
emphasizing commonalities among multiple faith-systems, while downplaying 
differences and linear religious identities.  To them, “syncretic” or “composite” traditions 
exemplify these commonalities in lived and reified terms.  The narratives of both 
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secularists and spiritualists broadly promote the ideal of Indian multiculturalist 
secularism, the defining characteristics of which I will discuss in the pages that follow.  
Within this larger framework of Indian multiculturalist secularism, Sufism gets swept up 
by both secularists and spiritualists as an exemplar of Indian composite culture.  In this 
chapter I show how Sufism is co-opted and rendered in this construction of ideal Indian 
religious subjecthood, and how this ideation pressures adherents of shrine-based Sufism 
to express their identity as Indian Muslims in very particular ways.  
I encountered the notion of a religiously ambiguous (and therefore appropriately 
Indian) Muslim identity in various iterations throughout my fieldwork.  The Mughal 
emperor Akbar and the poet-saint Kabir are perhaps the most visible of such tropes, and I 
therefore examine their use in greater detail in this chapter.  These tropes are present in 
what I characterize as secularist narratives in both state- and non-state media.  Such 
secularist narratives also appropriate Sufi saints and the sacred space of Sufi shrines into 
this imagining of acceptable manifestations of religiosity, and Sufism on the whole is 
portrayed as emblematic of India’s culturally composite ideal.  This chapter traces the 
emergence and context of such religious subjecthood and its points of manifestation in 
the popular Indian imagining.   
I contend that while the position of shrine-based Sufism within this imagining 
appears to be favorable to adherents of shrine-based Sufism, it in fact imposes ways of 
being Muslim that are not entirely acceptable to adherents.  This adds another point of 
pressure that shapes the narratives of adherents in their assertion of a Muslim identity.  
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NON-BOUNDED RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND THE “GOOD MUSLIM” 
The framing of religious identity and religiosity has been a very important part of 
the construction of national subjecthood in modern India.  A good way to gauge this 
interwoven relationship is by looking to state- and non-state media, which give us cues to 
the zeitgeist of contemporary India.  The treatment of historic figures in state-produced 
media (such as state-run television channels, or state-produced school texts) and in non-
state media (such as movies, commercial TV, and books of fiction and non-fiction) gives 
the observer an insight into the kinds of religiosity that are broadly considered as being 
congruent with an Indian national identity in the public imagination.  These cues and 
clues are visible everywhere, and it is hard to ignore once you become aware of their 
forms.  
I still remember distinctly a conversation I overheard in the eighth grade.  Two of 
my friends were studying for their upcoming History and Islamic Studies exams.  One of 
them seemed very confused about the two Mughal kings, Akbar and Aurangzeb.  Her 
friend had this clarification for her:  “Just remember: in history class, Akbar is good and 
Aurangzeb is bad.  But in Islamic Studies class, Aurangzeb is good and Akbar is bad.”  In 
retrospect, I wish had my little anthropologist’s notepad back then.  But as it stands, this 
overheard snippet struck me even then as presenting two very different notions of a 
religio-political ideal.  Why is it that these two remarkable emperors – Akbar and 
Aurangzeb – are framed in such contradictory ways?  Akbar, so glorified in the secularist 
narratives of the government-generated history textbooks, and Aurangzeb made out to be 
such a villain in the same?  What do these divergent narratives tell us about how the 
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“good Indian Muslim” is defined both by the state and in the popular imagination?  And 
how can we understand the imagining of Sufism in India within this context?  
The project of “national integration” embraced by the Indian nation-state after 
independence in 1947 has resulted in particular constructions of what a “good Indian 
Muslim” is.  The bloody partition of India and the creation of Pakistan placed Muslims 
starkly as the Other within the Indian national imagining.  If Pakistan was a nation 
created for South Asian Muslims, then how could Muslims who had remained in India be 
framed in ways that firmly established them as Indian?  
Over the 65 years since independence, an image of what this “good Indian 
Muslim” looks like has emerged: an image of a fully “integrated” and “assimilated” 
Muslim who cannot be considered an outsider to the Indian nation.  These terms are of 
course value-loaded, and connote the Indian nation as fundamentally Hindu in character.  
In this construction of Indianness, the onus of assimilation (regardless of Islam’s 
presence in, and impact on the Subcontinent for nearly a millennium) falls squarely on 
Muslims.  Against this political and cultural backdrop, the character of the “syncretized” 
or religiously ambiguous Muslim emerges as the ideal of Muslim religious subjecthood.  
In fact, the religiously “syncretic” Muslim, who is constructed as truly Indian because of 
his/her lack of a bounded religious identity, becomes emblematic of inter-religious 
harmony in general.  Before I explore this construction further, it is important to 
deconstruct Indian secularism and its predominant narratives.   
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INDIAN MULTICULTURALIST SECULARISM AND IDEAL RELIGIOUS SUBJECTHOOD  
An important part of the ideology of the Indian nation-state is its unique brand of 
secularism.  Secularism in India is not defined negatively, but positively.  That is, it is not 
defined as the absence of religion in the functioning of the state and the public sphere in 
general, nor as just the absence of discrimination on the basis of religion.  The Hindi 
word for secularism is the Sanskritic construction, dharmanirpekshata, which literally 
means ‘lack of religion-based biases’.  However, it is widely understood both by those in 
government and by governed citizens as an acknowledgment of, or an openness to, the 
presence of diverse religious representation in the public sphere.  And in state- and non-
state secularist narratives, it is often framed not merely as the acceptance of “religion” in 
the abstract sense of the term; within the context of Indian secularism, the understanding 
is that space in public discourse and in public action must be given to religions, as real, 
functioning entities, with their accompanying rituals, practices and beliefs
30
.   
Freedom of religion is a right guaranteed to all citizen of India, but this freedom 
involves the incorporation of diverse religious practices and symbolism into the activities 
and rhetoric of public institutions, rather than through their exclusion.  Thus, it is not 
uncommon for scientists at the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) to visit 
temples as a group prior to the launch of a satellite – visits that are often reported by the 
media.  Similarly, hosting iftar parties to mark the breaking of the day’s fast is de rigueur 
for politicians and political parties throughout the month of Ramadan, and politicians 
                                                          
30When I write of “religion” in the plural, it is of course with an acknowledgement that such a 
generalization comes with many problems.  There are belief-systems in India that are not recognized as 
religions by the state.  Many belief-systems and associated modes of living practiced by indigenous 
communities in India are either not granted official recognition, or are subsumed under the label of 
“Hindu”.  While Buddhism and Jainism are recognized as separate religious groups by the state, this is 
mostly nominal, as members of these groups also often get lumped in with Hindus for most bureaucratic 
purposes (as in the case of the Hindu Marriage Act).  
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(Muslim and non-Muslim) will often pay visits to Sufi shrines before launching their 
electoral campaigns.  It is in the same vein that one encounters religious symbolism in the 
form of portraits of Hindu deities, Oms, Swastikas, Nativity scenes and crucifixes, 
images of Mecca, Medina and Sufi shrines, calligraphic renditions of Quranic verses etc. 
in government offices, put up there by employees.  
Those who object to such overt inclusions of religion in the public space are few, 
and I have found that any objection is often frowned upon as a mark of being “un-
secular” in the public arena.  So what does it mean to be secular in India?  And this is a 
pertinent question especially for public figures and institutions active in politics and 
media.  As is clear from the above discussion, to be secular in India does not mean being 
a-religious in one’s public dealings, and institutions do not have to be overtly 
disconnected from expressions of religiosity in order to be secular .  To be secular in this 
sense is to positively re-affirm religio-cultural diversity; to display tolerance and an 
acceptance of different faith-systems.
31
 
Key phrases that usually occur in conjunction with the term ‘secular’ in public 
discourse are ‘communal harmony’, ‘national integration’, and ‘unity in diversity’.  The 
first phrase is used to indicate the amicable co-existence of Indian citizens who may be 
members of different faith-systems.  The latter two terms indicate an emphasis on the 
unity of India as a nation despite the huge variety of life-ways found within its territorial 
boundaries.  Thus, the implications of being non-secular within this context are grave, as 
it implies the disruption of peace among India’s citizenry, and risks the disintegration of 
the state.   
                                                          
31 I deliberately use the word ‘display’ here.  It often seems in India, that whatever your personal 
motivations and inclinations may be, an outward show of such inclusiveness is a must.  
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To emphasize this brand of secularism, I use the term ‘multiculturalist secularism’ 
to refer specifically to the Indian context, as this term points to the inclusionary aspects of 
secularism’s Indian manifestation.  It points to the idea that secularism in this avatar 
emerges in the Indian public discourse as the glue that binds the diverse peoples of India.  
This definition of secularism ties in with the positive connotation of the term 
‘syncretic’ in India, as it too refers to the layering of multiple identities.  Many Indian 
scholars and intellectuals use ‘syncretism’ to mean the successful blending and layering 
of a multiplicity of socio-cultural and especially religious identities (T. Stewart and C. 
Ernst 2003).  Indian intellectuals see ‘syncretism’ as a phenomenon that aids in India’s 
goal of maintaining ‘national integration’ and ‘unity in diversity’. 
The Indian state has routinely broadcast messages promoting national integration 
for decades now, largely through state-controlled media such as the state-run television 
channel Doordarshan, and through state-published civics, social science, and history 
textbooks.  State-sponsored public service messages have been produced by state-
institutions such as the Lok Seva Sanchar Parishad (Council for Public Service 
Communication), Films Division, and the National Council of Educational Research and 
Training, and are aired on Doordarshan or printed in school texts and advertising.  These 
have been especially successful in disseminating notions of how the diverse Indian nation 
is imagined as a cohesive unit through the popularization of slogans such as ‘Unity in 
Diversity’ (anekta main ekta), and ‘Unity in Integrity’ (akhandta main ekta).   
  One of the most iconic of these messages is the song and accompanying video 
“In Harmony” (Ek Sur) (1988).  In this piece, prominent movie stars, sports persons and 
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artists, along with common folk from India’s rural and indigenous communities, sing the 
words, “My melody joins with yours, and so we create our harmony” (mile sur mera 
tumhara, to sur bane hamara) in many of the official languages of India.  An earlier 
Doordarshan channel film produced by Films Division titled, “One, Many, and Unity” 
(Ek, Anek, aur Ekta) (1980) is a charming animated short that depicts a group of young 
children learning the lesson of strength in both unity and diversity from an older girl.  
Animated against whimsical and colorful backdrops, all the children are uncolored line-
drawings.  In the end, the children are colored-in as a chorus of children’s voices sings 
“The citizens of India are one people, though they may be diverse in color, appearance, 
clothing and language” (hind desh ke nivasi sabhi jan ek hain, rang-rup vesh-bhasha 
chahe anek hain).   
Most of these public service messages do not explicitly address the issue of 
religious identity and religious difference, but there is a subtext on religion that is evident 
in most of them.  These messages rarely ever depict overtly religious figures or symbols 
such as people praying, or even celebrating religious festivals.  At the most, these state-
produced national integration messages feature characters who are dressed in a way 
(usually stereotypical) that marks them as belonging to a particular religious minority (a 
turbaned Sikh man, a bearded Muslim with a skull cap, a priest in a white cassock, or a 
Buddhist monk).  But these characters do not figure prominently, or make a show of their 
religious identity; their presence can be seen as only a token acknowledgement of 
religious diversity in India.   
What is so striking, however, is this very lack of prominence given to overt 
religiosity in a country that is otherwise brimming over with religious expression.  As I 
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watched these videos I began to realize that these state-produced national integration 
shorts and advertisements placed Culture front and center.  That is, they showcased 
Indian art, architecture, music, dance, sport, and India’s linguistic diversity.  In this 
secularist imagining of India’s diversity, however, religion decidedly takes a backseat as 
an acceptable marker of an Indian citizen’s identity.  Religion finds a place in this 
imagining of India only in so much as it contributes to the variegated cultural landscape 
of the nation.  Where aspects of religious difference threaten to mar this portrait of 
national unity, they are ignored.   
The kind of religious subjectivity that becomes evident in this mode of imagining 
India is one where notions of commonality are promoted over any iteration of 
fundamental difference.  The idea is that though the garb of religious scripture and ritual 
is different, 1) these differences are only superficial, and the core values of all religions 
are the same, and 2) those who practice these different religions are united in their 
common “Indian culture”, which is their primary identity.  These two tenets of 
commonality are what Indian secularists and state and non-state secularist messages 
transmit.   
Nowhere did I find this mode of religious subjectivity more explicitly conveyed 
than in the northern Indian state of Himachal Pradesh.  It’s a commonly heard aphorism 
in India that the only way to see India is by train.  This certainly occurred to me as I 
travelled on the historic train-route from Kalka in the Gangetic plains to the small town 
of Shimla in the foothills of the Himalayas.  Throughout the journey, I was mesmerized 
by public service messages that had been posted on the walls that hugged the 
mountainside along the tracks.  These were official signs posted by the railway 
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authorities of Himachal Pradesh.  There were a limited number of messages in both Hindi 
and English that cycled through, and there were two that were most striking.  
One was a famous quote of Mahatma Gandhi: “The Allah of Islam is the same as 
the God of Christians and the Iswar of Hindus.”  The other was a couplet by the medieval 
Indian poet-saint, Kabir:   
pothi padh padh jag mua pandit bhaya na koye 
dhai akhar prem ka padhe so pandit hoe32 
You may read a thousand tomes; you leave this world no wiser; 
But understand the four letters of 'love', and then you are wise indeed. 
The impetus to find commonality among all religions is clear in the former message.  
And being a quote from a 20
th
 century Indian leader so closely associated with the 
formation of the Indian nation, it is well-situated in the context of Indian nation-building.  
The medieval couplet, however, requires some parsing.   
The medieval poet-saint Kabir is regarded as one of the foremost figures in what 
is commonly referred to as the ‘Bhakti Movement’ in India (bhakti means ‘devotion’) 
that spread in waves throughout the subcontinent from the 14
th
 to 17
th
 centuries.  I will 
examine the figure of Kabir more closely later in this chapter, but to understand the 
significance of this couplet it is important to know that one of the hallmarks of Kabir’s 
poetic and philosophical tradition is his staunch rejection of the religious authority vested 
in texts and the clergy.  His deep suspicion of textually and ritually-based religion cuts 
across religious lines; he was equally irreverent towards the Muslim preacher in his 
Friday pulpit and the Brahmin in saffron robes.  Kabir’s notion of God was not merely 
monotheistic, but non-dualist and wholly unconnected to all overt religious trappings.  To 
                                                          
32
 पोथी पढ़ पढ़ जग मुआ पंडित भाया न कोय / ढाई आखर पे्रम का पढ़े सो पंडित होए 
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him, knowledge (and love) of God was to be found within the believer (within any 
believer), and not in the texts or rituals of the tradition he is born into.   
Now going back to the couplet: 
You may read a thousand tomes; you leave this world no wiser; 
But understand the four letters of 'love', and then you are wise indeed. 
The term pothi that Kabir uses quite literally means ‘tome’ or ‘book’, but Kabir often 
uses it to refer specifically to religious texts and scripture.  The couplet then is not a 
rejection of the written word, but a rejection of the infallibility of religious textual 
authority, be it the Quran, or the Geeta.  Thus understood, it is clear how this couplet 
could be seen as being very much in tune with the Gandhian notion that differentiated 
religious nomenclature does not reflect the Truth, which he sees as fundamentally 
unified.  It is not hard to see that these “public service messages” are not as extraordinary 
as they appear prima facie.  Understood in a particular way, they are congruent with the 
idea that if religious differences are only superficial, religious differences need not be 
emphasized and promoted (and perhaps ought not to be) as an acceptable form of national 
cultural diversity.   
It is important to note that these public service films and messages I have 
discussed above and others like them cannot be considered merely propaganda pieces 
produced by the state and its bureaucratic apparatuses.  They have now attained iconic 
status in India, becoming cultural reference points for citizens across generations.  The 
slogans and messages broadcast through these media have permeated into the “national 
ethos” of India, so to speak, and have become an integral mode through which many 
Indian citizens imagine the Indian nation.   
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As I began fieldwork in India, I approached concepts such as “national 
integration” and “unity in diversity” with some skepticism.  I had grown up with these 
messages, but thinking about their place in the Indian imagination, I wondered if they 
were now not merely glib slogans churned out by the state’s efficient (and quite creative) 
propaganda mill.  I presumed that they were far removed from the ways in which most 
Indians, plagued by basic concerns over food and livelihood, perceived India.  It didn’t 
take long, however, for my cynicism to give way to a more complex understanding of the 
place that these concepts occupy in the imaginary of the average citizen.  I found that the 
various defining concepts of Indian multiculturalist secularism, such as diversity 
(vibhinnata, anekta), oneness or unity (ekta), and integrity (akhandta) are the primary 
mode in which most Indians I encountered (across class, caste and religious affiliation) 
imagine the ideal of India.
33
  The realities of daily life in India are painfully obvious to 
the average Indian citizen, but the Platonic ideal of India is certainly inflected by notions 
of communal harmony, inter-religious concord and the successful unification of a vivid 
and variegated citizenry
34
.  Indian popular media for the most part have also embraced 
this rhetoric.  Much of Indian popular cinema, news media, and India’s social and 
                                                          
33
It is important to note, however, that I rarely encountered anyone who credited the state with contributing 
to the achievement of this ideal.  Though my interlocutors often echoed terms used in state-produced 
messages, they rarely identified the state as being the source of this ideology or rhetoric.   
 
34A film was produced in the time that I was in India titled, “The Unheard Voices of India”.  This film was 
the brainchild of director and author, Saeed Mirza.  Soon after the unspeakable violence of Godra, a town 
in Gujarat where Hindutva mobs systematically butchered hundreds of Muslims, director Saeed Mirza 
found himself disenchanted and devastated.  One of the many who had believed in the ideal of a 
multiculturalist secular India, Mirza undertook a journey across the country, speaking to Indians from an 
impressively wide array of socio-economic backgrounds about what they thought India was all about.  The 
film documents this journey, and the people that Mirza encountered in his travels.  What is most striking 
about this film is that people across India, regardless of religion, caste, economic class or level of 
education, articulated a belief in the viability of a multi-religious, multi-lingual and multi-ethnic India.  In a 
brief presentation preceding a showing of this film, Mirza stressed that these responses were entirely 
unprompted; asked an open ended question about what they envisioned the promise of India to be, most of 
his interlocutors expressed their hopes in the language of multiculturalist secularism.   
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intellectual elite have been staunchly enthusiastic in their support of this multiculturalist 
agenda.   
Accompanying this imagining of the ideal Indian nation is, of course, the 
construction of the ideal Indian citizen.  And as has been discussed above, this ideal 
citizen may embody any number of India’s innumerable lifeways, but rarely one that 
embodies a bounded or linear religious identity.  
CONSTRUCTING INDIAN MUSLIM SUBJECTHOOD 
The corollary to the negative valencing of a bounded religious identity is the 
positive valuation accorded to religious identity that is ambiguous, or assimilative.  As 
discussed above, the term ‘syncretic’ is often used to characterize such religious identities 
or traditions in India, and does not carry much of the negative baggage associated with it 
in Euro-American academic discourse.   
This favorable view of religious identities with fuzzy boundaries in secular 
forums is apparent to anyone who follows reporting in any of the major Indian dailies, or 
the news and feature reporting on any of the innumerable television channels broadcast 
throughout India.  During the Hindu festival of Dussehra, for instance, there were 
innumerable feature articles about artisan families who, for generations, had been making 
the giant wicker effigies of the demon Ravana, which are ritually set ablaze during this 
festival.  Over and over again, these reports highlighted the fact that these families were 
Muslim, yet engaged with great pride in the ritual and celebration of a Hindu festival.   
As ubiquitous as such narratives that positively value assimilative or ambiguous 
religious identity are, just how much they inform perceptions of religious difference and 
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identity was brought home to me only many months after my arrival in the field.  I had 
been invited to the home of the chief custodian of the Khaja Bandanawaz shrine in 
Gulbarga at the time that the Sufi saint’s death-anniversary was being marked.  I sat on 
cushioned mats on the floor of this beautiful 14
th
 century house with the women of the 
household (the chief custodian’s wife, his sister, his sister-in law and others) as hot 
breads, meats and curries were brought out fresh from the kitchen.  Also present was a 
young woman, Manmeet Kaur, who had come to interview as a candidate for a teaching 
position in one of the colleges run by the shrine’s Education Society.   
As we sat around talking, the conversation drifted to the ongoing rituals and 
festivities that marked the saint’s death anniversary at the shrine (a very important 
occasion in the calendar of any Sufi shrine).  Speaking to Rabia, one of the women of the 
household, Ms. Kaur (a Sikh) expressed her pleasure in being able to visit the city and the 
shrine on this auspicious occasion, and having thus had the opportunity to learn about a 
religious community that she did not know very much about.  She said that one gets a 
skewed image of Muslims in the media.  She continued to say that it was refreshing to be 
able to interact with Muslims more intimately, and to find out more about Islam.  Rabia 
nodded in response and reflected on her own childhood, growing up in a cosmopolitan 
environment.  “You know”, she said, “my family was not very religious.  And I grew up 
in a very secular and multicultural environment.  When I was young, most of my friends 
were not Muslim.”  And then, frowning slightly, and with a thoughtful look in her eyes, 
Rabia acknowledged, “So, when I was growing up, I myself did not know what Islam 
was, and what it really was to be a Muslim.”  And in a moment of sheer dissonance, Ms. 
Kaur enthusiastically responded to Rabia’s solemn admission: “Yes! Yes! That’s very 
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good!”  What, to Rabia, was a lacuna in self-knowledge, was, in Ms. Kaur’s estimation, a 
positive expression of religious identity.  Rabia’s lack of a conscious and strongly 
affirmed religious identity struck Ms. Kaur as an asset rather than as a liability.   
This brings me back to the proposition I made at the outset of this chapter: that in 
India, the “good Indian Muslim” is one who has a fuzzy notion of his/her religious 
identity.  Throughout my explorations of Indian multiculturalist secularism I found that 
the use of the term ‘syncretic’, more often than not, is applied to Muslims whose 
religious identity leaves room for ambiguity.  I found that the Islamicate influences on 
Hindu practice, belief and custom are rarely identified as ‘syncretic’.  The positive 
perception of a ‘syncretic’ form of Indian Islam does not seem to translate into similar 
epithets for Hindu life-ways that have also been shaped by Islam.  Popular nationalistic 
rhetoric often speaks of how India has always absorbed its “invading” hordes, and has in 
turn transformed those who sought to conquer it.  Though the transformative powers of 
conquest and migration are acknowledged as being mutual, what is usually highlighted in 
this particular strand of rhetoric is how those who have come to India have become 
“Indianized.”  It is as though there is some default ‘Indianness’ that is then transferred to 
the outsider who ventures in.  That this notion of ‘Indianness’ is itself a product of 
millennia of cultural layering and amalgamation is part of India’s secularist amnesia.   
The invading hordes usually conjured up (by both Hindu and secular nationalists) 
are Muslim.  Nadir Shah, Mahmoud Ghaznavi and Muhammed Ghouri are famously 
reviled figures from India’s past, painting a picture of rape and pillage across the 
Gangetic plains of North India.  Against this backdrop, figures like the Mughal Emperor 
Akbar, the medieval poet-saint Kabir, and Sufis are portrayed as notable exceptions to an 
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otherwise uniformly violent Islamic legacy.  Secularist narratives frame them as syncretic 
or assimilative, and stories of their lives and legacies emphasize their incorporation of 
“indigenous” Indian beliefs and life-ways.  I place the term ‘indigenous’ in quotes 
because the logic of such a narrative makes sense only if Islam (as opposed to Hinduism) 
is placed as perpetual outsider to the nation; where Muslims can be regarded as Indian 
only if they adopt aspects of Hindu life-ways.  Such reasoning is especially problematic if 
we consider that contemporary Hinduism is itself ‘Islamized’ (and even ‘Christianized’) 
in so many ways.  
To highlight this bias, I will analyze media portrayals of Akbar and Dara Shikoh, 
and Kabir in the following pages.  I have chosen to pay special attention to the portrayal 
of these figures in the popular media as opposed to the academic historiography, because 
I feel that these are more widely accessible and accessed by the Indian public; this makes 
them better reflections of the Indian secularist zeitgeist. Also, I analyze these historical 
figures rather than contemporary ones because I feel that in looking at how India’s past is 
constructed in contemporary India provides us with an insight into how historical 
narratives are colored and molded to fit the narratives of present.  To quote Carl Ernst 
(2004), “The main distorting presupposition in Indian historical thinking today reads the 
medieval past in terms of modern religious nationalism” (p. 19).  I would add here, that 
this notion of “religious nationalism” extends to secularist understandings of Indian 
religiosity as well.  
I conclude this section with an analysis of how shrine-based Sufism is co-opted 
into these secularist narratives.  These figures and institutions have become the poster-
children of the secularist media in India (sate- and non-state).  The ways in which they 
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are represented by state- and non-state media will shed light on the favored modes of 
religious subjectivity in India today.   
IMAGINING AKBAR AND DARA SHIKOH 
The Hindi-language film Jodhaa-Akbar (2008) features this intriguing scene:  The 
young emperor Akbar sits in his open court.  An argument has been ensuing about 
treaties Akbar has negotiated with the Rajputs, the recalcitrant princes on the fringes of 
the growing Mughal Empire.  In the midst of the debate, one of the three Muslim clerics 
present at the court objects to Akbar’s recent marriage to the Hindu Rajput princess, 
Jodhaa.  The cleric, dressed in black and grey, with a chest-long, severe, white beard and 
a high Persianesque turban, finds the match distasteful and an insult to Islamic custom.  
Akbar responds by saying that he has entered into the union having taken the interests of 
the state into consideration.  The three clerics then insist that the Hindu princess not be 
given access to most of the living quarters and that no Islamic law be changed on her 
account.  The clerics are interrupted in their tirade by the distant voice of the princess 
Jodhaa herself, who is heard singing a devotional song for the Hindu god, Krishna.  
Akbar, seemingly mesmerized, rises and leaves the court in the direction of the singing.  
The court is dismissed, leaving the clerics rather stunned.  The film is replete with such 
images, where bellicose Muslim hardliners are present in stark contrast to Akbar’s open 
tolerance and proclivity for inter-religious melding.   
Most renditions of Akbar in popular culture also highlight his deep attachment to 
Chishti Sufism.  This connection is an important one as shrine-based Sufism is also often 
placed in the same category as Akbar in the national secularist rhetoric in India.  Other 
aspects of Akbar’s policies that are highlighted are his removal of the jiziya (a state tax 
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on non-Muslims in lieu of military service), his inclusion of Hindu noblemen and artists 
in his court (including his storied prime minister, Birbal), and his creation of the 
iconoclastic religion, din-e ilahi.  
All of these snippets of policy and personality are found not only in the massively 
popular genre of Bollywood cinema, but are also common in children’s literature, and in 
school history texts and other biographical writings on Akbar.  Akbar continues to persist 
in the modern secularist imagination, the scholarship discrediting certain claims made in 
these media notwithstanding.  Scholars (Nizami 1989; Ali 1992; Khan 1992) have 
pointed out, for instance, that Akbar was not quite the tolerant and open-minded man in 
his youth as he was in his later days.  And certain aspects of his reign may be more 
apocryphal than based on evidence.  Akbar’s religious convictions also developed over a 
considerable period of time.  As a youth, Akbar was drawn to religious orthodoxy and 
narrow interpretations of Sunni religious practice and belief.  It was only as a middle-
aged man that doubts about a singular path to Truth began to trouble Akbar.  Also 
important is that while Akbar in his later years did encourage inter-religious debate at his 
court and became more open to vastly new ideas of faith and worship, he did not perceive 
himself as merely a student of these multiple schools of thought.  Nizami writes that by 
around 1581, Akbar may have begun to think of himself as a religious leader and teacher 
in his own right (p. 130).  Akbar’s creation of the din-e ilahi, a new religion that 
combined tenets of many different religions created dilemmas among his courtiers over 
how to respond to what would have certainly been a heretical move from most 
perspectives.  His taking on of a prophet-like status could thus be seen as more of a 
divisive rather than a uniting force.  Additionally, the scholars have suggested that 
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Akbar’s control of the Muslim clergy was more the result of his desire to control various 
factions in his court, and to restrain rival power-holders in state affairs.  That is to say, 
Akbar’s motives in his engagement with various religions and religious figures were 
complex, and his stances were problematic to many of his contemporaries.  This 
scholarship notwithstanding, the public imagining of Akbar is hardly nuanced.   
The picture that emerges in the popular imagining of Akbar is one of a 
benevolent, secularist emperor who snubbed the orthodox clergy (who are presented as 
narrow-minded), and united his religiously diverse empire under a banner of tolerance 
and multiculturalism.  For instance, Akbar’s control over the Muslim clergy is presented 
not as political expediency in these media, but as a sign of his dismissal of Islamic textual 
orthodoxy.  Cartoons and comic books that recount the legendary escapades of Akbar and 
his witty minister, Birbal, also often present the Muslim clergy as calculating and 
intolerant characters, a suitable foil for the character of the all-embracing and 
magnanimous Akbar.   
The clearest and broadest manifestation of the state’s contribution to this narrative 
can be found in social science and history textbooks.  Most schools in India follow syllabi 
set by the central or state governments and use state-prescribed text-books put together 
by the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT).  These 
resources too present Akbar as the “good Muslim” battling, and finally overcoming 
negative Islamic influences in his court.  Here, for instance, is an excerpt from the current 
class VII history textbook, Our Pasts – II :  
(Akbar) was interested in the religion and social customs of different people.  It 
made him realise that religious scholars who emphasised ritual and dogma were 
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often bigots.  Their teachings created divisions and disharmony amongst his 
subjects.  This eventually led Akbar to the idea of sulh-i kull or “universal peace”.  
This idea of tolerance did not discriminate between people of different religions in 
his realm.  Instead it focused on a system of ethics – honesty, justice, peace – that 
was universally applicable. [sic] [pp. 54-55]  
This excerpt is striking in the normative nature of the claims made, but also in the very 
objective manner in which these normative claims are presented.   
The historical figure who is most contrasted to Akbar (in both these state-
produced texts and in the popular non-state media) is Aurangzeb.  Also a Mughal king, 
he was Akbar’s great-grandson, and last of the stronger Mughal rulers.  In comparison to 
the eulogizing on Akbar’s policies, the above-quoted history text book finds little of 
redeeming quality in Aurangzeb’s reign.  In these texts and other media, Aurangzeb, the 
sixth and last of the great Mughals is caste as a villainous and intolerant figure.  Much is 
made of his campaigns against unruly warlords and the defiant Sikh and Maratha 
kingdoms.  Even though Akbar has perhaps an equally bloody record of suppressing 
rebellion (Lehman, n. d.).  I have recounted early in this chapter the disparate treatment 
of these two figures in school history texts and in Islamic studies lessons. 
Also revealing is the contrast made between Aurangzeb and his elder brother, 
Dara Shikoh.  Dara Shikoh was the heir apparent to the throne, but was ousted and 
assassinated by his younger brother, Aurangzeb, in his bid for imperial authority.  There 
is consensus in the historiography that Dara Shikoh was of a more mystical and 
philosophical bent of mind than his younger brother.  As part of his spiritual pursuits, 
Dara Shikoh acquainted himself with various Hindu philosophical texts, such as the 
Upanishads, and was in dialogue with both Sufi and Hindu spiritual figures and scholars 
(Srivastava 1998, Schimmel n. d.).   
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This is usually presented in stark contrast to the more dogmatic piety of 
Aurangzeb.  What is important here is not so much the fact that the brothers differed in 
temperament, but that Dara Shikoh is presented as an ideal in state- and non-state media, 
whereas Aurangzeb is wholly vilified in the popular secularist imagining.   To quote that 
eternal source of “common” wisdom, Wikipedia:  “Dara devoted much effort towards 
finding a common mystical language between Islam and Hinduism”.  And it is this 
penchant that places Dara Shikoh squarely within the mode of acceptable Islamic 
behavior in the secular and multiculturalist rhetoric in India today.   An article in the 
Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society that discusses these two figures shows how 
these roles are reversed in the prevailing rhetoric across the border.  Writes the author of 
this article:   
It will be observed that the day religion relaxed its hold on man, the animal urge 
got hold of him and the society started decaying.  (Aurangzeb) tried his best to 
bring his people to the right path but could not achieve much success for the 
moral canker had gone deep. [p. 294]   
In contrast, Aurangzeb’s name is often used as an insult in India; someone who dislikes 
music and dance, or is perceived as being excessively puritanical is derisively called an 
‘Aurangzeb’!35   
CONJURING KABIR 
Another figure who is usually held up as the ideal of Indian Muslim subjectivity is 
the poet-saint Kabir.  Unlike Akbar, who had the weighty bureaucracy of an empire 
                                                          
35
But of course, this is not to generalize that these figures are universally idolized and vilified on either side 
of the border.  As is indicative in the conversation about Akbar and Aurangzeb that I recounted at the 
beginning of the chapter, there are competing discourses within India regarding these historical figures.  
However, the prevailing narrative in India, as seen in state-generated rhetoric and in the multiculturalist and 
secularist rhetoric of non-state media, favors figures who can be framed in narratives of pluralism and 
religious assimilation.  
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taking note of his acts, Kabir came from an impoverished background.  There is, 
therefore, little in terms of concrete data about his life.  What we have are hagiographies 
by his disciples and his verses.  Most of what is transmitted about Kabir’s life is largely 
apocryphal and more lore than history.  There is consensus in the scholarship that Kabir 
was an orphan raised by a family of Muslim weavers some time during the reign of 
Sikander Lodi in the late 15
th
 and early 16
th
 centuries (Lorenzen 1991; Sethi 1984; 
Hedayetullah 1977).  In his writings, Kabir openly and harshly rejects both formal 
Hinduism and formal Islam, but found adherents from both these communities.  The 
agreement ends here.  The lacuna left by reliable historical scholarship is however amply 
filled by legends that detail Kabir’s life.   
The lore surrounding Kabir in popular culture, however, continues to be contested 
and is deeply tied in with the politics of religious identity in the Subcontinent.  Whether 
Kabir was actually a Hindu or a Muslim seems to have occupied the minds of many very 
soon after his demise.  As Sethi writes,  
The Kabir-panthis, in the absence of an adept spiritual guide, became more 
Vaishnavite in outlook and tried to bring their preceptor into the Brahminical fold.  
By the advent of the eighteenth century, new themes had been added to the life of 
Kabir…Thus according to some, Kabir was the son of a Brahmin woman. [p. 5] 
Questions have also been raised about the religious affiliations of Kabir’s religious 
teachers.  Some traditions suggest that the saint Ramanand of Banaras was his guru, 
while others point to Sheikh Taqi of Sufi persuasions.   
This lore of religious ambiguity is also evident in the most widely held story of 
Kabir’s death.  The tale is told that on Kabir’s death a heated feud broke out between his 
Hindu and Muslim followers.  Both groups wished to accord Kabir the funerary rites of 
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their particular religious practice.  In the midst of this conflict, the devotees realized that 
Kabir’s body had been transformed into a heap of flowers.  These flowers were then 
divided among the followers, who then accorded their share with the rite they deemed 
fitting.   
The modern, secularist spin on this tale can be found in Sethi’s biography of 
Kabir:  
Silenced, the two groups divided the flowers between them…The haze of 
ritualism, which for a while had blurred their vision, lifted, and the disciples felt 
ashamed, realizing that even in his death Kabir had vindicated the futility of such 
formal beliefs. [p. 42]   
In the story, as it is told by most, the devotees did not, even till the end, let go of what 
they considered appropriate ritual practice (which Kabir’s poetry so pointedly derides).  
The replacement of Kabir’s body with flowers merely allowed for the dispute at hand to 
be resolved.  However, the secularist narrative, as is seen in Sethi’s rendering of the tale, 
usually highlights an ambiguous religious subjectivity that is neither here nor there.  In 
many ways this narrative is a metaphor for Indian multiculturalist secularism; where the 
solution to the complexities of a diverse citizenry is to find a middle-ground where all 
can claim ownership to and share in some usually undefined notion of the Truth.  As with 
figures like Akbar and Dara Shikoh, this spin on the narrative can be seen in government-
issued history texts as well.  This is what a state-produced grade XII History textbook has 
to say about Kabir: 
Diverse and sometimes conflicting ideas are expressed in [Kabir’s] poems.  Some 
poems draw on Islamic ideas and use monotheism and iconoclasm to attack Hindu 
polytheism and idol worship; others use the Sufi concept of zikr and ishq (love) to 
express the Hindu practice of nam-simaran (remembrance of God’s 
name)…What this rich corpus also signifies is that Kabir was and is to the present 
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a source of inspiration for those who questioned entrenched religious and social 
institutions, ideas and practices in their search for the Divine. [p. 162]  
What is highlighted here is that Kabir drew from various religious traditions.  That he 
rejects textual and bounded modes of religiosity is also presented in a very positive light.  
The highly normative nature of this passage is also quite representative of the secularist 
narratives in state-produced media.  This passage also provides a great example of the 
ways in which multiple religious strands are woven together in these secularist narratives: 
Kabir’s rejection of institutionalized religion, Sufism, and Hinduism.   
There are other religious figures and mystics who, like Kabir, have emerged as 
seminal figures in defining an ideal of religious subjectivity in India.  Sai Baba and Guru 
Nanak are two who are perhaps most similar to Kabir in their treatment in secularist 
narratives.  There are other less widely known figures, such as Shishunala Sharif Sahib in 
Karnataka, who embody the kind of religious ambiguity and “syncretism” that have been 
highlighted in the examples provided thus far.  
While the poetry of Kabir has been part of the folk song traditions of many 
communities in rural India, the past decade has seen a resurgence of interest in Kabir 
among the intellectual elites in urban centers.  While I was in India for my fieldwork, a 
massive project (funded by the Ford Foundation), titled simply ‘The Kabir Project’ was 
unveiled in New Delhi.  This project included four full-length documentary films based 
on the life and poetry of Kabir, a series of audio CDs of the folk singers featured in the 
films, and a set of beautifully rendered books with the poetry of Kabir in the original and 
in translation.  The films, launched all over India, in turn spawned many exhibitions and 
concerts centered on the life and works of Kabir.   
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This burgeoning interest in Kabir’s poetry among India’s urban elites (especially 
among India’s youth) has been accompanied by a similar growth in interest in Sufism and 
Sufi poetry among this demographic.   
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SYNCRETIC SUFI 
In the preceding pages I have outlined how certain Muslim political and religious 
figures are framed as being “syncretic” and religiously ambiguous, and therefore as ideals 
in the secularist narratives in India.  Tied into these constructions of ambiguous (and 
therefore desirable) Muslim religiosity is shrine-based Sufism. It is significant that 
political figures such as Akbar and Dara Shikoh, and religious personalities like Kabir 
and Sai Baba are linked in the historiography by their association with Sufi Islam.   
In histories of South Asian Sufism, Sufi saints and masters are co-opted into the 
notion of the synctretic Muslim and Sufi shrines become loci of inter-religious dialogue 
and exchange (Saiyed 1989, Siddiqi 1989).  Shrine-based Sufism, especially Chishti 
Sufism, is characterized as having an ecumenical bent.  In these secularist narratives, the 
inclusion of Hindu imagery (such as motifs of Radha and Krishna) in Sufi poetry, the 
inclusion of many Indic ritual motifs at Sufi shrines, and the non-Muslim following of 
these saints are pointed to as supporting evidence.  In contrast to this positive 
presentation of Sufi shrines, reformist Islam is usually presented more negatively 
(Gaborieau 1989, Baljon 1989) and early Muslim reformist figures such as Shah 
Waliullah and Sayyed Ahmed Barelwi are presented as anti-shrine and also as 
incongruent with Indian multiculturalist secularism.   
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This formulation is evident in media that is produced by both private and state 
sources.  In all of these cases, Sufism is upheld as the emblem of Hindu-Muslim unity in 
India.  This rhetoric often emerges in the context of certain rituals of the Sufi shrines or 
certain shrine events.  Attending major shrine events is par for course for members of the 
political elite, and at the start of political campaigns.  But particular events in the calendar 
of prominent shrines get held up as representative of the ecumenical nature of Sufi 
practice and belief.   
Two such events of note are the Procession of Flower-Sellers (phool valon ki sair) 
in Delhi associated with the Sufi saint Shaikh Bakhtiyar Kaki, and the Spring (basant) 
festival that is associated with the shrine of Hazrat Nizamuddin.  Both events draw 
considerable public attention, and are often reported on widely in all news media.  The 
Procession of Flower-Sellers is what it states: the flower-sellers in question wind their 
way through the Mahrauli district of New Delhi.  Important to this event is that the 
flower-sellers stop at both the Hindu temple of the Goddess Jagmaya and at the shrine of 
the prominent Sufi saint, Khaja Bakhtiyar Kaki.  The procession is led by shahnai
36
 
players, and the event draws devotees to both the temple and the Sufi shrine.  This event 
has grown in grandeur over the decades.  The start and finish, and each stop, is well 
attended by dignitaries and political figures.  Presidents, Vice-presidents, Prime 
Ministers, and Governors have often attended this event, which always includes a special 
program where these figures speak on the symbolism and the importance of this event to 
the cause of inter-religious harmony.   
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The shahnai is a long reed instrument played in North India.  It is an instrument that is commonly played 
at wedding ceremonies, both among Hindus and Muslims, and is thus strongly associated with festivities.  
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The Spring festival as celebrated at the shrine of Hazrat Nizamuddin certainly 
grabbed my interest as an ethnographer much more.  This celebration is one that comes 
with a story.  Knowing the story behind this annual ritual is important to understanding 
the ways in which it is marked at the shrine. The legend goes that the saint Hazrat 
Nizamuddin’s favorite nephew, Taqiuddin Nooh, had died. The saint had been mourning 
this loss deeply, and had become reclusive.  He had shut himself away, had not spoken to 
anyone, and no one had seen him smile for months.  This had distressed all his followers, 
but especially his ardent disciple, the poet Amir Khusro.  One day in spring, Amir Khusro 
saw a group of women dressed in yellow, carrying yellow flowers, making their way to 
the temple.  He asked them what was going on, and they told him that they were dressed 
in the colors of spring and were going to make offerings of flowers to mark the arrival of 
spring.  This caught the fancy of Amir Khusro; he wished to make a similar offering to 
his Master, Hazrat Nizamuddin.  He dressed himself like the women – in yellow robes, 
decked in jewelry, and carrying mustard flowers – and proceeded to his Master’s hospice 
(khanqah).  On seeing Amir Khusro dressed in such an outlandish fashion, singing songs 
to the spring, Hazrat Nizamuddin could not help but smile – the first in many months.  
Since then, the spring or basant festival has been marked with great ceremony at the 
shrine of Hazrat Nizamuddin.   
Traditionally, basant at the shrine of Nizamuddin Auliya is marked by a 
procession of the resident Sufi singers (qawwal).  They wear turbans and stoles dyed 
yellow for the occasion, they carry freshly gathered bunches of yellow mustard flowers, 
and walk slowly into the shrine singing centuries-old songs about the Spring season 
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written by Amir Khusro.  The hereditary caretakers of the shrine too, adorn themselves in 
yellow turbans and sashes and make offerings of yellow flowers to the saint.   
When I visited the shrine of Nizamuddin Auliya that day in February, this is what 
I awaited as I sat in the courtyard of the shrine.  And as expected, the hereditary 
caretakers began to appear, wearing yellow and distributing sashes the color of spring to 
shrine visitors. The singers eventually made their entrance, sporting their mustard flowers 
and singing their songs to the saint.   
Soon, though, another large group of celebrants flooded the shrine.  They were 
also dressed for the occasion, carrying baskets of yellow and orange marigolds.  They 
were welcomed into the shrine by the caretakers, and distributed marigolds to all at the 
shrine.  I learnt that this second group had walked from a local park a few kilometers 
away, as they do annually during basant.  Leading this group was Ashutosh Krishan, a 
contemporary Indian artist and collector.  He was dressed in saffron and yellow robes; he 
wore earring, bangles, and anklets, and his troupe certainly brought an added 
flamboyance to the spring festival at Hazrat Nizamuddin.  What was traditionally a 
celebration performed by the resident singers and caretakers of the shrine, was now being 
co-opted and embellished by a group entirely unrelated to the shrine in any historical or 
ritual sense.  They brought their own visual and semantic interpretation of this Sufi 
tradition with them, and in the process transformed the sacred space of the Sufi shrine. 
The procession of the shrine’s ritual musicians is a re-enactment ritual that 
commemorates the devotion of Amir Khusro to his Master, and has ritual significance to 
adherents of shrine-based Sufism as a marker of a significant event in the life of the saint 
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and his devoted disciple.  The new group of people who walk to Nizamuddin every 
spring seeks to recreate this event, but in its own fashion.  Krishan often leads this group 
dressed as he imagines Amir Khusro to have dressed: in gender-bending clothing, and 
arriving with much flamboyance.  To Ashutosh Krishan and his group, though, this is not 
an act of pure ritual reenactment.  To them, the celebration of this primarily Hindu 
festival at the mausoleum of a Muslim saint carries with it messages of inter-religious 
harmony and cultural melding.  The event calendar on Krishan’s website boasts of the 
spring celebration at the Nizamuddin shrine thus: “From the burst of the first yellow and 
mustard at Basant Panchami (the Spring festival), a syncretic celebration with Khwaja 
Nizamuddin and (the Hindu goddess) Saraswati.”   
Krishan’s spring entourage at the shrine of Nizamuddin, an annual event, has 
now become part of a larger multi-media performance-art project called The Genda 
Phool Project, or Project Marigold.  The website for this project has this explanation: 
The marigold is widely considered an “Indian flower” and is grown and used 
extensively in India, but it is native of Mexico, and came to India only about 500 
years ago with the Portuguese, thus challenging assumptions of what is “Indian” 
and thus becoming the flower of exchange and universal syncreticism. Genda 
hence is a marker for, all at once – love, brotherhood, internationalism and 
positive energies. We have chosen such a flower to celebrate, it is such a universe 
that we want to lose ourselves in…  
In this context, the space of the Sufi shrine, co-opted into this larger project, then begins 
to mean so much more to Ashutosh Krishan and his group.  I corresponded with Krishan 
over email, and was able to ask him about his goals and inspirations for the spring walk 
to the Sufi shrine.  He said,  
We [who are involved in the genda phool project] celebrate festivals and try to 
revive natural, organic ways of celebrating seasons and festivals, so it was part of 
that larger effort.  Normally we have a Basant Panchami [the Hindu spring 
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festival] celebration but a few years ago we also started celebrating Sufi Basant 
with this walk… [The motivation behind this event is] to celebrate Basant! And to 
take more and more people to the blessed house of Khwaja ji [Hazrat 
Nizamuddin] on this very special day, that somehow has now just become a 
denominational ritual but holds great significance for all mureeds [disciples] of 
Baba [Hazrat Nizamuddin] and Khusrau… [The people at the Sufi shrine] have 
always been welcoming, and I am friends with the people at the dargah [shrine], 
so we normally plan the walks and visits in close collaboration with them… I feel 
blessed every time I go to the [shrine], and it seems that Khwaja ji [Hazrat 
Nizamuddin] is watching over us like a benevolent, intimate friend.  Also, in 
Delhi, where there are no old temples, I feel this is one of the places that is really 
charged with spiritual energy, and surely one of my most loved spots in Delhi. 
It is apparent that the shrine of Nizamuddin Auliya is loaded with meaning for Krishan.  
And it is a feeling not limited to him.  Over the past decade, Sufism and the sacred spaces 
of Sufi shrines have begun to symbolize a notion of “universal syncretism”, to use 
Krishan’s words.   
Sufism also gets brought up at secular events outside of the shrine’s environs in 
high frequency.  While in India, I visited Aligarh, a small town in a few hours South of 
Delhi, along with a study abroad group from the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill.  While there, we had the good fortune of attending the graduation ceremony of the 
Aligarh Muslim University
37
.  The guests at this event were the Oscar-winning composer, 
A. R. Rahman, and the Urdu author, Dr. Gopichand Narang; they were both conferred 
honorary degrees by the University.  The keynote speaker at the graduation ceremony 
was Gopal Krishna Gandhi, a grandson of Mahatma Gandhi and the governor of West 
Bengal.  There was much pomp and circumstance and the general theme of the speakers 
seemed to be inter-religious harmony and the depoliticization of the Urdu-Hindi language 
divide.  
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The Aligarh Muslim University is a secular institution.  It was founded by a prominent Muslim reformist 
of the 19
th
 century, Sir Sayyed Ahmad Khan, and was structured on the lines of British universities.  
Though a secular institution, the University does attract a substantial number of Muslim students from all 
over India.   
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A.R. Rahman spoke first.  In introducing him, the vice-chancellor of the 
university spoke of his commitment to Sufism, which he referred to as “Eastern 
mysticism”.  He also said that Rahman was a “symbol of (Indian) composite culture”.  At 
the ceremony, the keynote speaker, Gopal Krishna Gandhi spoke of Aligarh Muslim 
University being the kind of institution that was in a position to combat Islamic 
extremism. Towards the end of his address he brought up the figure of Dara Shikoh.  In 
very poetic and flowery language, Gandhi nostalgically spoke of Dara Shikoh as a builder 
of bridges and wondered what India would be like had the rightful heir to the throne – 
Dara Shikoh – not been killed by the likes of Aurangzeb, and if it was him who had 
reigned.  This was followed by a round of loud applause from the audience.  Gandhi then 
transitioned to speaking about Sufism as the hope against forms of religious intolerance 
and extremism in India.   
Aligarh Muslim University is an institution that caters to a religiously diverse 
student body, and is a secular academic institution; however, it was begun with the goal 
of providing Western-style higher education to Muslim men, and has historically 
attracted a pre-dominantly Muslim student-body.  Muslims formed a majority of the 
audience and participants at the graduation ceremony.  However, as a secular institution 
regarded very highly in India, it is interesting that Sufism was brought up so often by the 
speakers (Hindu and Muslim alike) at the graduation ceremony.  It is almost as if any 
mention of inter-religious concord and the fight against terrorism (topics of great import 
in contemporary India) must necessarily come with a garnishing of Sufism.   
Throughout my stay in India I was able to attend innumerable seminars, film 
screenings, concerts and art exhibitions that celebrated India’s cultural diversity.  At 
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practically every event, Sufism was given pride of place.  One such event was Jashn-e 
Aman (meaning, Celebration of Peace), and featured a movie about national integration 
and a performance by classical singers in the drupad style
38
.  The cover of the booklet 
distributed at this event featured the word ‘peace’ (aman) written in Urdu calligraphy in 
the shape of a whirling Sufi dervish. 
PROBLEMATIZING THE PRO-SUFI STANCE 
Secularists and spiritualists speak in glowing terms of the Hindu motifs found in 
Sufi poetry and point to the use of regional Indian languages in Sufi verse. In addition to 
this, they also often highlight commonalities between Sufism and Hindu mystical 
traditions: Sufi saints are associated with the poet-saints of the Bhakti movement (like 
Meera, Gorakhnath, Tukaram, etc.), the Sufi philosophical strains of wahdat ul-wajud 
and wahdat ul-shuhud are linked to the Vedanta school of philosophy (or even 
characterized as having borrowed from this Indic school), and forms of Sufi meditative 
breathing are paired with Yogic breathing exercises.   
Adherents of shrine-based Sufism too speak, with no little amount of pride, of 
Sufism’s contribution to Punjabi and Hindavi poetry, and often celebrate the overlaying 
of Indic and Perso-Arab motifs in these verses (a topic that I will address in depth in the 
next chapter).  However, the association of Sufism with Hindu traditions by secularists 
and spiritualists often lacks nuance and results in the portrayal of Sufism as a mere 
offshoot of Yogic practice, Vedanta philosophy, and the Bhakti movement.  Sufism often 
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The drupad style of classical music is a very old tradition in North Indian classical music, usually 
considered to be pre-Islamic in origin.  Songs in this style of music are long devotional pieces in praise of 
various Hindu gods and goddesses.  What is striking is that the most eminent exponents of this style of 
music are Muslim, and the tradition is passed down through these Muslim families.  The performers at this 
particular event too, hailed from one of these prominent Muslim families.   
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gets characterized as a step-child of Hinduism; a religious, spiritual, and philosophical 
entity that had no life-history outside the South Asian context.   
Take this paragraph from a book titled Sufi Thought, by S. R. Sharda (1974).  He 
writes:  
Sufi literature of the post-Timur period shows a significant change in thought 
content. It is pantheistic. After the fall of Muslim orthodoxy from power at the 
centre of India for about a century, due to the invasion of Timur, the Sufi became 
free from the control of the Muslim orthodoxy and consorted with Hindu saints, 
who influenced them to an amazing extent. The Sufi adopted Monism and wifely 
devotion from the Vaishnava Vedantic school
 
and Bhakti and Yogic practices 
from the Vaishnava Vedantic school. By that time, the popularity of the Vedantic 
pantheism among the Sufis had reached its zenith. [p. 95] 
The uncomplicated equation of certain Sufi schools of thought to pantheism aside, this 
fairly typical construction ignores the rigorous philosophical debate among Muslim 
intellectuals that existed independent of Hindu philosophical streams, and that thrived 
centuries prior to the Mughal era.  From a reading of this paragraph it remains entirely 
unclear if Sufism has any positive link with Islam at all.  From this perspective, it seems 
as if Sufism grew intellectually only after “adopting” various concepts directly from 
Hindu philosophical and mystic traditions.   
Not only do secularists and spiritualists often conceive of Sufism as owing its 
intellectual identity to schools of Hindu philosophy, Sufism is also often thought of as 
being pure spirituality and philosophy, being entirely “free” of what is seen as religious 
(specifically Muslim) baggage.  This conception of Sufism without the “encumbrance” of 
Islam was brought home to me time and time again during my fieldwork in India.  Soon 
after my arrival in New Delhi, I attended the launch of the book, Sufism – the heart of 
Islam (2009) by Sadia Dehlvi.  Ms. Dehlvi was a committed adherent of shrine-based 
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Sufism, and was herself on the Sufi path, having entered into discipleship (muridi) with a 
Sufi master (pir).  The event was at The Attic, an elite venue for art shows, poetry 
recitals, experimental plays and such.  After her presentation, where she spoke of Sufism 
being at the core of Islam, the session opened up for questions.  One woman in the 
audience asked, sounding quite troubled, “But by saying that Sufism is at the heart of 
Islam, aren’t you limiting Sufism in some way? Maybe other people trace it to other 
sources.”  Ms. Dehlvi responded by pointing to the origins of Sufism at the time of 
Islam’s inception, but said that the wisdom of Sufism was one that was not limited by its 
historical roots in Islam.  The member of the audience who had raised the question was 
not satisfied with this response.       
I encountered such resistance to seeing Sufism as Islamic many times during my 
research in India.  In a personal conversation, Ms. Dehlvi too said that she was 
questioned about Sufism’s place in Islam frequently from secularist and spiritualist 
quarters.  She said that she understood that these apprehensions came from the 
stereotyped image of Muslims in the media.  The mention of ‘Islam’ or ‘shariah’ 
frightens them, she said.  And so her audiences (who are mostly spiritual or secular-
minded Hindus) are comfortable thinking of Sufism as a “sect outside of Islam”; as 
something not so “rigid”, or something perceived as being close to “idol-worship.”  
There is an odd paradox at play in the way Sufism is imagined and desired by 
secularists and spiritualists.  On the one hand, there is a desire to think of Sufism as being 
above or beyond religious labels, while on the other, Sufism is conceived of as the most 
acceptable form of Islam (for India and for the world).  One can surmise from this 
juxtaposition of desires that Sufism is acceptable to secularists and spiritualists because it 
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is thought of as not being quite Muslim.  To them, it is the perceived lack of “Muslim-
ness” that makes Sufism the most desirable mode of Islamic practice and belief.  There is 
a desire among secularists and spiritualists to construct a notion of Sufism (and by 
implication, of Islam) that is non-threatening in its supposed lack of adherence to Islamic 
strictures.  
These secularists and spiritualists consider themselves “pro-Sufi” or even self-
identify as Sufis.  They often position themselves as supporting Sufism and being 
opposed to reformist ideology.  Many who hold this favorable view of Sufism and Sufis 
are almost always antagonistic to reformists and view them with deep suspicion.  As one 
of my interlocutors, a left-wing activist and journalist, once said to me, “It is easier for a 
Wahhabi to wield a gun than for a Sufi to.”   This highly problematic and simplistic 
construction of religious identity and proclivity towards violence does however give 
shrine-based Sufism in India an advantage.   
Secularists also take a pro-Sufi stance in more concrete ways.  An on-going 
dispute between Hindutva groups and Sufis over rights to a shrine in Karnataka is a good 
example of this.  This small shrine of the saint Baba Budhan has become the site of a 
protracted legal and religious dispute, in which right-wing Hindu nationalist groups have 
claimed that the Sufi shrine was “originally” a Hindu shrine. The dispute is now at the 
level of the State High Courts, and legal aid and funding for the Sufi custodians of the 
shrine has come primarily from secularist activist groups.   
I have mentioned my visit to this shrine earlier in this chapter.  While there, I had 
the opportunity to meet with a boisterous group of secular activists.  These folks, mostly 
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middle-aged men from a secularist group in Bangalore, had come to the small plantation 
town of Chikmagloor for some court hearings and testimonials with regard to the shrine.  
Sitting in their small hostel room by the market, we engaged in a long and animated 
discussion of the issue at hand.  They told us that in this dispute, the shrine family and 
adherents of shrine-based Sufism have received very little support from the larger 
Muslim community in the area for precisely the reason that the issue concerns a Sufi 
shrine.  It evokes less passion among the mostly-reformist population.  As one of the 
activists succinctly put it, “If this were a dispute over a mosque, it would be an entirely 
different matter.”   
These activists and the community of Sufi adherents have very little in common; 
but a common desire for a particular outcome has brought these socially and religiously 
disparate people together.  Another activist involved in the proceedings said, “We are all 
mostly atheists, but we think people should have the right to practice their religion.”  
These secularist groups perceive the claims of ownership over the Sufi shrine by Hindu 
nationalist groups as a threat to the ideal of Indian multiculturalist secularism, thus 
making strange bed-fellows of atheist secularists and hereditary custodians of a Sufi 
shrine.  
It is also true that the kind of exposure that Sufism has enjoyed over the past 
decade due to this resurgence of interest among secularists and spiritualists is 
unprecedented: the showcasing of Sufi saints and Sufi poetry by the news and popular 
media, concerts and seminars on the topic, books, and magazine and newspaper articles 
abound.  Recently, Sufism has also been positively associated with projects aimed at 
forwarding inter-religious dialogue and bettering strained relations with Pakistan.   
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In 2009, the Times of India newspaper and Jang, a news-group in Pakistan, 
launched a joint initiative called Aman ki Asha (meaning, Hope for Peace), which they 
promote as “an Indo-Pak peace project”.   Seminars, discussion panels, speeches, 
newspaper articles and concerts in the major Indian cities were organized (and continue 
to be organized) as part of this initiative.  The music concerts are the most publicized and 
most popular of these events, and most of them prominently feature “Sufi music”.  Each 
of these concerts usually features two well-known musicians – one from India, and one 
from across the border, and at least one of these two musicians is always part of the Sufi 
tradition.  These events draw huge audiences as Sufi music has gained immensely in 
popularity over the past two decades.  These concerts include musicians who are 
traditional Sufi qawwal; professionals singers whose repertoire is predominantly Sufi in 
its focus, but who now perform mostly in the concert setting; or “fusion” artists who 
mesh rock with South Asian classical styles and draw from Sufi poetry for their 
repertoire.  
 While it can be argued that most people who attend these concerts are there just 
for the music, increasingly these and other Sufi-related venues have begun to carry a lot 
of meaning for many in India.  This is part of the general growth of interest in Sufism that 
India has seen over the past two decades.  Sufism, for many, has become the poster-child 
of “communal harmony” and Indian secular democracy; a panacea for inter-religious 
violence and distrust.  For others, it is a spiritual solution to what they see as the problem 
with religion these days.  More and more, the sight of young men and women in faded 
jeans and washed-out t-shirts has become a common one at Sufi shrines in the metropoles 
of India.  Drawn from the local colleges and universities, they sit among the crowds in 
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rapt silence, often swaying to the music with their eyes drawn shut, or gazing intently 
into the crowds around them, absorbed in some deep thought.   
This wave of new interest is evident not only among India’s urban youth, but also 
among an older demographic.  Dancers, musicians, artists, authors, poets and lay folk of 
all ages seem to be drawing inspiration from Sufism to spur their work and to color their 
perception of their socio-religious world. One of my interlocutors (an adherent of shrine-
based Sufism) once remarked, her tone betraying mild exasperation, “Everything is Sufi 
these days!” It is these young and old enthusiasts that primarily constitute the categories 
of secularists and spiritualists of which I spoke earlier.  But what do they see in Sufism 
that draws them to Sufi ritual audience (sama), to Sufi poetry, and to Sufi shrines?  What 
is it that makes shrine-based Sufism such an attractive poster-child for Indian 
multiculturalist secularism? 
I posed this question to Sohail Hashmi, an activist, a film-maker, and an author 
who writes on issues related to religion and secularism in India.  In response, he painted a 
complex portrait of socio-religious trends over the past several centuries in the 
Subcontinent.  He said that several centuries ago, when the revival of Brahminical 
Hinduism threatened to reassert the low-caste status of artisanal groups in South Asia, 
many of these groups looked to the Bhakti movement (a religious and spiritual movement 
that spanned several centuries in medieval India, which questioned the legitimacy of 
organized religion) or embraced to Islam via Sufism.  It is against this historic backdrop 
that the current interest in Sufism (and the saints of the Bhakti movement) begins to make 
sense.  
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The late 20
th
 century saw a resurgence of inter-religious violence and vitriol, 
peaking with the demolition of the Babari mosque in Ayodhya by Hindu-nationalist mobs 
and the retaliatory violence that followed.  Hashmi said that in the aftermath of the 
“frenzy” that was Ayodhya, there was a growing realization that “secularism was alien” 
to India; that “the separation of religion and politics is not possible here”.  At this point, 
both Hindus and Muslims in India began looking for a “secular tradition within the Indian 
ethos”.  In the early 1990s, after the demolition of the Babari mosque, a major multi-city 
concert-series was organized by SAHMAT, a group that Hashmi was deeply involved in. 
The series aimed at “question(ing) the artificially created boundaries between people” 
and which featured the verses of Sufi and Bhakti poets.  This event, said Hashmi, was 
about “foregrounding the secular, Indian tradition” and saw the revival of interest in 
Sufism.  “This is the Indian ethos,” he said, “working and creating together.”  And it is in 
this context, too, said Hashmi, that the Sufi shrine with its shared sacred space becomes 
important: the mantel of providing this “secular space” falls to the Sufi shrine. 
An intriguing instance of the ways in which the sacred space of the Sufi shrine 
has permeated the imagination of India’s youth as an emblem of diversity is the 
tremendous amount of attention the shrine of Nizamuddin Auliya has begun to receive 
from members of the Queer community in Delhi.  I recounted in the previous chapter the 
spring festival marking the gesture of Amir Khusro that brought a smile to his beloved 
Master’s face.  The poet Amir Khusro’s devotion to his Master, Hazrat Nizamuddin is 
legendary.   
It is important to note here that the Sufi poetry of South and Central Asia (be it in 
Persian, Hindavi, or Punjabi) is replete with erotic imagery.  In these verses, both God 
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and the Sufi Master are likened to the beloved, and the poet-disciple is the ardent and 
enraptured lover.  Coupled with the gender-neutral pronouns in Persian and the 
predominant use of only masculine pronouns in the Islamicate poetry of South Asia, the 
homoeroticism of these verses is striking to the novice reader.  Amir Khusro’s verses to 
Hazrat Nizamuddin, too are replete with homoerotic and gender-bending imagery. Take 
these famous verses for instance:  
chap tilak sab cheeni re mose naina milayke 
 
bal bal jaun main tore ran rijva 
apni se kar dini re mose naina milayke 
 
khusro nijam ke bal bal jaye 
mode suhagan kini re mose naina milayke
39
 
You have made me lose myself with just a glance of your eyes. 
 
I sacrifice myself to you, O dyer of cloths; 
You have colored me in your colors with just a glance of your eyes. 
 
I, Khusro, give myself to you, O Nizamuddin 
You have made me your bride with just a glance of your eyes.  
 
I will not delve into a discussion of homoeroticism in Sufi poetry, or of notions of 
homoerotic love in medieval India here
40
.  But what is especially interesting to me is that 
these two figures, Amir Khusro and Hazrat Nizamuddin, have captured the imagination 
                                                          
39 छाप ततलक सब छीनी रे मो से नैना ममलायके / बल बल जाऊं मैं तोरे रंग ररजवा / अपनी सी रंग दीनी रे मो स े
नैना ममलायके | / खुसरो तनजाम के बल बल जाए /मोहे सुहागन कीनी रे मो स ेनैना ममलायके |  
40
Scott Kugle provides a provocative and much-needed analysis of gender ambiguities and homoeroticism 
in Sufi literature and cosmology in his essay, Dancing with Khusro: Gender Ambiguities and Poetic 
Performance in a Delhi Dargah (2010).  With regard to Khusro and his sensuous verses, Kugle asks, “Can 
we read such examples of Khusro’s poetry as an expression of his sexual orientation?”(256) Though the 
question, and the theme of this essay, is provocative by its very nature, Kugle’s handling of the subject is 
both nuanced and considerably understated.  
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of the Queer community in Delhi.  To many of them with whom I spoke, Amir Khusro’s 
open and brazen love for Nizamuddin, and his love poetry of so many centuries ago, 
seemed to reflect their own desire for social and political change.  A 2001 book, “Same-
sex Love in India: Readings from literature and history” by Ruth Vanita and Saleem 
Kidwai (both of whom are active members of the LGBT-rights movement in India) 
defines the relationship between Amir Khusro and Hazrat Nizamuddin as homoerotic, 
and perhaps even homosexual. It certainly may be that projecting our contemporary 
notions of homosexuality and romantic love on actors from centuries in the past is an act 
of anachronism; but the fact remains that these Sufi figures have taken on specific 
meanings for the Queer community in India today.  
On many evenings I would find members of the Queer community (many of 
whom were active in the LGBT-rights movement in Delhi) at the shrine of Hazrat 
Nizamuddin.  They sat with all the other visitors to the shrine and listened to the ritual 
musicians singing the love-poetry of Amir Khusro.  They were never there openly as 
members of the Queer community, and in a sense, they did not transform the physical 
space of the shrine in as visible a way as the group led by the artist Ashutosh Krishan did.  
But certainly, their imagining of the saint and his disciple, their reception of the sung 
poetry at the shrine, and their communication of these experiences through texts, and 
through their activism, shapes the ways in which the shrine and its inhabitants are 
perceived.   
It is also a significant point that in Sufism, the listeners of poetry and song are 
considered spiritual agents, and the act of ritual audition is especially important in Sufi 
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practice. Therefore, especially within the Sufi paradigm, how someone listens and how 
one understands what is being listened to, is a deeply powerful process. Within this 
paradigm, the very presence of these Queer listeners, if you will, is radically 
transformative.   
It is evident by now that to many in India, shrine-based Sufism has begun to 
symbolize something much more than the link between the human and the divine.  For 
them, the shared space of the shrine is a salve for the dysfunctions of a profane world.  In 
this imagining, shrine-based Sufism has a role that is at once sacred and profane.  Against 
the backdrop of India’s multiculturalist secularism, where the overlapping of multiple 
sacred traditions is the marker of secularity, this is not so unusual. 
This (re)construction of Sufism as emblematic of multiculturalist secularism, 
broad-strokes spirituality, and social harmony was preceded by a steady secularization of 
some aspects of Sufi practice in the Indian public arena.  To a certain extent, this was a 
global phenomenon.  Translations of the poetry of Rumi and Hafez, for instance, were 
widely disseminated throughout Europe and America after being bowdlerized of its 
Islamic content, and the remixed versions of Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan’s ecstatic renditions 
of qawwali became staples at dance-clubs and raves globally in the 1990s. Most who read 
Sufi poetry in translation read it outside of its socio-religious context, and an entire 
generation knows qawwali as Sufi “dance music” and not as a component of Sufi ritual 
audition.   
India too saw a similar trend for several decades after independence, where the 
secularization of qawwali played out through Indian cinema. Qawwali in the movies 
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became a secular affair: a setting for flirtations between hero and heroine, a stage for 
contest between romantic rivals.  The metaphors of the devotee as the lover and the Sufi 
Master or God as the beloved, was appropriated by the heteronormative plots of 
Bollywood cinema.  Sufism, as a religious and philosophical tradition, rarely made an 
appearance in these highly choreographed numbers.  
What is singular about the past decade is that Sufi ritual practice is now being 
given yet another layer of meaning, a fact that Sohail Hashmi’s words clearly reflect.  
Shrine-based Sufi practice is now valued by a variety of people who do not necessarily 
identify themselves as adherents of shrine-based Sufism.  While Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan is 
still played at discos and “Sufi-rock” remains ever popular in India, renditions of Sufi 
poetry and discussions of Sufism in the public arena have for the most part lost their 
entirely profane garb.   
During an elite Sufi concert I attended, for instance, one of the performers was 
Rabbi, a rocker famous for his rock renditionsof Sufi poetry.  He told the audience that 
the current generation “need(s) to contemplate and reflect more”; that they need to 
“reclaim the niche” between being a Sufi and a rocker. Comparing the video of Rabbi’s 
2004 hit number, ‘Bullah, I know not who I am’ (bullah ke jana main kaun), with the 
video for Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan’s 1995 rendition of  ‘My beloved has come home’ (mera 
piya ghar aya) is telling.  Both songs are by the 18
th
 century Punjabi Sufi poet Bulleh 
Shah.  Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan’s video makes absolutely no gesture towards the Sufi 
underpinnings of the verses and instead tells a story of a war-veteran returning home. 
Rabbi’s video, on the other hand, features a montage of stark portraits of faces from 
across the subcontinent set against a backdrop of cities, mosques, temples and fields.  The 
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video flashes Bulleh Shah’s poignant verses in translation across the screen as Rabbi 
belts the verses out.  Where Bulleh Shah’s verses make way for electronic funk interludes 
in the Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan video, they occupy center-stage in Rabbi’s.    
As far as Indian movies are a gauge of socio-political and economic trends in 
India, the presentation of Sufism in Bollywood cinema provides another striking example 
of this sea-shift in how Sufism is now viewed.  As has been mentioned earlier, qawwali 
in Indian movies was almost entirely secular in its presentation, full of innuendo and 
referencing only romantic human love.  This changed from the mid-1990s, when qawwali 
in the movies was moved off the romantic plot-lines and back into the Sufi shrine.  
Silver-screen qawwali no longer frames only romantic love, but more often than not is 
presented as a backdrop for commentary on the broader human capacity for love – love 
of the divine and, increasingly, love of the Other.  Any movie made that has even a 
semblance of a message about inter-religious co-operation or the futility of communal 
strife features a qawwali sung not by a star-struck hero, but by qawwals at Sufi shrines. 
Apropos to the attraction of the sacred space of the shrine to the Queer 
community in Delhi, the controversial film, Fire (1998) is important to note.  This film 
explores the lesbian relationship between two sisters-in-law from a Middle-Class family 
in Delhi.  The film reaches its denouement at the shrine of Nizamuddin Auliya, where the 
two lovers who have finally decided to break away from their abusive marital home 
decide to meet.    
I have discussed how religious subjectivity in India is valences towards religious 
identities and practices that are seen to be unbounded and amorphous.  And apropos to 
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this, secularists and spiritualists now identify Sufism as having a suitably unbounded 
religious character.  The cinematic lens has been refocused on this conception of Sufism, 
and it is this perceived attribute of Sufism that is presented as emblematic of the 
aspirations of secularists and spiritualists in India.   
This trend is evident not only in the arena of popular entertainment, but in the 
arts, in academic scholarship, in the proliferation of Sufi-themed seminars, feature 
articles, and public lectures.  There is now more of a focus on Sufi philosophy, on the 
literature produced by Sufi thinkers and saints, and on the legacy of Sufism in the 
Subcontinent today.  Sufism has begun to stand for the aspirations and hopes of a 
generation that has seen the devastating effects of inter-religious violence from the 
demolition of the Babari mosque in Ayodhya in 1992 by a mob of Hindu nationalists, to 
the brazen violence of Mumbai at the hands of Islamic radicals in 2008; from the attacks 
of September 11 to the ensuing “War on Terror”.  In this religio-political environment, 
Sufism is seen by many as having the capacity to bridge the divide between multiple 
religious factions.  It is seen as a refuge by those who find commonalities between 
various faith traditions – by secularists and spiritualists alike.   
Ewing (1997) presents a parallel trend of religious co-option mobilized in 
Pakistan, both in its conception before 1947 and its inception in the decades that 
followed.  She writes that 
in the process of injecting a positive content (to the label of Pakistani Muslim), 
aspects of Muslim practice…became the focus of competing interpretations.  In 
the same way, Sufism and the pir have been caught up in this discursive process 
of what is and is not the true Islam that Pakistan should embody. [p. 66]  
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The Sufism co-opted and transformed by the Pakistani nation-state, however, is a stark 
contrast to the syncretic imagining of Sufism in Islam.  The kind of Sufism envisioned to 
suit the purposes of the Pakistani nation was a rarified and philosophically-oriented mode 
of Islamic belief; it was Sufism purged of its hagiographical narratives of miracles, and 
rituals associated with the Sufi shrine (pp. 69-71).  By contrast, the secularist and 
spiritualist narratives that have permeated state- and non-state media in the post-
independence era have focused on assimilative shrine rituals, Indic and Hindu motifs in 
South Asian Sufi song and poetry, and have given prominence to the sacred-space of the 
Sufi shrine.  
The broader values and ideals that Indians today associate with Sufism were made 
evident to me by the witty remark of Ashish Khanna, one of my interlocutors.  A young 
journalist and photographer, Ashish had converted to Islam after being drawn to its 
beliefs and philosophies through Sufism.  He and I once met at a coffee shop to chat 
about his beliefs and about shrine-based Sufism.  He asked me what my research interests 
are, and among other things I mentioned that I was particularly interested in how Indian 
secularism plays a part in the formation of a religious identity in India.  I added, “And the 
idea of secularism is constructed so differently in India than it is in say, France.”  Ashish 
chuckled and quipped, “Yeah, definitely!  Indian secularism is Sufi secularism, and 
French secularism is Wahhabi secularism!”  His remark, though tongue-in-cheek, 
reflected the association that many of my interlocutors make between shrine-based 
Sufism and notions of plurality and multiculturalism.        
This perception of Sufism has proved to be a mixed blessing for adherents of 
shrine-based Sufism. Adherents are not averse to Sufism being given this task; in fact, I 
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found that my interlocutors were quite enthusiastic towards the potential that Sufism and 
the shared sacred space of the shrine.  It is clear to adherents of shrine-based Sufism, 
especially to those who have strong ritual or familial association with a Sufi shrine, that 
Sufism and the sacred space of the Sufi shrine are invested with a lot of social, religious 
and political symbolism in contemporary India.   
However, what is very problematic to them is that the sacrality of shrine-based 
Sufism is appropriated and then transformed by those who would place this task on its 
shoulders.  In its appropriation, secularists and spiritualists mold the sacrality of Sufism 
and the Sufi shrine into a form that adherents of shrine-based Sufism do not recognize as 
true to its character.  In this transformed state, Sufism is often presented as part of the 
Hindu tradition, or otherwise lacking in a core Islamic identity.  The often simplistic 
subsumption of Sufism under the umbrella of Hinduism, and/or the construction of 
Sufism as pure spirituality without its socio-religious context within Islam, is not 
something that adherents of shrine-based Sufism acquiesce to.  To them, such an 
appropriation undermines the fundamentally Islamic roots of Sufism and their own 
identity as Muslims.   
As has been discussed above, embedded in the notion that a “syncretic” and 
unbounded religiosity is the ideal of Indian religious subjecthood is the idea that a linear 
and bounded religious identity is not quite Indian.  This added pressure to conform to 
certain modes of religiosity is layered over the already complex and problematic 
imagining of Muslims as the Other in India.   
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The paradox of which I wrote earlier in this section (that to many secularists and 
spiritualists, Sufism is the most amenable form of Islam because they perceive it to be not 
very Muslim at all) is at the core of this process of undermining.  Secularist and 
spiritualist claims of this kind may not be something most folks encounter at a personal 
level; the majority of adherents of shrine-based Sufism are from the lower socio-
economic bracket and have little occasion to engage with secularists and spiritualists, 
who more often than not are part of the upper middle-class and the English-speaking 
urban elite . However, secularist and spiritualist arguments in “favor” of Sufism, as well 
as the valenced position of composite religious traditions in India, are stances many 
adherents encounter through TV programming, newspapers, and the movies nearly every 
day.  Growing interest in shrine-based Sufism in the public sphere has meant increased 
exposure to the ways in which it is imagined by secularists and spiritualists.  The notion 
that the practices and beliefs of shrine-based Sufism are more “syncretic” than they are 
particularly Muslim gets hammered home from various quarters, and on all forms of non-
religious media available to the average Indian.   
For adherents of shrine-based Sufism, their links to India are deeply meaningful 
as they see Islam to have spread throughout the region primarily through the teachings of 
Sufi saints.  The subordination of nationality to religiosity or vice versa is not an identity-
choice that my interlocutors found to be of any value.  To be regarded as truly Indian was 
important to them, and thus the pressure to conform to a certain conception of Sufism and 
Muslimhood quite evidently bore down on them.  It was unacceptable to them that being 
Muslim somehow interfered with their ability to be Indian; and they did not acquiesce to 
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the many ways in which secularists and spiritualists removed Sufism outside of the 
context of Islam in order to lionize it as an ideal of Indian religious subjecthood.  
RELIGIOUS AMBIGUITY AND THE RHETORIC OF ‘COMMUNAL HARMONY’ 
What is striking in these narratives that I have discussed above is not so much that 
religiously “syncretic” figures are usually presented in a positive light in India, but that 
most of these figures are in some way “originally” Muslim.  That is, these narratives 
place these Muslim figures (Akbar, Dara Shikoh, Kabir), and the institution of shrine-
based Sufism as being open to spiritual paths and teachings outside of Islam.   In this 
construction, being recognized as indisputably Indian requires the presentation of an 
assimilative and composite religiosity, and the onus of proving national loyalty and 
belonging falls on Muslims rather than on Hindus (who are considered “naturally” a part 
of India’s cultural ethos).  And these Muslim figures and institutions are upheld as ideals 
of Indian religiosity and are presented as promoting “communal harmony”.   
Again, I am hard-pressed to find an example where a religious figure of Hindu 
origin is held up as promoting religious harmony through their “syncretic” practice and 
belief.  The only personality who comes to mind is Gandhi, who brought together the 
teachings of so many different faiths into his formulation of non-violent action.  And yet, 
Gandhi is also constructed more as a modern political and social player, rather than as 
one who was significant in religious or spiritual terms
41
.  And even then, Gandhi is not 
framed as “syncretic”; influences of Christian and Buddhist teachings on his ideologies 
are highlighted in biographies, text-books and popular media, but his religiosity is never 
questioned as being anything but Hindu.  And certainly, there is never an implication that 
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This is especially peculiar, considering that Gandhi was a deeply spiritual man.   
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Gandhi was a better Hindu because of these cross-religious influences.  This is markedly 
different from the way the previously-mentioned Muslim religious and political figures 
have been handled in these media.    
One explanation for this is that Muslims in India continue to be framed as 
outsiders in most media.  Even though Islam has been an Indian entity for nearly a 
millennium now, Muslim culture and life-ways are identified as separate from Indic 
modes of practice and belief
42
.  The persona of the Muslim as an outsider was further 
exacerbated by the partition of the Subcontinent and the traumas that accompanied it.  
One of the major ideas that was used to justify Partition was the “two-Nation Theory”: 
the idea that Hindus and Muslims were peoples of separate and incompatible nations; that 
these two communities could not co-exist in an equitable fashion within the same state.  
This theory gained immense traction and eventually did lead to the creation of the 
separate state of Pakistan, which was ostensibly the new homeland of South Asia’s 
Muslims.   
Only ostensibly, because a significant number of Muslims lived in what remained 
Indian territory; Muslims who could, or would not, move to Pakistan due to ties to 
family, land and livelihood, and some fundamental attachment to India as a political 
entity.  The dilemma, if I may use the term, for the Indian state then is how these masses 
of Muslims who were “left behind” were to be characterized.  If Pakistan was framed as 
politically the Other, then Muslims within India had to be framed in a way that identified 
them as unquestionably Indian.   
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 I have reservations using the term “Indic” to indicate modes of religious practice that are “indigenous” to 
India or pre-Islamic for several reasons.  One is that it results in the equation of the geographic identity of 
India with the religious identity of Hindu/Buddhist/Jain/Sikh.  This necessarily excludes Islam and 
Christianity as Others, and as perpetual outsiders to India.   
182 
 
This is where notions of how India itself is characterized ties in with the ideal of a 
“good Indian Muslim”.  If India is an entity conceived to have existed in a particular form 
before and after the arrival of Muslims, then for Muslims to be truly Indians, they must 
assimilate into some perceived default mode of “Indian-ness”.  This creates the ideal of 
the “syncretic” Muslim who is not substantially different in his/her practice and belief 
from the average (and presumed Hindu) Indian, and also therefore not part of a distinct 
“nation”.  
What kind of a national ethos constructs a religiously ambiguous subjectivity as 
the ideal? Ewing (2008) writes that the way in which the character of a nation is imagined 
defines modes of acceptable citizenship and religio-political subjectivity.  “The state 
makes claims on the loyalty of its inhabitants through identification with the nation and 
its specific forms of culture, a process of imagining a shared experience that 
simultaneously marks various forms of social difference” (p. 2).  Ways in which the 
Indian nation is imagined have resulted in very different ways in which various minority 
groups are positioned within it.  Just as Turkish masculinity has been stigmatized in the 
German imagining as distinctly the Other, certain forms of Muslim subjectivity have 
been painted as incompatible with the Indian multiculturalist secular ethos, and others as 
appropriate.  
Sabah Mahmood, in her article Secularism, Hermeneutics, and Empire (2006) 
writes of how secular states create a certain kind of political and religious subjectivity.  
She details how the kind of secularism found in the United States creates a religio-
political subjectivity that is congruent with its political formation.  In her view, secular 
states not so much tolerate religious differences, as remake them into appropriate 
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subjectivities.  She writes that the current “theological campaign” of the United States 
seeks to civilize and discipline Muslim subjectivity, through theological prescriptions and 
interpretations of Islam, an agenda that is echoed by “secular liberal Muslims” (239).  
Though I find Mahmood’s assessment of the allegiances of liberal Muslims to be very 
problematic in its firm assertions, it is clear that there is a certain kind of religious 
subjectivity that is favored by the secular American state over others.   
Indian secularism is a very different beast, however.  While a certain idea of 
secularism is fetishized in Europe and America, secularism in a very different avatar is 
held up as an ideal in India.  There are a few who cast a polity bereft of religious 
influence as desirable (India’s staunchly Marxist enclaves, for one).  However, the 
general consensus seems to be that a government, a ruling elite, and a civic society that 
embraces a richly variegated religious landscape is best suited to India.  This is a very 
different notion than that of Bernard Lewis who speaks of a clash between Western a-
religious secularism, and the non-secular Islamic world.  In the Indian rhetoric of national 
integration and multiculturalist secularism, the clash is not imagined as being between a-
religiosity and religiosity.  It is instead one that pits religiosity that sees diversity of 
religious practice and beliefs as multiple paths to the same truth against religiosity that 
defines piety in more singular and linear forms.  
This is markedly different from the kind of Muslim subjectivity identified by 
Hindu nationalists as being appropriate.  Blom Hansen (1999) has characterized the 
nationalist vision of India thus:  
The Hindu nationalists desire to transform Indian public culture into a sovereign, 
disciplined national culture rooted in what is claimed to be a superior ancient 
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Hindu past…According to the movement, the Indian nation can only be 
reinvigorated when its rightful proprietors, the Hindu majority, resurrect a strong 
sense of Hindutva [Hinduness].  This majoritarian call for Hindutva combines 
well-established paternalist and xenophobic discourses with democratic and 
universalist discourses on rights and entitlements, and has successfully articulated 
desires, anxieties, and fractured subjectivities in both urban and rural India. [p. 4]  
The Hindu nationalists thus envision Muslims as belonging either outside of the 
Indian nation, or as a compliant and submissive Other governed by a Hindu majority.  In 
this imagining, the “good Muslim” is one who accepts his/her position as the outsider or 
as the Other, and the category of “good Indian Muslim” is virtually oxymoronic.   
In contrast, Indian secularists see India as a religiously composite nation.  The 
ideal Muslim to them is therefore one who is also composite and assimilative in his/her 
religiosity.  The question then arises: Why does the onus of assimilation, even for 
secularists, fall primarily to the Muslim? Why is such an act of osmosis not expected 
overtly of Hindus?  Here it must be admitted that there is a bias even within Indian 
multiculturalist secularism towards imagining India as having some essentially Hindu 
core.  However, it is not so much that secularists see India as a fundamentally Hindu 
nation (with Hinduism defined as a religion in the Protestant sense of the term).  Instead, 
Hinduism is itself imagined as composite and inherently Indian.  In this view, Hindus 
need not be consciously assimilative, since assimilation is seen as the inherent and natural 
character of Hindus for millennia
43
.  Thus, though Hindu nationalists and Indian 
secularists speak at cross-purposes and have very different goals, the resulting religious 
subjectivities championed have a core assumption in common.   
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Non-theistic religions such as Buddhism, Sikkhism and Jainism are not seen as antithetical to the category 
of “Hindu”.  
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From this perspective, the more “non-assimilative” and “textually-bound” religion 
of Islam is capable of being congruent with Indian multiculturalist secularism only in a 
consciously “syncretic” form.44  It is no wonder that a political figure such as Akbar is 
seen as having contributed to communal harmony, and the poet-saint Kabir is considered 
“the apostle of Hindu-Muslim Unity” (Hedayetullah 1977).  In such a rhetorical 
environment, the questions posed by Mamdani (2004) in his book Good Muslim, Bad 
Muslim become pertinent.  He asks: “Could it be that a person who takes his or her 
religion literally is a potential terrorist?  And that someone who thinks of religious text as 
metaphorical or figurative is better suited to civic life and the tolerance it calls for?” (p. 
20).   
In the Indian case, the question that needs to be asked is not so much if the literal 
interpretation of religious texts is compatible with secularism and modernity, but rather, 
if bounded and non-assimilative modes of religiosity are entirely incongruent with a 
religiously diverse public sphere.  
The Indian brand of multiculturalist secularism has produced a certain imagining 
of appropriate religious subjecthood.  Integral to this imagining is both how the Indian 
nation itself is perceived and how minority religions are positioned within it.  This 
chapter has examined how the category of the “good Indian Muslim” is constructed 
within this secularist narrative.   
Certain religious and political figures are held up as ideals of Muslim subjectivity 
in India.  Secularist narratives in India are replete with images of the non-threatening, 
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The question remains as to why Christianity has not generally received a similar treatment in this national 
secularist imagining, and would be an interesting question for a future project.   
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“syncretized” Indian Muslim.  Key among these are the Mughal emperor Akbar, the 
Mughal prince Dara Shikoh, the 14
th
 century poet-saint Kabir, and shrine-based Sufism in 
general.  Contrasted with these “ideal types” is the figure (often a caricature) of the 
textually rigid, dogmatic, and narrowly pious Muslim.  Multiculturalist secularism in 
India thus favors Muslim religiosity that is “syncretic” or religiously ambiguous.  Within 
this narrative, syncretism and ambiguity are held up as contributing towards “communal 
harmony”, which is seen as fundamental to national integration and the stability of the 
Indian state.  Lost in this grand narrative is a place for a less-ecumenical mode of 
religious piety that may not echo the multiculturalist rhetoric of the state, but is 
nonetheless not orthogonal to the nation’s naturally diverse religious landscape.  
In the following chapter I will discuss how the assertions of a Muslim religious 
identity by adherents of shrine-based Sufism are informed by and are a response to this 
mode of religious subjecthood favored in India, and the pressures to conform to reformist 
interpretations of proper Islamic practice and belief.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
IV. MULTIPLE IMAGININGS OF SUFISM 
At the end of the bustling alleyway that wends its way from the busy thoroughfare 
of Mathura Road and into the heart of New Delhi’s Nizamuddin neighborhood is the Sufi 
shrine of the saint Nizamuddin Auliya; at the mouth of this lane is the headquarters of the 
Muslim reformist group, the Tablighi Jama’at.  As one walks through this alleyway, the 
clots of young Tablighi Jama’at missionaries (with their characteristic chest-length 
beards, lose tunics and pajamas that stop just above their ankles), and the shops and stalls 
selling reformist literature, prayer-beads, skull caps and kababs give way to the world of 
the Sufi shrine, with streams of men, women and children making their way to the sacred 
space of the shrine ahead.  At this end, one passes small cubby holes selling rose-petals 
and incense, prayer-beads and amulets, colorful posters and trinkets with Sufi themes, 
CDs and cassettes of Qawwali performances, and booklets with hagiographies, histories 
of famous shrines, prayers and Quranic verses.  This journey, from the mouth of the 
alleyway to its heart, is in many ways a lived metaphor for a journey between two ways 
in which Sufism is imagined.  
Across the road from this alleyway is the tomb complex of the Mughal king, 
Humayun.  A large quadrangle here enclosed by crumbling 16
th
 century walls witnessed 
the annual Jahan-e Khusro Sufi music concert series in mid-February 2010.  One of the 
performers at this event, Rabbi Shergil, introduced himself as a “part-time Sufi, and a 
full-time rocker”.  A guest of honor present at this concert, a member of the current 
government, said at the start of the concert that Sufism was one face of Islam, while 
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terrorism was another face of Islam, and it was up to the world to decide which face of 
Islam we will have.  This was met with a round of applause from the largely upper-class 
audience.  But, interestingly, this was the only time the word ‘Islam’ made an appearance 
during the entire event.  There was no mention of Allah or Muhammad, except when it 
was part of a Qawwali that was sung.  This was in some sense, Sufism without Islam, and 
here we find a third imagining of Sufism.  
Adherents of shrine-based Sufism must contend with all of these ways in which 
Sufism is conceptualized: their own, the way reformists construct an ideal of Sufism, and 
the way spiritualists and secularists construct it.  And it is vis-à-vis the latter two (often 
competing) conceptualizations that adherents of shrine-based Sufism must assert their 
own identity as Sufi Muslims in India.   I think of these two different ways of 
conceptualizing Sufism as pressures to be not just a certain kind of a Sufi, but 
fundamentally, a certain kind of Muslim. Any assertion of a Muslim identity by adherents 
of shrine-based Sufism is thus a negotiation between these pressures.   
Pressure from reformist groups comes in the form of critique of shrine practice 
and belief.  As has been discussed in chapter 2, and as is suggested by the term 
designating them, the goal of many reformists is to reform Sufism.  At a basic level, it is 
a goal to alter the character of contemporary Sufism, to make it conform to reformist 
interpretations of Islamic doctrine.  To assert their identity as Muslims vis-à-vis this 
strong opposition, adherents of shrine-based Sufism must establish their practices and 
beliefs as fundamentally Islamic – not just as compatible with Islam, but as being 
inalienably Muslim.   
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Secularists and spiritualists in India pose a very different kind of problem for 
adherents of shrine-based Sufism.  While reformist opposition is quite overt and 
obviously adversarial in many cases, the pressures on religious identity that come from 
secularists and spiritualists are not so apparent, and are in fact couched in a pro-Sufi 
stance.  In chapter 3, I discussed the kind of religious subjecthood that the Indian nation-
state favors.  While this kind of religious subjecthood is ostensibly valenced towards 
shrine-based Sufism, it too undermines the Muslim identity of its adherents.  Claiming a 
staunchly Muslim identity in this context also involves an assertion of Sufism’s Islamic 
roots.  But such an assertion must not at the same time be seen to negate other forms of 
identity and belonging that are equally important to Muslims in India: linguistic, regional, 
cultural and national.   
These two sources of pressure on their religiosity leave adherents of shrine-based 
Sufism in a bind: where the very perception of Sufism as not quite Muslim positions 
them as outsiders to one faction, and as part of the in-group to the other.  In the previous 
chapters I have delineated these two sometimes competing pressures in detail.  In this 
chapter, I will examine how the identity-narratives of adherents of shrine-based Sufism is 
a response to both these pressures, and how their assertion of religious and national 
identity navigates between these.   
ENCOUNTERING AND COUNTERING THE DOUBLE-BIND 
In her book Arguing Sainthood (1997), Ewing posits a “return to an older usage of 
the concept of hegemony as a control over public discursive space, a phenomenon that 
must be distinguished from consciousness” (p. 5).  She elaborates:  
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Discourses constitute subject positions, but the experiencing subject is a 
nonunitary agent (perhaps better described as a bundle of agencies) who – in 
part through the experience of competing ideologies and alternative discourses 
– operates with a potential for critical distance from any one discourse or 
subject position, including a discourse of modernity. [p. 5] 
Where Kathy Ewing examines how individual experience and subjecthood are 
formed in the face of these “competing ideologies and…discourses”, in this chapter I ask 
how these individual experiences and agencies also function to assert “truths” about the 
identity and character of a larger community or cohort.  
Adherents of shrine-based Sufism encounter pressures to construct Sufism (and, 
by implication Islam) in particular ways from reformists, and from secularists and 
spiritualists.  The latter group would like to imagine Sufism as unencumbered by Islamic 
scripture and doctrinal injunctions; as retaining a few aspects of Islam, but as borrowing 
heavily from Hindu ritual and philosophic traditions.  To them, this is a happy mix – 
representative of India’s “composite culture” – and is paradoxically the ideal form of 
Islam for India since it is perceived to be not quite Muslim.  But it is this notion of being 
not quite Muslim that undermines the self-identity of adherents as Muslims.  
The legacy of constructing Sufism as owing a debt of identity to Hinduism is a 
legacy of orientalism that continues to linger in India among scholars and lay folk.  Ernst 
(2004) has noted that orientalist assertions that Sufism was not part of Islamic belief and 
practice were based “on an abstract definition of Islam that was often derived from the 
hostile context of European colonization of Islamic countries.”  These narratives posited 
“that Sufism was ‘derived from’ Neoplatonic, Christian, Buddhist, or Hindu sources” (p. 
6).  This legacy of orientalist scholarship persists not only among secularists and 
spiritualists, but very prominently among Sufi reformists as well.  The reformist 
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contention is that practices and beliefs associated with Sufism are un-Islamic.  The 
primary argument on their part is that these practices and beliefs have no basis in Islamic 
scripture.  Like orientalist scholars of centuries past, who sought to find the “origins” and 
“sources” of everything,45  many reformists view Sufi practice and belief as derivative of 
Hindu traditions and therefore as heretical innovations.   
In an odd assemblage of ideas, the reformist message that shrine-based Sufism is 
in many ways un-Islamic is reinforced by the secularist and spiritualist claim that Sufism 
has little to do with Islam.  Many secularists and spiritualists consider themselves to be 
proponents of Sufism; and yet, it is Sufism taken out of its socio-religious and historic 
context within the fold of Islam
46
.  Reformist views too position shrine-based Sufism at 
the fringes of or even outside the pale of “correct” Islamic practice and belief. 
Adherents of shrine-based Sufism encounter the pressure to be “more Muslim” 
from reformist groups; and as Muslims, they experience the pressure to be “more Indian” 
from secular quarters.  Underlying these dual pressures is the presumption that these 
categories are to some extent mutually exclusive; that a choice has to be made between 
one and the other.  Confronted with these complex demands on their religiosity, and their 
national and cultural identity, adherents of shrine-based Sufism respond with an equal 
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Carl Ernst (2005) has discussed this quest for origins or “Quellenforschung” in his piece Situating Sufism 
and Yoga. I bring this concept up in greater detail farther in this chapter.  
 
46
I found it quite interesting that right-wing Hindu nationalists, too, tended to frame Sufism as something 
Muslims had “borrowed” from Hinduism.  The most intriguing encounter I had with someone of this 
opinion came early during my fieldwork in Gulbarga.  I was visiting an acquaintance of a relative there, 
and it came up that I was doing research at the Sufi shrine.  The man of the house immediately perked up at 
this and he confided to me that he had done extensive research in Sufism.  He said that he had found the 
Hindu roots of Sufism, and claimed that he had found verses of the Bhagawat Geeta in the Quran!  He also 
made the odd claim that the phrase Allah Hu! (He, Allah), a Muslim declaration of the Godhead, was 
basically the same as the words allah hoon (I am Allah) in Hindi; this he said was the same as the Vedantic 
declaration, aham brahmasmi (I am Brahma).  While his views were on the extreme end of the spectrum, 
they are not unusual, and adhere to a general pattern common in right-wing Hindu rhetoric.  It is one that 
identifies Hinduism as the source of all wisdom and philosophy.  
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measure of complexity.  Faced with such a double-bind
47
, adherents of shrine-based 
Sufism use their identity-narratives to stake an equal claim to being both Muslim and 
Indian, and present a construction of their identity that weaves together notions of 
religious authenticity and national belonging.   
It became evident through my early conversations that adherents of shrine-based 
Sufism used narratives of Indian multiculturalist secularism in claiming legitimacy for 
shrine-based Sufism; that is, they seemed to be aligning shrine-based Sufism with 
modern values of multiculturalism and egalitarian democracy.  However, as my time in 
India progressed, I came to see that though the language of multiculturalist secularism 
used by my interlocutors to assert their identities vis-à-vis reformist critique was very 
similar to the idioms deployed by secularists and spiritualists, these two groups were not 
necessarily aligned.   Both reformist groups as well as secularist and spiritualist quarters 
sought to define Sufism and Islam in ways to which adherents of shrine-based Sufism did 
not acquiesce.  
Leve (2007) has used the term “double-bind” in her analysis of the appeal to 
human rights via secularism made by Theravada Buddhists in Nepal.  In speaking of the 
incongruity of Theravada Buddhist notions of the self, or more appropriately the denial of 
the self, and the construction of the self inherent to the ideal of “human rights”, she writes 
of “an irreconcilable tension between what Buddhists do and the subjectivities they 
inhabit when they call on human rights, and the acts and identities those rights are 
supposed to guarantee” (p. 79).  Adherents of shrine-based Sufism too are faced with a 
                                                          
47I would like to acknowledge W. E. B. Dubois’ work The Souls of Black Folk for its excellent explication 
of this notion of a double-bind for African Americans.  It is a concept that is germane to the pressures on 
ways of being and ways of conceiving of one’s position in society for marginalized peoples all over the 
world.  
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similar bind where the occupation of the category of “good Indian Muslim”, as defined 
by the secularist narratives of the Indian nation-state, necessitates the negation of a 
staunchly Muslim identity.   
Adherents of shrine-based Sufism counter these multi-facetted pressures using 
multiple registers – scriptural and doctrinal, and socio-political.  These multiple registers 
enable adherents to position themselves as Muslims, as Indians, and as active members of 
a modern world; and in doing so, posit new definitions of ‘Muslim’, ‘Indian’, and 
‘modern’ subjecthoods.  In asserting the legitimacy of shrine-based Sufism, adherents lay 
claim not just to ways of being Muslim but also to ways of being Indian.  The arguments 
put forth by my interlocutors to legitimize shrine-based Sufism were certainly attempts to 
trace its roots to the beginnings of Islam; they were also arguments made in dialogue 
with, and apropos to contemporary social, political and religious pressures.   
There are of course numerous and complex issues that shape the way Muslim 
identity is constructed in India.  I have discussed previously the valencing of a composite 
religious subjectivity in India, the lingering burden of Partition-era politics, and the ways 
in which being Indian and being Hindu are defined; these factor all contribute to this 
complexity.  Adherents of shrine-based Sufism, however, are subject to pressures on their 
religious identity from two very different sources (reformists, and secularists and 
spiritualists) that often strain at their religious identity from two very different (and 
sometimes orthogonal) directions.   
In effect, adherents of shrine-based Sufism encounter multiple hegemonies in 
their assertion of religious identity.  I have previously discussed the hegemony of Hijaz-
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centered, Salafi and Wahhabi Islam.  This hegemony is for the most part experienced by 
Muslims globally, since most Muslims in the contemporary world live outside the 
Arabian Peninsula, and practice regional modes of Islam.  Even though, demographically 
speaking, the “rest of the world” wins the contest, I have previously discussed how the 
Arabian Peninsula continues to dominate the valenced geography of the Muslim world.  
In this hegemonic conception of the Muslim world, shrine-based Sufism (be it in South, 
Central or Southeast Asia, or West Africa) is continually marginalized as antithetical to 
mainstream Islamic belief and practice by reformist groups and influential seminaries, 
scholars and preachers. Thus, even though shrine-based Sufism is perhaps the 
predominant form of Islam practiced in India, adherents of shrine-based Sufism 
increasingly find themselves on the back-foot, having to defend their practices and beliefs 
in the face of strong reformist critique.  
In India, in addition to this hegemony of reformist Islam is the hegemony of 
Hinduism.  This hegemony can be seen in the form of Indian religious subjecthood that 
favors a “syncretic” or a “composite” Muslim identity.  It also manifests itself in the 
constant harassment and undermining faced by most Muslims from Hindu nationalist 
groups (who claim India is essentially Hindu) and from the Indian state’s bureaucratic 
apparatuses (who intimidate Muslims in the name of internal security).     
Responses to critique from reformist groups do not occur in a socio-political void.  
Adherents of shrine-based Sufism are well aware of the various pressures on their claims 
to religious authenticity and national belonging.  They thus counter reformist pressures at 
various levels: 1) positing doctrinal arguments in favor of shrine-based Sufism, 2) 
marking the shared ritual space of Sufi shrines as necessary for the contemporary world, 
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and 3) claiming South Asia as a valid and vital source of Islamic practice and thought.  
Significantly, these acts of countering also play out in dialog with discourses on religious 
subjecthood in India.  Arguments in the defense of shrine-based Sufism are thus 
imbricated with assertions of a particular kind of Indian Muslim identity.   
In framing their assertions of religio-political identity as they do, adherents of 
shrine-based Sufism are responding to both reformist opposition, and the appropriation of 
Sufism by secularists and spiritualists.  In the face of reformist critique, adherents find 
that they must address the fundamental accusation that shrine-based Sufism is un-Islamic, 
that it has veered from the path of what reformists define as “true” Islam.  Countering this 
critique involves providing doctrinal proof for the legitimacy of shrine practice and 
belief, and claiming Sufi shrines as legitimate Muslim sacred spaces (along with 
mosques).  Adherents pose these arguments against reformist rhetoric as Muslims who 
are staunchly Indian; a demographic to be reckoned with, and not dismissed as 
constituting the periphery of the “Muslim World”.  But in taking these stances, adherents 
of shrine-based Sufism are also speaking to secularists and spiritualists, whose 
appropriations of Sufism, and whose characterizations of what it means to be Indian and 
what it means to be productive members of a modern world often undermine the self-
identification of adherents as Muslims.   
In responding to these multiple pressures on their socio-religious identity, 
adherents of shrine-based Sufism thus deploy narratives that simultaneously position 
them as vital players in a modern, cosmopolitan India, and that assert their claims to an 
origin in Islam’s pre-modern past.   
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THE TEXTUAL REBUTTAL 
Reformist groups in India levy the very serious accusation of being un-Islamic on 
adherents of shrine-based Sufism.  As mentioned, accusations of idol-worship (but 
parasti), polytheism (shirk), and heretical innovation (bid’at) are very openly made against 
adherents; accusations that adherents do not take lightly.  Proofs given by oppositional 
reformist groups against shrine-based Sufism are usually drawn from the Quran, the 
Hadis (sayings of Muhammad), and the Sirat (biographical anecdotes from the Prophet’s 
life).  One of the ways in which adherents of shrine-based Sufism respond to this is by 
presenting textual counter-proofs that validate specific practices.   
Early in my fieldwork I was able to attend lectures on Quranic exegesis (tafsir) at 
the religious school (madrassa) at the shrine of Khaja Bandanawaz.  This religious school 
was primarily a school for boys, where they are taught a standard curriculum
48
 that trains 
them in the memorization of the Quran (hifz), its formal recitation (qir’at), and in basic 
Islamic jurisprudence (fiqha). The school is a good-sized open hall within the shrine 
complex, adjacent to the tomb of Khaja Bandanawaz.  Annexed to this larger school 
building is a smaller anteroom that functions as a religious school for girls.  The religious 
school for girls is much more limited in its scope.  A few female teachers come in every 
weekday to tutor the girls in the memorization of the Quran, which they are tested on 
annually (for a certificate) by one of the male teachers from the boys’ school next door. 
At my request, the chief custodian of the shrine, Syed Shah Khusro Hussaini 
(henceforth Khusro Sahab), had asked one of the teachers from the boys’ school to 
lecture on Quranic exegesis in the girls’ annex.  I would show up at the girls’ school 
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This curriculum was set by the Jamia Nizamia seminary in Hyderabad.  This seminary, as opposed to the 
Dar ul-Ulum Deoband, is largely a pro-shrine seminary.   
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every day close to noon.  The little room would be packed with girls aged about four to 
sixteen.  The whole room would be a-buzz with their murmured recitations as the girls sat 
cross-legged on floor mats, rocking back and forth, attempting to memorize the Quran.  
Occasionally one of the female tutors would linger on from the morning’s session (the 
girls’ school was technically open only till mid-day), but more often than not the girls 
would be working on their own.  Many of the very young girls left at noon, but a few of 
the older girls stayed on to listen to the lectures on Quranic exegesis, which I realized 
was an unusual treat for them.   
Maulvi Sahab, the religious scholar and teacher who gave these lectures on 
Quranic exegesis, proceeded with his lectures every day, tackling each book of the Quran 
in turn.  A stern-looking man in appearance, Maulvi Sahab was a genial and engaging 
teacher, who was passionate about his work and also clearly enjoyed interacting with his 
students.  He often digressed from the formal exegetical analysis to narrate incidents from 
other parts of the Quran that were related to a particular verse we had just read, or to 
clarify a particular point being made.  He also often cracked jokes to enliven his lectures, 
grinning broadly as the students giggled shyly at his droll humor.  As this religious school 
was part of a Sufi shrine, the mode of Islam taught here too was favorable to shrine-based 
Sufism; and often Maulvi Sahab would narrate episodes from the Quran or bring up 
verses that he felt validated some aspect of shrine-based Sufism.  
He often brought up an episode from the Quran (in Surah Maryam) to make a 
case for the validity of shrine practice.  In this episode, the aged Zakariyah, on seeing that 
unseasonal fruit often appeared in Maryam’s room, prays for a child there. He is soon 
blessed with his son, Yahya (John).  Here, Maryam’s status as a saint or a friend of God 
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(waliya) ensures that divine blessings (barkat) shower down on her and her surroundings.  
These blessings rub off on others in close proximity to her.  Maulvi Saahab used this 
incident as proof that a saint (wali or waliya can be used as a means (wasila) to access 
God.   
Another Quranic proof used was quite an intriguing one.  Here Adam, after his 
fall from Paradise, takes the name of (as-yet unborn) Muhammad as a means (wasila) to 
have God forgive his trespasses.  Similarly, Maulvi Sahab also recalled a traditional 
account of the actions of Ayesha, one of Muhammad’s wives, to counter the claim that 
only living saints can be used as a means to God.  In this narrative, Ayesha advises a 
group of petitioners who are desperate for rain at the time of a drought to merely make a 
hole in the roof right above Muhammad’s grave: the unobstructed connection between 
the deceased Muhammad and the heavens would be enough to bring rain.  Ayesha, 
herself considered a saint, is here suggesting that the deceased Muhammad be used as a 
means to reach God.  Maulvi Sahab pointed to the latter two instances to highlight the 
legitimacy of using saints and prophets who were not alive as a means to connect with 
God; one of the points of contention among various groups being whether only living 
saints and prophets can be used as a means to access divine grace.  
Many of my interlocutors also used non-Quranic sources, such as the 
hagiographies and teachings of Sufi saints to validate current practice.  Some brought up 
Nizamuddin Auliya’s view that bowing in reverence (sajda-e ta’zim) is vastly different 
from bowing as an act of worship (sajda-e ‘ibada).  Thus, if the intent of bowing before 
the tomb or a shrine custodian was to show respect or reverence, it did not violate the 
fundamental tenet of monotheism (tauhid).  One highly revered Sufi master in Delhi I 
199 
 
spoke to, Nizami Sahab, added that proof of the difference between these two kinds of 
bowing could be found in the Quran as well.  He recounted the episode in the Quran 
when God, on fashioning Adam from a lump of clay, commands the angels to bow before 
his new creation.  “This, naturally”, said Nizami Sahab, “is an instance of reverential 
bowing, and not of worshipful bowing.”49 
Maulvi Sahab, at the shrine’s school in Gulbarga, also often recalled episodes 
from the hagiographies of Sufi saints and biographical narratives of various prophets that 
he then used as validation for shrine practice.  One instance in particular stood out to me.  
During one of his lectures at the religious school, Maulvi Sahab mentioned in passing 
that music was antithetical to the spirit of Islamic law (shariyat).  I asked him how this 
could be reconciled with the use of music as part of ritual at Sufi shrines, something that 
could be routinely observed at the shrine at which he was a preacher and teacher.  He 
replied that music had not been a part of Islamic ritual practice before its advent in India.  
However, when the Sufi saint, Moinuddin Chishti, arrived in India he found that it was an 
important part of Hindu practice.  And so, keeping in mind the cultural practices of the 
region, music was incorporated into Islamic practice in the Subcontinent.  He added after 
a pause:  
But music is different from song-and-dance. Popular songs usually include things 
that are far removed from the Truth.  But in Islam there is no injunction against 
music per se. The Prophet himself has said that our voices lend beauty to the 
Quran.  And it is said that the Prophet’s caravans were led by those who sang to 
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The Quranic account of the fall of Satan is markedly different from Biblical narrative.  In the Quran, God 
commands all the angels to bow before his best creation, Adam.  All the angels, except for Satan (iblis), 
comply.  Satan refuses to bow before Adam stating that he will submit only to God and to no other.  God 
then punishes Satan for his disobedience.  This account places Satan in a very grey area.  I have heard 
accounts (especially from Sufi quarters) that position Satan as the greatest of believers because of his 
refusal to bow before no one but God, even at God’s command.  
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ease the hardships of the journey.  So music and humming are not wholly 
prohibited in Islam.    
He said that context was important in this regard; the type of music, its purpose and 
above all, the intent (niyyat) of those who sang and those who listened was very 
important.  He then recounted a narrative from the hagiography of Nizamuddin Awliya.  
It is known that though music was very often a part of ritual practice at Nizamuddin 
Awliya’s Sufi hospice (khanqah), he himself never participated in ritual audition (sama’).  
When asked why this was so, he responded succinctly, with a clever play on words that is 
unfortunately lost in translation: “I do not do it, but I do not object to it either.”50.   
Maulvi Sahab, and numerous other adherents of shrine-based Sufism I spoke to, 
emphasized that such a refusal to judge the actions of others as wrong at face-value came 
from a belief that it was not the act, but the intent (niyyat) behind it that was of 
paramount importance.  The importance of the intent of the believer was emphasized to 
me over and over again by a variety of interlocutors.  This was in fact, one of the main 
reasons given to me for the cross-religious appeal of the Sufi shrine; it did not matter if 
the devotees at the shrine were not Muslim as the intent of the believer was key.  
I also often encountered conversion and miracle (karamat) narratives that were 
used to bolster the argument in favor of shrine-based Sufism.  These are different from 
the narratives I have mentioned above because they are not based on authoritative texts as 
markers of religious legitimacy.  The charisma of a given saint, his powers, and the 
miracles experienced and witnessed at the shrine were seen as proof in and of themselves.  
Coupled with tales of miracles performed by the saint during his life and beyond were 
conversion stories.  Interlocutors at various shrines often recounted stories of Hindu 
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In kar na-mikonam, vali inkaar na-mikonam.  نیا راک یمن منک یلو منک یمن راکنا!  
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followers of a saint who had embraced Islam through Sufism.  Also quite common were 
narratives of anti-shrine reformists humbled by the charisma of a given Sufi saint.  
My interlocutors often recounted personal experiences with the saint’s power.  As 
I have mentioned, the death anniversary of Sufi saints is an event that draws huge crowds 
to the prominent shrines.  At the shrine of Khaja Bandanawaz, most of the pilgrims in 
attendance are from the rural areas of Deccan India.  One such pilgrim I spoke to was an 
old woman from a village not too far from Gulbarga.  Her clothes and her possessions 
told me that she was quite poor, and so making the journey to the shrine would not have 
been easy both in terms of her age and her income.  I sat by her and started up a 
conversation.  I asked her about what had drawn her to the shrine.  She told me of how, 
years ago, her very young son had been separated from her among the throngs of pilgrims 
outside the shrine.  The boy had later been found circumambulating the tomb, which to 
the woman was nothing short of a miracle.  She said that it was the saint who had led this 
young child to the tomb and to safety amid the hundreds of thousands of people gathered 
for the event.    
I found that the death-anniversary of a Sufi saint is a great venue to hear miracle 
and conversion narratives of this type.  Preachers and scholars from various religious 
institutions are invited to deliver sermons at the shrine, and these sermons are often 
broadcast on speakers throughout the shrine complex for the benefit of all gathered.  I 
heard miracle narratives that were part of these sermons, as well as from personal 
conversations with pilgrims at the shrines.   
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A miracle narrative that I heard often during the sermons at the shrine of Khaja 
Bandanawaz is one that has parallels in the hagiographies of many other South Asian Sufi 
saints.  The shrine complex of Khaja Bandanawaz houses the shrines of his close 
relatives and descendants as well.  One tomb that is quite popular among visitors is that 
of his great-grandson.  The story goes that a renowned Sufi master from another town, 
Sayyed Ahmad Sher Sawar, had travelled a great distance to meet Khaja Bandanawaz.  
What was singular about this saint was that his powers were so great that he rode a lion 
(his epithet, Sher Sawar, literally means ‘one mounted on a lion/tiger’).  As Sher Sawar 
approached the hospice of Khaja Bandanawaz, the latter’s great-grandson, Nadim Allah, 
decided to challenge the powers of the visitor.  To outdo the lion-riding Sufi master, 
Nadim Allah sat himself on a wall and commanded it to move, which it promptly did.  
Amazed by the powers of Khaja Bandanawaz’s great grandson, Sayyed Ahmad Sher 
Sawar deemed himself unworthy to meet the saint himself and returned whence he came.   
On hearing of this battle of miracles, Khaja Bandanawaz reprimanded his great-
grandson for his impertinence.  Unable to bear the displeasure of this great saint, Nadim 
Allah “walked into the Unknown” (ghaib main chale gaye), and never returned.  The site 
of his disappearance continues to be very popular among pilgrims to the shrine.  I have 
detailed the significance of this tomb to adherents in chapter 1.   This miracle narrative is 
especially interesting since the power of Khaja Bandanawaz himself is only implied, thus 
rendering its unstated potential even more awesome
51
.  
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Simon Digby, in his essay To Ride a Tiger or a Wall (1994), has analyzed this particular form of 
hagiographical anecdote in detail.  This anecdote is not unique to the shrine of Khaja Bandanawaz, and is 
one that is commonly narrated all over South Asia in reference to other Sufi figures.  Digby notes that it can 
be found further afield as well.  In this essay, Digby delineates the context of the wall-tiger narratives as 
one of competition between rival Sufi figures.  Here, the power of the Sufi Master, who is established in his 
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Stories like these are common in the hagiographic tradition of South Asia.  Sufi 
saints encounter rival Sufi masters and Yogis (masters of the Yogic traditions), and in the 
duel of miracles that often ensues, the Sufi saint central to the tale is able to surpass his 
challenger’s powers.  The 21st century heirs to this tradition are narratives of the 
encounter between the living Sufi saint (now entombed in a shrine
52
) and the doubting 
reformist.  Two prominent issues are addressed in these narratives: 1) the continued hold 
that Sufi shrines have on Muslims and on the population of India in general; 2) moments 
when the power of the saint is perceptibly experienced.   
A sermon that I heard during the death anniversary of Khaja Bandanawaz is a 
case in point.  The preacher was a teacher at the shrine’s religious school and began by 
posing a question: When the saint sat at his hospice (khanqah), a steady stream of people 
visited him.  But why do so many thousands flock to the shrine now – hundreds of years 
later, when he is nowhere to be seen?  “What is the solution to this conundrum?” he 
asked.  He said that this was the question one could pose to the Tablighi Jama'at, the Ahl-
e Hadis and the Jama'at-e Islami (various reformist groups currently active in India).  
"This is not a question that I pose! This is the question that God poses (to those who 
doubt)!”  His voice thundered through the loud-speakers as he reached the crescendo of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
hospice (khanqah), is challenged by a Sufi figure who is not sedentary.  The symbolism of riding a wall is 
linked with this rooted form of Sufi power and authority (p. 100-102).   I have recounted this tale as I heard 
it at the shrine, but Digby reports this particular version of the anecdote as it is rendered in the armughan-I 
sultani (p. 124).  
Nile Green (2004) has also contextualized “competition narratives”, especially those between Hindu and 
Muslim figures.  Closely examining the cult of Shah Nur, Green paints a complex picture of a religiously 
plural landscape in Deccan India where these narratives of competition reflected competition over 
adherents whose religious identities were not always rigid and bounded.  
 
52
A primary belief among adherents of shrine-based Sufism is that Sufi saints do not die in the same sense 
as others.  Sufis are on the path to oneness with God.  This oneness is achieved only when the Sufi is able 
to totally surrender the Self or destroy the Self (fana) into the presence of God.  This point of destruction 
results not in the death of the Sufi saint, but in his continued sustenance (baqa) within the being of God.  
Thus, the saint is believed to be alive in his tomb, a concept known as zinda piri (living sainthood).    
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his point: that there was no reasonable explanation for this except that the wonder of the 
saint's continued draw and charisma was God's doing; that the continued powers of the 
saint were meant to remind humanity of the Unknown (ghaib).   
He then went on to speak of an encounter he had with a member of the Jama’at-e 
Islami
53
, whose son had gone missing.  The man had oddly been convinced that his son 
would be found at a Sufi shrine.  When pressed on why this was so, it emerged that the 
child had been conceived after the man’s wife had asked for a Sufi saint’s intercession.  
Emphasizing the irony of the situation, the preacher pointed out that this man, who made 
it his business to spread literature against shrine-based Sufism, was now going to Sufi 
shrines looking for his son.  “This is the power of the saint,” he concluded, “He has 
turned the circumstances of this man so, that he who once was totally against Sufi 
shrines, is now having to seek a miracle from Sufi saints in this manner!”  This 
declamation was met with great appreciation from the audience of scholars and preachers 
in the shrine mosque, and I observed many of the lay pilgrims seated in the shrine-
courtyard nodding in appreciation.  
On visiting any prominent Sufi shrine in India, it is very easy to presume that 
adherents of shrine-based Sufism have no cause to feel threatened by reformist rhetoric 
and proselytizing.  The sheer number of people at these shrines on any given weekday 
speaks of their immense popularity, and the massive numbers of people who travel great 
distances for the death anniversaries of even relatively minor saints speaks of the 
                                                          
53While the Tablighi Jama’at and the Dar-ul Umlum Deoband seminary self-identify as Sufis (but as Sufi 
reformists) the Jama’at-e Islami Hind is a staunchly anti-Sufi.  Their rhetoric is very much Salafi in 
character, with highly rationalized notions of religion and religious practice.  In India, they are an a-
political group (as are most Muslim religious groups in India – the Muslim League in Kerala being an 
exception to this).  In Pakistan, however, the Jama’at-e Islami is very active in the political arena, and is a 
key player in regional and national electoral politics.  
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immense hold that these institutions and figures have on the religious imagination of 
India’s people.  However, any conversation with committed adherents does not take long 
to veer in the direction of reformist critique of shrine-based Sufism.  And this is 
especially true of adherents who are closely associated with shrine-based Sufism – 
descendants of a saint, shrine functionaries, Sufi scholars and masters, teachers, preacher, 
students at the shrine, and daily visitors.  
 The sermon that I recounted above is a good example of this.  It was one among 
around ten hour-long sermons delivered during the death anniversary of Khaja 
Bandanawaz.  These sermons were broadcast from a mosque at the shrine that was 
packed with adherents; it was broadcast on loudspeakers scattered throughout the large 
shrine complex, which was bursting at the seams with hundreds and thousands of 
pilgrims.  The absolute numbers at the shrine for the event would have led anyone to 
believe that shrine-based Sufism remains entirely unaffected by the activities of anti-
shrine reformist groups.  And yet, every sermon at some point directly addressed the 
issue of anti-shrine stances on the part of reformist groups.  Arguments were presented 
directly in response to various aspects of reformist critique, and were intended for a lay 
audience.  The need to confront the anti-shrine rhetoric of reformist groups seemed 
urgent, and the animosity towards these groups and their anti-shrine messages was 
palpable.   
Doctrinal and theological arguments in favor of shrine-based Sufism were used to 
refute specifically the reformist claim that shrine-based Sufism had little or no basis in 
Islam.  Such arguments were deployed to assert the legitimacy of specific shrine practices 
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(such as bowing before the tomb or the use of music in shrine ritual), or to validate the 
general concept of sainthood (waliyat) and saintly miracles (karamat).    
Along with this, miracle and conversion narratives presented Sufi saints and their 
shrines as conduits of God’s power, and therefore as living proof of their legitimacy in 
and of themselves.  Sufi saints trace their spiritual descent (through a chain of master-
disciple relationships) to the prophet Muhammad, and through him, to Adam.  The past 
miracles of a saint during his lifetime, and the miracles that continue to be experienced 
centuries after a saint’s passing, thus make the shrine a living connection to Islam’s past 
and its beginnings.  The continued experiences of pilgrims at saints’ tombs tie miracle 
stories from centuries past to the very lived reality of shrine practice today.  My 
interlocutors saw the validity of shrine-based Sufism as self-evident in this lived 
connection with Sufi saints, and in the continued interaction with their charisma and 
power as friends of God.  However, the growing influence of reformist groups certainly 
placed them in a defensive stance, which compelled them to respond to reformist critique 
with doctrinal proofs of the validity of shrine-based Sufism and the reiteration of the 
God-granted power of Sufi saints.   
 ISLAMIC VALUES AND A SECULAR, DEMOCRATIC INDIA 
While I did hear all of the above-mentioned narratives quite frequently, I also 
very often encountered a different kind of argument in favor of shrine-based Sufism. 
Adherents would identify certain values as fundamental to Islam, and then point to 
shrine-based Sufism as being a reification of these values.  That is, my interlocutors 
spoke of themselves and fellow adherents, their practices and beliefs, and the shrine 
space itself as being reflective of core Islamic values.  Importantly, they saw shrine-based 
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Sufism as being in a unique position to make concrete these values, due to its 
fundamental character.  My interlocutors often pointed out to me that groups antagonistic 
to shrine-based Sufism lack the capacity to bring these ideals to bear.  
My interlocutors identified inter-religious dialog and cooperation, unifying 
diverse peoples, and equality among citizens and subjects as some of the core messages 
of Islam. And intriguingly, my interlocutors used terms like “communal harmony”, 
“national integration”, “secularism” and “democracy” to give voice to these values.  That 
is, the language used to articulate these Islamic values overlapped with the narratives 
used by the modern Indian nation-state to articulate its own core values.  Many of my 
interlocutors were separated by hundreds of miles and had never met or been in 
correspondence; they belonged to varied socio-economic classes. And yet over and over 
again, they brought up these aspects of shrine-based Sufism, and consistently used the 
lexicon of Indian multiculturalist secularism to express them.   
I once attended a seminar organized by a Sufi master and shrine custodian in 
Delhi to commemorate the life and works of the great Indian Sufi poet Amir Khusro.  A 
poet, musician and inventor, Amir Khusro was one of the most devoted disciples of the 
saint Nizamuddin Auliya.  He wrote and composed beautiful poems for his master in 
Persian, the court language of the time, and in the language of the people of the Gangetic 
plains, Hindavi.  His poems contain Persio-Arab imagery, as well as Indic motifs.  The 
seminar that I attended was held in the neighborhood of Nizamuddin, in a hall adjacent to 
another minor Sufi shrine.  There were mostly lay Muslim men in attendance, and the 
few women who were there (including me), were seated at the back of the room.  The 
audience sat on cushioned mats on the floor, while the participants in the seminar were 
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seated at a table on the dais.  The speakers were Sufi teachers, religious scholars, and 
professors of religion and history at various Universities.  
Many speakers at this seminar spoke of Amir Khusro’s contributions to 
interreligious concord.  One among them declared that the 13
th
 century poet had been a 
“champion of secular democracy”.  That Amir Khusro would have no conception of 
secular democracy as we know it now was of little consequence to the speaker.  In his 
talk, the term “secular democracy” was used to express the more abstract value of finding 
commonalities amongst diverse cultures.  Khusro’s work here is seen as a step in the 
direction of that “composite” and “syncretic” culture so valued in secularist and 
spiritualist narratives in India today.   
On another occasion, Abdul Ghani Sahab, an adherent who was also the librarian 
at the shrine of Khaja Bandanawaz in Gulbarga (and an interlocutor with whom I spent 
considerable amounts of time), told me that the saint never discriminated against people 
of different religions, and all were welcome at his lodge if their intentions were pure. “It 
was about national integration, you know,” he added.  The phrase “national integration” 
here seems quite out of place, considering that Khaja Bandanawaz was a 14
th
 century 
saint in Deccan India.  But here, the phrase “national integration” is being used to 
articulate the idea that the Sufi hospice was a place where diverse peoples were brought 
together by common desires and goals.  I could go on ad infinitum. Over a year of 
research in India I heard narratives of this sort very often.   
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I don’t want to suggest here that these terms and phrases are merely stand-ins for 
other abstract values.  Phrases like “national integration” and “communal harmony”54 are 
so enmeshed in the Indian national ethos, and so value-laden that it would be naive to 
suppose that they did not possess some inherent meaning of their own; meaning that was 
independent (but not necessarily separate) from the values identified as fundamentally 
Islamic by my interlocutors.  That is, these terms were not being used as merely 
substitutes for what, to my interlocutors, were core Islamic values.  By using these 
phrases my interlocutors were suggesting that there were definite points of congruence 
between core Islamic ideals and the ideals of a modern, religiously and culturally diverse 
India.  That the two are not incompatible; that being part of the ahl-e sunnat wa al-
jama’at (the term used by adherents of shrine-based Sufism to self-identify), and being 
integrated members of the Indian secular democratic nation-state are not mutually 
exclusive states of being; that they are in fact irrevocably connected.   
I have thus far not engaged much with the issue of Hindu nationalism and its 
place in this mosaic.  However, one encounter during my fieldwork does call for me to 
dip my toe into this other complex pool of religio-political relations.  Early during my 
research in India I had the opportunity to visit the shrine of Baba Budan in the Southern 
Indian state of Karnataka.  I have previously described how this shrine has been a site for 
contestations over sacred space between adherents of shrine-based Sufism and regional 
Hindu nationalist groups.  The former claim the site as the shrine of the Sufi saint Baba 
Budan; the latter contend that it was originally a shrine of the Hindu figure Dattatreya, 
and that it was appropriated by Muslims as a Sufi shrine.  The shrine had long catered to 
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My interlocutors invariably used these terms in English, even if they were speaking Hindi, Urdu or 
Kannada.   
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both Hindu and Muslim pilgrims to the site by providing ritually-blessed offerings in the 
form of Sufi tabarruk and Hindu prasad.  The site is now, however, a transformed space.  
The communal dispute that emerged in the early 1990s has now been brought to court.  
The site has been cordoned off with metal barricades and barbed wire fencing by the 
State till a legal decision is taken.  However, big rallies of Hindu nationalist supporters 
still occur outside the shrine, and the community of Sufi adherents who claim descent 
from the saint still lives in the villages surrounding the shrine.   
I had visited this shrine as a child, as part of a family excursion to the beautiful 
countryside of Karnataka’s coffee plantations.  I have very positive memories of the 
shrine and its beautiful, mist-swathed environs.  The shrine had been a relatively organic 
site, blending in with its surroundings; moss-covered steps led to a shrine complex that 
was partly a built structure and partly a cave.  Inside, the shrine was chilly, humid and 
dark.  Niches in the cave area were lit with oil-lamps, and parts of the wall were moist 
with seepage from natural springs.  I have little recollection of the actual tomb of the 
saint, but I do remember receiving flowers and sugar from a Muslim attendant as well as 
from a Hindu priest.    
When we visited the shrine in early 2009, however, it was a transformed place.  
The natural browns and greens of the original shrine complex were interrupted by bright 
blue railings and the entire site was cordoned off with a barbed-wire fence.  The effect 
was jarring and violent.  Entry into the shrine complex was barred due to a court-order.  
A few adherents paid their respects to the saint from beyond this barbed wire fence, and 
their offerings of incense, flowers and coconuts were managed by an attendant who sat 
by the entrance.  Some of these adherents had travelled from very far to be here, and were 
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visibly disappointed at not being able to enter the sacred-space of the shrine.  The family 
of hereditary shrine custodians and Hindu nationalist groups were embroiled in this battle 
over a sacred space that had long been shared.  I have recounted that interestingly 
enough, the Muslims of the area were mostly apathetic to the cause of the Sufi shrine 
since most had reformist leanings, and that aid for the hereditary custodians of the shrine 
had come from secular activist groups rather than from the Muslim community around 
the shrine.   
While there, Dr. Bigelow and I had the opportunity to have an extended 
conversation with a few shrine adherents.  Some were members of the community, who 
claimed descent from the saint.  A couple of the men had been posted to the shrine as 
representatives of the state to supervise its handling as a disputed site.  We were ushered 
into a bare room that had been constructed outside of the shrine complex that housed a 
desk and a few simple chairs.   
Asked if they acquiesced to the sacred space of the shrine being shared by Hindus 
and Muslims (as it had been for as far back as people could remember), one of the 
community members, Sayyed Pasha, said to my colleague and me, “This is India! In 
India, it’s imperative that we move forward together.  We shouldn’t look at creed or 
caste.”  Then smiling, and pointing to each of us in the group he continued,  
Now look…you are here, she is here, we are here.  She is Christian, she is Hindu, 
I am a Muslim, but we are kindred. We just have different religions.  This is India, 
and in India we must walk together.  In our language we say that we are bharatiya 
muslim (Indian Muslim).  In India, we must take everyone along as we move 
forward; whether one is small, or big, we gather everyone as we walk. Our 
kinship expands from this, and so this is of benefit to us as well. We must not 
pause to differentiate and say, ‘No, he is Hindu; he is Muslim; he is 
Christian…Fighting for the Truth; that’s what jihad is. Sitting amidst each other 
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with love; that’s what humanity is; just as we’re sitting here now—Hindu, 
Christian and Muslim.  
 
Sayyed Pasha’s remarks were made apropos to Hindu nationalist claims to the 
shrine’s space.  But his narrative, and many others like it that I encountered through the 
course of my research, reveal much about the ways in which adherents of shrine-based 
Sufism assert their identity as Muslims and as Indians.  Here, our interlocutor had drawn 
a link between being Indian and being Muslim, and how each affected the other: the 
ideals of togetherness, of kinship across religious lines were ideals at the core of both the 
Indian nation and of Islam.  In making a statement about shrine-based Sufism and the 
nature of the shrine space, Sayyed Pasha felt it necessary to draw on both identities – 
national and religious – to make his point.   
Through such interactions with numerous interlocutors I also got the sense time 
and again that adherents believed that the seeds of what we now term as secular 
democracy or multiculturalism or pluralism, were all planted in India centuries ago; that 
the basic values that lie at the core of these concepts were ones that were not only 
embraced by Sufi Muslims, but often originated with them.  And to these adherents of 
shrine-based Sufism, it is these same basic values that continue to be reified by them in 
21
st
 century India. 
This notion of continuity and of the legacy of Sufism was most clearly articulated 
by one of my interlocutors, Dr. S. L. Peeran.  Peeran Sahab, as I addressed him, was a 
charismatic and passionate individual.  He was a retired judge and committed Sufi who 
ran an organization dedicated to the study and dissemination of Sufism in Bangalore.  
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This organization published journals in both English and in Urdu, and held gatherings 
where religious figures and scholars would speak about Sufism to a lay Muslim audience.   
Peeran Sahab and I had many deeply interesting conversations about Sufism that 
lasted for hours at a stretch.  During one such conversation, he told me that democracy in 
India was possible only because Sufis had brought Islam’s message of equality to India, 
and because they had questioned the very basis of Hinduism’s caste-centered hierarchy.  
The simple example set by Sufi hospices and shrines, which were open to all regardless 
of class, caste or religion, had resulted in a major shift in how people perceived their 
position within society.  It had made democracy more easily acceptable and adoptable in 
India.  To him, the advent of Islam in India (via shrine-based Sufism) and the open-door 
policy of Sufi shrines and hospices had set the stage for modern Indian secular and 
democratic institutions.   
On a similar vein, one of my interlocutors at the shrine of Hazrat Nizamuddin 
Aulia, Nooruddin Sahab, on being asked about the importance of Sufi shrines today, said 
to me very forcefully: “[The Sufi shrines] is where national integration55 is forged.  If 
there weren’t places like the Sufi shrine in India, then you might as well erase the word 
‘secularism’ from the Indian constitution!”  
My interlocutors often pointed to the shrine space itself as proof of the 
congruence of these two categories: being a Muslim who adhered to shrine-based Sufism, 
and being a secular and modern Indian.  The shared sacred space of the shrine and the 
                                                          
55
The term ‘national integration’ is often deployed in state and non-state rhetoric to describe the unity of 
India as political and cultural entity.  I unpack this term in detail in chapter 7.  
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cross-religious appeal of the messages conveyed by South Asian Sufi poetry were seen as 
exemplifying both the ideals of Islam, and those of Indian multiculturalist secularism.   
One of my most intriguing interlocutors was an aged Sufi scholar and master 
whom I had got to know in Delhi, Nizami Sahab.  I once asked him what he thought the 
importance of Sufism was in our contemporary world.  As we sat in his century-old home 
in the back-alleys of the Nizamuddin neighborhood, his eyes twinkled as he answered, 
“Uniting people (milap), bringing people together.  This is Islam, and this is Sufism.”  I 
then asked him if this task of uniting people was ongoing; if it was something that could 
be seen happening now.  He raised his eyebrows, and with great enthusiasm he said, “Of 
course it’s ongoing!  And where else but at Sufi shrines do you see it?!  It is there that 
people are brought together.”  
Again and again my interlocutors at Sufi shrines presented me with the 
juxtaposition of the Indian state’s multiculturalist secular rhetoric and conceptions of 
Islam’s core messages.  Early in my research, I sat with other female students in the 
religious school at the shrine of Khaja Bandanawaz in Gulbarga as the head of the 
religious school, Maulvi Abdul Razzaq Sahab expounded to us on Sufi Islam.  When I 
first arrived at the Sufi shrine in Gulbarga, he had asked me to present him with a list of 
questions that I had about Sufism, which I had promptly done.  Since he was a religious 
scholar, I had asked him mostly theological questions regarding Islamic law and how it 
pertained to Sufism.  When it came time for me to leave Gulbarga, Maulvi Abdul Razzaq 
Sahab made a special appearance at the girls’ school for a few days in order to answer my 
questions, and to expound on Sufism in general.   
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During these lectures, he touched briefly on theological issues, but for the most 
part he emphasized the humanitarian aspects of Sufism.  To illustrate his point that 
Sufism embodied the message of service to all humanity, he recounted how Khaja 
Bandanawaz had enjoined his followers to be like the large tree in the courtyard of the 
shrine (a tree that still stands in the shrine), which withstood the intense heat of day but 
provided shade for so many.  Then, much to my surprise, the Maulvi recalled a public 
service message that he had heard years ago on the state-run television channel, 
Doordarshan: “Service to mankind is service to God” (mano-seva hai prabhu seva). 56  This 
message, he said, captures the essence of Sufi Islam.  It was extremely interesting to me 
that he had identified a core value of Sufi Islam in a state-produced message, and that he 
considered the phrase to best capture a core tenet of Sufism.  At another point during this 
same lecture he said that we must serve humanity and regard it as one whole.  “All 
humans are part of this whole, as of one body.”  He then recited a verse by the medieval 
Persian poet Sa’adi: 
bani adam azai-e yek pikarand 
keh dar afarinash ze yek goharand
57
 
The children of Adam are as limbs of one body; 
In their glory, they are of the same essence. 
 
He continued: “So this is tasawwuf: to wish for your brothers what you’d wish for 
yourself.  And your brother could be Hindu, he could be Christian, he could be Muslim.”  
                                                          
56
 The maulvi’s use of this phrase is doubly interesting because it employs the term ‘prabhu’, a Hindu word 
for God.  
57 کی دنرهوگ  ز  شنیرفآ رد هک / دنرکیپ کی یاضعا مدآ ینب   
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Maulvi Abdul Razzaq Sahab was drawing on quite varied sources to convey the message 
of Sufism: from medieval Persian poets to state-sponsored public service messaging.  
One interaction during my fieldwork that has stayed with me was with my 
primary interlocutor at the shrine of Nizamuddin Auliya, Nooruddin Sahab.  One evening 
in winter he and I were sitting at the foot of Nizamuddin Auliya’s tomb and discussing 
Sufism (as we often did).  I posed the same question to him that I had posed to so many 
other interlocutors: what he thought the contemporary importance of Sufi Islam was.  He 
looked out at the throngs of people at the shrine who circumambulated the tomb or sat by 
the ritual musicians as they performed, and said with sudden energy: 
Look at this! Different kinds of people are here at the shrine! Rich, poor, men, 
women, young, old, Hindu, Muslim.  They all come here because of Hazrat 
Nizamuddin.  They come here and sit together, and no one asks what your 
religion is.  Islam does not teach people of different religions to hate each other.  
No religion teaches that! 
At this point I recalled a line from a poem penned by the eminent Sufi philosopher-poet 
of the 20
th
 century, Iqbal.  And I said, “As Iqbal wrote, ‘Religion does not teach enmity 
amongst people’ (mazhab nahin sikhata apas main bair rakhna).”   
At this, Nooruddin Sahab became pensive.  He looked out into the crowd of 
shrine visitors, nodded slowly and in a steady voice completed the verse, “We are Indian, 
we are Indian by birth, and India is ours” (hindi hain ham, hindi hain ham vatan se; 
Hindustan hamara).  In echoing his sentiment in Iqbal’s verse, I had quite forgotten that 
the line I had recited had been from one of India’s national songs.  But Nooruddin 
Sahab’s completion of the verse brought new layers of his narrative into perspective.  
Whereas I had recalled the words of Iqbal only as words penned by a modern-day Sufi 
philosopher, Nooruddin Sahab had just driven home his point that the identities of being 
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Muslim and being Indian were enmeshed in the fabric of the Sufi shrine.  His completion 
of the verse made the sentiment being expressed not just words of Sufi wisdom by virtue 
of their author, but words that were marked explicitly as Indian.  To him, the relevance of 
Sufism lay in the reification of an ideal that he saw both as Muslim and as Indian.   
My interlocutors often also pointed to Sufi poetry performed as part of the 
qawwali repertoire as exemplifying this coming together of people and cultures.  As I 
have discussed in the context of the poet and Sufi devotee Amir Khusro, many qawwalis 
have both Islamicate and Hindu motifs.  Performers are very conscious of this, and will 
often highlight this meshing of metaphors by interrupting their singing to point out the 
mixing of motifs and language.  One ritual musician, while performing to a more intimate 
gathering at the home of one of my interlocutors came to a verse in the qawwali where 
Amir Khusro refers to the saint Nizamuddin Auliya as ‘Manmohan’ (another name for 
the Hindu deity, Krishna).  He paused here to point this out, and then went on to say, 
“Allah understands Hindi, and Bhagwan (an Indic name for God) understands Urdu.”  
This was interesting commentary on the highly politicized issue of Hindi and Urdu in 
South Asia, where the former language gets deemed a Hindu language while the latter is 
identified as a Muslim language.  
These narratives, at face value, are quite similar to the ones heard from secularists 
and spiritualists in their pro-Sufi arguments.  They present Sufism as compatible with the 
values of a secular nation-state.  What differentiates these from the narratives that 
originate from adherents of shrine-based Sufism is their commitment to keeping the 
conversation about Sufism centered on Islam.  To secularists and spiritualists, Sufism is 
often a stand-alone entity (often more closely linked to Hinduism than to Islam).  
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Whereas to adherents of shrine-based Sufism, the potential to unify that Sufism possesses 
is not of value only because it reaffirms the ideals of a modern multiculturalist nation-
state; it has immense value because of its origins in the very core of Islam – the Quran, 
the teachings of Muhammad, and the insights of the Sufi masters.  We can see in the 
instance I have recounted above for instance, where Peeran Sahab links democracy in 
India today to the advent of Islam centuries ago, that to adherents Sufism embodies the 
fundamental values of Islam.  These values have not originated with the Sufi masters.  
They are present in the Quran and are reflected in the teachings of Muhammad; and the 
Sufi masters have merely been able to recognize and exemplify these messages already 
inherent to Islam.   
The direct link that my interlocutors saw between Islam and the values of a 
multiculturalist secular democracy was nowhere more evident than when they recalled 
Quranic verses that they identified as especially important.  They cited these verses when 
speaking of what they deemed core values of Islam, but also pointed to how these values 
were especially relevant and essential in the modern world.  They saw reflected in these 
verses principles of pluralism, religious tolerance, and the acceptance of a diverse 
religious milieu as the norm.  And significantly, they considered shrine-based Sufism to 
be in a unique position to reify these ideals.      
Throughout my year in India, there were a few verses from the Quran that my 
interlocutors often brought up.  For instance, adherents often quoted verse 13 from the 
book, The Private Apartments (al-hujurat) of the Quran with emphasis on the words:  
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yā 'ayyuhā an-nāsu 'innā khalaqnākum min dhakarin wa 'unthá wa ja`alnākum 
shu`ūbāan wa qabā'ila lita`ārafū58 
O mankind! Indeed, we have created you from a man and a woman, and have made you 
into various peoples and tribes so that you may know one another. (49:13) 
 Nizami Sahab, the aged scholar whom I have previously quoted, once recounted 
an instance from his youth when some of his acquaintances had said to him that as a 
Muslim he could not fully accept, and could not be a willing part of a multiculturalist 
nation-state like India.  This proposition had been made against the backdrop of the 
religiously divisive politics that preceded India’s partition and independence in the late 
1940s.  He told me that he had responded by quoting the above verse, and had pointed 
out with great relish that being Muslim was in no way inimical to the acceptance of 
diversity.   
Another verse I heard in a similar context was verse 48 from the book, The Table 
(al-ma’ida) of the Quran.  It is a long verse, but the part of this verse that my 
interlocutors recited was:  
likullin ja`alnā minkum shir`atan wa minhājāan  wal law shā'a al-lahu laja`alakum 
'ummatan wāĥidatan wa lakin liyabluwakum fī mā 'atākum  fāstabiqū al-khayrāti59 
We have made for each of you a law and a way.  And if God had willed it so, He could 
have made you as a single people. But so that He might try you in what has been given to 
you, so strive with each other in virtues. (5:48) 
Asghar Ali Engineer, one of my interlocutors, referenced this same verse in an 
article published through his Center for Study of Society and Secularism.  He writes:  
                                                          
 
58 َاہَُّیأٰٓ  ـ َی   ساَّنلٱ اَِّنإ م ك  ـ َنَۡقلَخ ن ِّم    رَكَذ   َىثن
 أَو  ۡم ك  ـ َنۡلَعَجَو ا   بو  ع ش  َلِ ٮَٰٓاَبقَو   ٰٓو فَراََعِتل  
 
59    ل ك َانۡلَعَج  ۡم كنِم  
  ةَعۡرِش ا   جَاھۡنِمَوۚ   َۡولَو  َءٰٓاَش   َّللّٱ  ۡم َڪلَعََجل  
  ة َّم أ  
  ةَدِحٲَو نِك  ـ َلَو  ۡم كَو لَۡبیِّل ىِف  ٰٓاَم  ۡم ك  َٮتاَءۖ   او ِقَبتۡسَٱف  ِتٲَرۡیَخۡلٱۚ  
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As against power, the Sufis for ages carried on a dialogue with the people of other 
religious groups, with Jews, Christians, and Hindus in India. While kings and 
sultans grabbed power causing so much bloodshed, the Sufis followed the 
Islamic civilisation’s values and pursued the unity of people — Muslims as well 
as non-Muslims…The Quran also lays emphasis on pluralism. According to the 
Quran, Allah could have created one people but He created diversity and plurality 
so that He can test us and it is better to cooperate with each other in good deeds.  
Two other Quranic references I often heard were from the books, The Cow (al-baqara) 
and The Disbelievers (al-kafirun).   The first line of verse 256 in the former was one such 
verse:  
lā 'ikrāha fī ad-dīni60 
There is no compulsion in religion. (2:256) 
And verse 6 of the latter:  
lakum dīnukum wa liya dīni61 
Unto you your religion, and unto me, my religion. (109:6) 
 Interlocutors presented these verses as proofs of Islam’s acknowledgement and 
acceptance of a plural world.   
These verses are quoted by many others who wish to point to the pluralistic 
aspects of the Quran.  However, what makes the use of these verses by my interlocutors 
interesting is that they see shrine-based Sufism as being uniquely able to live by the 
Quranic messages of tolerance and acceptance.  They especially considered the shared 
sacred space of the shrine as a site where this message was reified and reproduced: a 
message that they emphasized was common to both Islam and the modern Indian nation.  
                                                          
 
60
  َٰٓل  َهاَرِۡكإ ِىف  ِنیِّدلٱۖ  
 
61
  ِنیِد َِىلَو ۡم  ك نیِد ۡم  َكل 
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As one of my interlocutors said, “Muslims don’t go to temples; Hindus don’t go to 
mosques. But everyone can come here as believers.  The Sufi shrine is a platform for 
secularism.”  
MARKING BOUNDARIES 
Not surprisingly, I found that adherents of shrine-based Sufism kept any 
discussion of Sufism grounded in Islam.  This can be seen as a response to both anti-
shrine reformist groups, and pro-shrine secularists and spiritualists.  In deploying Quranic 
verses, narratives from Muhammad’s life, and insights of revered Sufi saints such as 
Nizamuddin Auliya and Rabia Basri, adherents of shrine-based Sufism are very clearly 
speaking to reformist critiques of shrine-based Sufism.  These text-based narratives are 
deployed as positive markers of an essentially Muslim identity.  Claiming a position 
within the fold of Islam vis-à-vis secularist and spiritualist narratives, on the other hand, 
involves acts of distancing and negation as well.   
As has been discussed in the previous chapter, secularist and spiritualist narratives 
often characterize Sufism as closely related to, or even derivative of, Hindu Vedantic 
traditions.  Staking out a Muslim identity in response to such appropriations involves 
asserting Sufism’s independence from Hindu traditions.  This is not a straightforward 
task as adherents of shrine-based Sufism are well aware.  As I have outlined above, 
adherents are very accepting of, and even promote the link that shrine-based Sufism has 
to India, its languages, and its adoption of regional customs into its Islamic practice.  This 
deep connection to India is important to adherents of shrine-based Sufism, and yet this 
connection is often used by spiritualists and secularists to dissociate Sufism from Islam.  I 
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found that in negotiating a path between these various pressures, adherents rejected 
outright any suggestion that Sufism borrowed or originated from Hindu philosophic and 
theological traditions.  At the same time, however, they wholeheartedly embraced 
Sufism’s deep ties to Indic ritual traditions.  Adherents got around the bind they faced by 
characterizing these as shared “culture” or shared “customs”, rather than specifically 
religious practices.   
These acts of alignment and distancing can be clearly seen in the following lines 
from the introductory page of the website for the International Sufi Centre.  This 
introduction was written by Dr. Peeran, a trustee of the organization and the editor of 
their English-language magazine, Sufi World, and their Urdu-language magazine, Anwar-
e Sufiya: 
The Ulamas (religious scholars) of the Government of Saudi Arabia have declared 
Sufism or Tasawwuf or Irfan, its study and practice as Polytheism i.e. shirk and as 
not being within the tenets of Islam. Nothing can this be shorter than a lie. This 
charge has been met by scholarly writings down the centuries by eminent saints 
and scholars of Ahl e Sunnat wal Jama’at. Sufism has not drawn its practices from 
Greeks or Vedanta. If there is any similarity, it is purely coincidental. Several 
great religions have similar teachings and all aim at reaching the Truth through 
various methods. Sufism or Tasawwuf or Irfan has totally arisen from Holy 
Quran, precepts of Prophet sallallahu alaihi wasallam and from the lives of his 
companions…(The International Sufi Centre) is an attempt to expound and show 
that, there are no contradictions in the teachings of Islam and Tasawwuf or 
Sufism. Both teach humanism and calls up mankind towards love, peace, and 
brother-hood to achieve higher thoughts through its practices. [sic]  
 
The negotiation underway here is quite sophisticated, and precarious.  On the one 
hand, the many shared traditions between South Asian Sufi Islam and Indic ritual 
practices, and the similarities between many Islamic and Hindu philosophical strains is 
used as ammunition by oppositional reformist groups in questioning the validity of 
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Sufism.  On the other, these same connections are often highly valued by adherents of 
shrine-based Sufism as markers of Islam’s implicit message of pluralism and of their 
sense of national belonging.   
A conversation I once overheard at the Khaja Bandanawaz shrine highlighted the 
complexity of the stance adopted by my interlocutors.  The head of the shrine’s religious 
school, Maulvi Abdul Razzaq, was discussing Sufism with the shrine’s secretary, 
Muhammad Rasheed.  They were talking about the net of flowers, known as the jhela, 
which decked the enormous dome of the tomb of Khaja Bandanawaz during his death 
anniversary.  At this shrine, the jhela was put in place jointly by a Muslim and a Hindu 
family who had undertaken this task for centuries now.  In reference to this joint effort 
the Maulvi said to Rasheed Sahab, “It is this humanity that goes by the name of Sufism.”  
(It is important to note here that he used the Arabic word for Sufism, tasawwuf.)  He 
continued:  
Not making a distinction (based on religion)…only looking at the intent (niyyat) 
in people’s hearts...Hazrat Bandanawaz never discriminated between people.  
Whoever came—Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Jew, Sikh—he would glance into 
their hearts and determine if their intentions were sound.  Nothing was hidden 
from him – everything appeared plainly to him.  This is tasawwuf.  
Muhammad Rasheed Sahab then said, “You know, I had never heard of the word 
tasawwuf before I came to work at the shrine!  I had heard of Sufism, but not of 
tasawwuf.”  The Maulvi let out a short amused laugh at this, and said, “Sufism is just 
something new…for younger folks.  The real complex stuff is what we call tasawwuf.  
And I have delved deeply into the study of tasawwuf.”  
I was intrigued by this differentiation being made between the English term 
‘Sufism’ and the Arabic/Persian term ‘tasawwuf’.  I had not heard such a distinction 
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made before. A few weeks later, as I sat with fellow students in the shrine’s religious 
school for girls, I asked Maulvi Abdul Razzaq Sahab to elaborate on this.  The Maulvi 
gave his characteristic smile, accompanied by a quirk of his eyebrow, and said,  
The two become different, you see.  The sense of ‘Sufism’ these days is 
tantamount to taking good things from here, good things from there…there being 
good and bad in all religions.  Things have thus got mixed up.  And so those who 
oppose us think that tasawwuf is separate from the Quran and the teachings of the 
Prophet.  But this is not true at all. 
He then brought up the Mughal prince, Dara Shiko (who is also a darling of secularists 
and spiritualists in India), who translated many works from the Sanskrit to Persian and 
also wrote commentaries on Hindu texts.  The Maulvi said,  
Dara Shiko wrote a book called ‘The Confluence of the Two Seas’ (majama’ul 
bahrain).  It is an exceptional book. It’s hard to get a hold of, but if you do, you 
must read it.  In this book (Dara Shiko) looked at the works of Sufi and Hindu 
saints in order to understand the concept of monotheism (tawhid).  Now this can 
be called ‘Sufism’, but not ‘tasawwuf’.  
The Maulvi’s ruminations on ‘Sufism’ and ‘tasawwuf’ amazed me.  He was clearly 
distinguishing between mystical and philosophical traditions that were entirely grounded 
in Islam (tasawwuf) from traditions that drew from multiple sources – Sufism.  While the 
latter was certainly worthy of praise and consideration, it was different from the former in 
that it was not entirely Islamic in its sources.   
The Maulvi’s words make apparent a clear dissonance between the way 
secularists and spiritualists conceptualize Sufism and the way adherents do.  While to 
most academics and non-adherents, the word ‘Sufism’ is merely a translation of the term 
‘tasawwuf’, the Maulvi sees them as different approaches to understanding God – one 
Islamic, and the other not entirely so.  Non-Islamic understandings are not by definition 
false (as the Maulvi often said, “There are good things in all religions.”), but they do not 
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form the basis of what adherents of shrine-based Sufism practice and believe.  Here, the 
boundaries of shrine-based Sufism, or tasawwuf, are being delineated vis-à-vis those who 
would question its Islamic identity, and those who would take its kinship with non-
Islamic mystic traditions too far.  
It is clear from the above narratives that my interlocutors who were adherents of 
shrine-based Sufism equated Sufism with open-mindedness and acceptance of difference.  
They also saw oppositional groups (both Salafi and Wahhabi groups, and Sufi reformist 
groups) as insular and intolerant.  They perceived this intolerance to be directed not only 
at non-Muslims, but of course, at adherents of shrine-based Sufism as well.   
This kind of distancing from other anti-shrine reformist groups came out quite 
clearly in a conversation I had with the chief custodian (sajjada nashin) of the Khaja 
Bandanawaz shrine.  He said that whatever kind of Islam is being taught through the 
shrine-run Education Society, or at the shrine’s religious school is "Islam through 
Sufism", which he defined as “moderate Islam”. He continued, “Even in the shrine 
madrassa we avoid any kind of extremism…Students get trained in the light of Sufism – 
a softer Islam.” He then spoke about Muslim “fanatics” and their hard-line interpretations 
of the Quran.  He added, “I call them fanatics (and not fundamentalists) because a 
fundamentalist would actually have to be broadminded after studying these things.   
I encountered these acts of distancing quite frequently.  There was a sense among 
my interlocutors that strict literal interpretations of the Quran and Hadis (prophetic 
sayings of Muhammad) were misplaced or even wholly inaccurate.  Many of my 
interlocutors perceived Salafi and Wahhabi Islam to be on the slippery slope to terrorism, 
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something that maligns all Muslims, and many placed Sufi reformist groups in this 
category as well.  One of my primary interlocutors at the Nizamuddin shrine, Nooruddin 
Sahab, expressed this sentiment as he lamented the state of Muslim religious education in 
South Asia.  He said,  
People don’t want to send their children to religious schools any more.  And can 
you blame them?  In many of these schools little children are brainwashed and 
even handed guns!  They twist young minds.  They have brought a bad name to 
Islam! 
While the extent of this correlation between religious education and religious violence 
may be highly exaggerated, the concern among my interlocutors about the need to be 
wary of certain kinds of religious education was palpable
62
.   
Thus, in their worldview, where being an adherent of shrine-based Sufism brings 
with it open-mindedness and acceptance of plurality, oppositional groups represent a 
tendency towards intolerance and hatred.  To them, shrine-based Sufism was antithetical 
to “fundamentalism”, “terrorism”, “extremism” and “religious violence”. It was not 
merely a difference of opinion and approach, but a dichotomy between “true Islam” and 
misguided doctrine; in effect, it was a mirroring of the stance of Muslim reformist 
groups.  In this dichotomous view, shrine-based Sufism was congruent and contiguous 
with both the fundamental principles of Islam and with multiculturalist secularism of 
India.  The values of these two entities – Islam and India – were not mutually exclusive.  
In fact, they were aligned on multiple counts.  And it was shrine-based Sufism that was 
the point of congruence.   
                                                          
62As one interlocutor said, the alarm evident in his tone, “We’re all really worried about my nephew. He’s 
started going to the mosque every day!”  
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Adherents of shrine-based Sufism time and again spoke of how their beliefs and 
practices reflected this congruity.  They especially emphasized the shared sacred-space of 
the shrine as being uniquely capable of making real the entwined values of Islam and 
multiculturalist secularism.  To them, adherents of shrine-based Sufism, through their 
embodiment of these values, were in a position to stand as examples to other Muslims as 
well as to non-Muslim Indians.  Thus many adherents I spoke to considered themselves 
not only true Muslims, but also true Indians by virtue of their commitment to the shared 
values of Islam and multiculturalist secularism.   
This dichotomy that adherents of shrine-based Sufism emphasize is of course, 
problematic.  As I have mentioned above, at a fundamental level it mirrors the 
dichotomies that Muslim reformist groups present vis-à-vis shrine-based Sufism.  It is 
problematic in another way: by positioning themselves as uniquely embodying the values 
of multiculturalist secularism, adherents of shrine-based Sufism in effect place anti-shrine 
groups as antithetical to these same values.  Inter-religious relations in India continue to 
be strained by the legacies of colonial policy and the politics of partition.  Added to this 
are the events of the past decade (starting with September 11) that have made Muslims 
suspect in the eye of the police and among many non-Muslims  in India.  In such an 
environment, it is certainly not easy being a Muslim in India.  It is doubly difficult if you 
are a Muslim who, by virtue of your beliefs and practices, is positioned as incongruous 
with the values of modernity, secularism, and democracy.  
However, it is important to note that adherents of shrine-based Sufism frame their 
narratives in response to multiple pressures on their religious identity.  Confronted with 
the sharp criticism of Muslim reformist groups, and with the blunt-edged force of 
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secularist and spiritualist appropriation, adherents of shrine-based Sufism respond with 
incredible complexity. Their narratives navigate the multiple pressures to their religious 
identity, while also establishing an inalienable link to the Indian nation-state.   
AUTHENTICITY AND BELONGING 
To conclude this chapter, and to draw the main themes of this dissertation 
together, I will now discuss what has been at the heart of the identity-narratives of those 
who adhere to shrine-based Sufism: narratives of authenticity and belonging. These two 
notions – authenticity and belonging – are deeply interconnected.  Narratives of religious 
authenticity especially, often have roots in topography and territory.  Places of birth and 
death and resurrection, the confluences of holy rivers and the bubbling of sacred springs, 
sites of revelation and miracle, and the earthly playgrounds of gods and demons – all of 
these create an irrevocable bond between heaven and earth.  It is not surprising then, that 
claims to religious authenticity and claims to belonging are bedfellows.   
Such claims to religious authenticity are often counterintuitive, and lead to 
notions of belonging that are not situated at what is presumed to be the “point of origin”.  
But perhaps my use of the term ‘counterintuitive’ here too is telling.  It comes from an 
essentialist (and Orientalist) understanding of authenticity, where the point of origin is 
fetishized.  Ernst (2005), in his piece Situating Sufism and Yoga cautions against the need 
to look to origins to establish the authenticity of any practice and belief.  There is a 
compelling urge to look to some hoary past, some point of origin to find the reason for 
something now being true.  He writes,  
Once influence has been established, it is felt, one has said something of immense 
significance; the phenomenon has been explained – or rather, explained away.  
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There is in addition an implicit evaluation in this kind of language.  ‘Sources’ are 
‘original’ while those ‘influenced’ by them are ‘derivative’. [p. 15] 
Such a fetishization of the source both in academic scholarship, as well as in the popular 
media, lead many to presume that religious authenticity too, must inevitably derive from 
such a point of origin (real or imagined).   
Islam, especially, has been vulnerable to such presumptions.  Mecca as the center 
of the “Muslim world” has captured the imagination of scholars, adventurers, and the lay 
observer for centuries now.  The idea of Muslims the world over bowing in prayer in the 
direction of Mecca several times a day, and the image of the churning masses of Muslims 
during Hajj have evoked both a sense of awe and a sense of bafflement about this notion 
of Islam’s “center”.  At its extreme and most overt, this fetishization of Islam’s center can 
be seen in the reactionary material produced by such radical evangelical Christians as 
Jack Chick, or even Rush Limbaugh.   
At a subtler, yet no less incendiary level, the idea that Islam (and every Muslim 
believer) is inevitably oriented towards Mecca is one that permeates religio-political 
rhetoric in Euro-America, and in India.  I have heard some variation of the line, “He is a 
Muslim first and an Indian later” innumerable times during visits to India, and it is a 
notion that is readily believed by many.  Among Hindus, I have often heard people say 
that while a Hindu is undeniably a part of the fabric of India, Muslims don’t feel as much 
of a sense of belonging to the nation.  Among the more secular (and politically-correct) 
intellectual elite in India, certain kinds of Muslim-ness are characterized as threatening 
and others as non-threatening; those that threaten, are those that are seen to be focused 
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“too much” on notions of the Muslim world or the ummah.  Here the presumption is that 
such a focus confuses the believer in defining a motherland.   
Such geographic valencing and orienting occurs among Muslims as well.  These 
days, the hegemonic narrative among Muslims (especially among Salafis and Wahhabis) 
is certainly focused on the Arabian Peninsula in particular, and the Middle East in 
general.  Muslims with such an orientation regard the kind of Islam practiced in the 
Arabian Peninsula and by the Arabic-speaking world as more authentically Muslim than 
the Islam practiced elsewhere.  I have discussed in chapter 2, that the point of origin of 
Islam is the region of the Arabian Peninsula known as the Hijaz, where the holy cities of 
Mecca and Medina are located, and where the primary events that mark the inception of 
Islam played out.  It is not just that Muslims in this part of the world regard their own 
form of Islamic practice and belief to be the authentic form, but that many Muslims all 
over the world now subscribe to such a notion.  As I have pointed out, this was not 
always the case, and the geographic valencing of the “Muslim world” has changed 
substantially over the past millennium.   
I label this interest in the Hijaz as the “center” of Islam as a fetishization because 
it ignores other foci of Islamic piety and religious practice.  Sufi shrines in South Asia 
and in West Africa, for instance, draw many millions of pilgrims.  At the death 
anniversaries of popular Sufi saints, their shrines attract pilgrims in the millions.  More 
recently, the annual meetings of the Tablighi Jama’at (a Sufi reformist group) in Raiwind 
in Pakistan have rivaled the numbers seen in Mecca during the Hajj.  I have discussed 
this previously, but I reiterate here that biases in academia and the media favoring this 
perspective – that the Hijaz is indeed the center of the Muslim world – discounts other 
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lived modes of Islamic practice and belief found in other parts of the world.  (And it is 
important to keep in mind also that the majority of Muslims in the world live outside of 
the Middle East.)   
In this dissertation, I have drawn attention to narratives used by adherents of 
shrine-based Sufism to claim religious authenticity as Muslims – narratives that focus on 
their history and their present realities in the Subcontinent.  However, the deep spiritual 
relationship to the Hijaz runs deep among many Muslims the world over – be they Sufis, 
reformists, Sufi reformists, Wahhabis or Salafis.  But it is significant that to many, the 
Hijaz is perhaps a primal or primordial point of origin – different from lived, remembered 
points of origin.  The latter is consciously shaped by historical narratives, and the 
memories of them constructed for each subsequent generation; the former is a point that 
is beyond history, and that surpasses memory.   
HISTORY, MEMORY, AMNESIA  
I have mentioned history and memory above, and will now delve into these 
concepts in greater detail.  The intertwined notions of authenticity and belonging require 
the nurturing of particular historical narratives and the preservation (and construction) or 
certain memories.  They also of course involve copious amounts of amnesia that purge 
contradictory or counterproductive strands of memory from narratives of the past.     
Adherents of shrine-based Sufism, Muslim reformist groups, as well as the 
secularists and spiritualists who have been so influential in shaping Indian religious 
subjecthood, have all been involved in the constructions of such histories and memories.  
Their narratives can be seen as iterations of, or reflections of, the memories and the 
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histories that they hold to be true; but they are also tied to present realities as to the past.  
Maurice Halbwachs’ (1992)63 insight that in constructing religious memory, groups 
“reconstruct the past” within the context of both the texts and traditions left by the past, 
and the extant realities of the present (p. 119) certainly rings true within the contexts that 
I have discussed throughout this dissertation.  Halbwachs emphasizes this link between 
the past and the present in the collective memory of social groups and sees the 
manifestations of collective memory – religious beliefs, language, reconstructions of the 
past etc. – only as remembrances of the past; but these remembrances rely on present 
frameworks for their reconstructions (p. 188).  That is, the collective processes required 
to construct and reconstruct the past exist in, and are framed by, the present.  This creates 
a duality in the process of memory-making tied inexorably to both past and present.
64
  
For adherents of shrine-based Sufism, their past as the bringers of Islam to India, and 
their present as reifying Islamic and Indian values through the sacred space of the shrine, 
come together to form their identity-narrative as Indian Muslims.   
Their construction of their present as authentically Muslim is certainly an 
“ideological project”, to use a term from Le Goff (1992:1), where it is conceived in direct 
relation to historical trajectories linking particular pasts.  While Le Goff’s notion of both 
                                                          
63Halbwachs’ collected writings were translated and published as a single unit only many decades after they 
were written.  This later translation was published as the volume: On Collective Memory (1992).  
 
64Halbwachs’ thoughts on the construction of the past are insightful.  However, in thinking about the 
construction of religious memory, he over-emphasizes the dichotomy between “dogmatic” and “mystic” 
groups.  While individuals may be mystics, they too leave behind legacies that are taken up by groups of 
disciples, descendants or lay-followers.  The collective memories of mystically oriented groups, though 
sometimes amorphous, are nonetheless collective reconstructions of the past in ways that are similar to 
dogmatic religious groups.  The long tradition of Sufi hagiographies, the detailed charts that trace master-
disciple lineages back to Muhammed in the past and to present disciples, the existing Sufi shrines that are at 
once monuments of remembrance as well as sites of contemporary worship and belief – all these speak of 
collective memories that rival the texts and rites of dogmatic religious traditions.  
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the past and present being “ideological projects” is presented via psychological theories 
of memory, and linguistic constructions of time, it is a useful concept in understanding 
the weaving of these historical narratives in claims to religious authenticity.  What gets 
defined as the past is subject to change, and certainly subject to debate.  Adherents of 
shrine-based Sufism and reformists often engage in contestations over the validity of 
historical narratives that are used to justify contemporary religious stances.  Here, there is 
both the act of myth-making, as well as of reality-making.  Miracle narratives from 
hagiographies are essential parts of historical narratives, and are often subject to 
contestation and doubt; the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad are also identified as valid 
or dubious; and contemporary narratives of the power of Sufi belief and a saint’s 
charisma are added to the cannon of similar narratives.   
Amidst all of this talk of memory and history, we must remember to delve into the 
act of forgetting.  My ruminations on this theme have been deeply informed by Marc 
Augé’s work, Oblivion (2004).  In this slim but critically rich volume Augé critiques our 
current obsession with remembering past injustices, and points those who must needs 
forget their “incommunicable memory” in order to live (p. 87).  I would add here, that 
imperatives to remember presume that there is but one history to be remembered.  What 
happens when ritualized or contrived remembrance necessitates the forgetting of other 
historical narratives?   
In contemporary India, the rise of Hindu nationalism has been accompanied by 
such a need to remember the ways in which the “native” Hindus of India have suffered at 
the hands of the “invading” Muslims and the missionizing Christians.  In these narratives, 
there is amnesia concerning a variety of competing (or at least undermining) historical 
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narratives – the massacre of Buddhists at the hands of Brahminical dynasties in ancient 
India, the shaping of contemporary Hinduism through contact with Islam and 
Christianity, and the impracticality of conceiving of India as anything but a crossroads of 
diverse linguistic, religious, political, economic and ideological histories.  
Thus, in a broader and more abstract sense, for the notion of Hindu nationalism to 
live on, or for the notion of India as a fully integrated (and integrative) entity to persist, 
involves the purging of various strands of Indian history and national memory.  Similarly, 
for reformist narratives of “true Islam” to ossify, requires the erasure of many trajectories 
of Islamic thought, belief and practice.  Seen in this light, the narratives that adherents of 
shrine-based Sufism draw on to claim their identity as Muslims and as Indians are 
narratives that induce memory in the face of such amnesia.   
Various trajectories of the past that are chosen to establish legitimacy in the 
present have links that are not only temporal, but also topographic. These linkages may 
be very site-specific: a certain tale of a miraculous recovery is associated with the shrine 
of a certain saint, Mount Ararat is established as the site for the landing of Noah’s Ark, 
etc.  These linkages are also often macro in scale.  Thus, the authenticity of Wahhabi 
groups may be drawn from their political and religious inception in the Hijaz; and though 
this movement emerged in the modern era, nearly a millennium after the birth of Islam, 
this geographic congruence is a powerful marker of legitimacy.  Similarly, narratives of 
the advent of Islam in India via the teachings of Sufi saints inexorably link Sufism not 
only to the history of Islam, but also to the Subcontinent as a geographic entity.   
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Which narratives are given precedence over others, which are embellished and 
which erased, draws our attention to where belonging is claimed and where it is not; 
where certain geographies are given primacy and where others are not.  Constructions of 
the past and the present thus bear associations with not only the then and now, but with 
the here and the elsewhere.  Both time and space become essential in these narratives of 
identity, and link claims to being with claims to belonging.  
It is not my intent here to delegitimize certain narratives of identity and history 
and to validate others.  On the contrary, it is my desire to emphasize the inevitability of 
such constructions and reconstructions of memory, especially since they are dynamic 
responses to ever-changing lived realities.  To echo Carl Ernst’s view: “Those who deny 
the significance of historiography are most likely to be at the mercy of their own 
presuppositions” (p. 18).  Ranajit Guha, in his book, History at the Limit of World-
History (2002), traces our obsession with keeping the story straight, so to speak, to a 
notion of “World History” that equates the recounting of history with a narration of facts.  
Guha proffers an alternative view by (re)introducing us to a form of an historical account 
– itihasa, which could be found in the Subcontinent in pre-colonial times.  This form of 
historiography represented “a traditional account relayed from generation to generation” 
(p. 51).  In the historiography of “World-history” the focus rests primarily on the point of 
origin or the sole author of the “story”, who is then invested with authority for his (yes, 
invariably “his”) experience and subsequent account of it (p. 55).  As Guha succinctly 
puts it, “experience stands for truth in the European narrative” (p. 63).  On the other hand, 
itihasa involves a telling and a retelling of the past, where a sense of wonder at the 
narrative is “not tied to any particular experience and exhausted, therefore, by retelling” 
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(p. 67).  Guha’s discussion of itihasa is useful in bringing into perspective the idea that 
competing narratives of history do not lose their value when contradicted by 
“mainstream” historical narratives.  The linkages drawn in these alternative narratives; 
the genealogy of tellings and retellings; the setting, the audience and the purpose of 
narration are all vitally important in understanding our pasts and our presents.     
Through the above discussions I have attempted to show that constructions of the 
present, as well as the past, as they play out in claims to authenticity and belonging, are 
part of a dialogic process – a dialog among various actors in the present that then 
necessitates the selection or omission of certain histories and memories; and also a dialog 
among these various pasts, that compete, that reconcile, that obviate.  
The identity-narratives of adherents of shrine-based Sufism must be seen in the 
larger context of the identity-narratives of Muslim reformist groups, as well as the 
identity-narratives of India as a nation-state.  In their assertions to an identity as Muslims, 
adherents of shrine-based Sufism weave together narratives of religious authenticity and 
national belonging; they assert claims to certain pasts, and the validity of their place in 
the inceptions of both Islam and India.  These assertions in turn reinforce their claim to a 
position of authority and legitimacy within the fold of contemporary Islam and present-
day India.   
 
 
  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
In this dissertation I have shown that assertions of religious identity and intra-
religious debates must be understood within the context of broader debates on issues of 
national and religious subjecthood.  Adherents of shrine based Sufism, in responding to 
reformist Muslim critique of their beliefs and practices, both assert their identity as 
Muslims and as Indians.  Here, their assertions of religious identity are enmeshed with 
notions of regional and national belonging.  In staking a claim to the essentially Islamic 
nature of their Sufi practices and beliefs, adherents of shrine-based Sufism are also 
defining Islam in terms that position it as inexorably tied to the Indian Subcontinent. 
The responses of adherents of shrine-based Sufism to reformist critiques of their 
practices and beliefs are thus embedded in larger discourses on what it means to be a 
Muslim in India.   In the preceding chapters I have detailed how adherents are faced with 
a double-bind.  On the one hand, the practices and beliefs of shrine-based Sufism are 
subject to very vocal and aggressive critique by reformist Muslim groups.  Oppositional 
reformist groups claim that these practices and beliefs are tantamount to polytheism and 
idol-worship, that they are heretical innovations that deviate from the true teachings of 
Islam.  The accusation that their practices and beliefs are un-Islamic flies in the face of 
adherents’ own assertions of a Muslim identity.  
On the other hand, secularists and spiritualists among India’s intellectual elite 
often characterize Sufism as derivative of Hindu philosophical traditions, and point to the 
“syncretic” character of shrine-based Sufism as evidence of the fluid nature of Sufi belief.  
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Thus, while this narrative of syncretism places adherents of shrine-based Sufism as 
conforming to the ideal of Indian religious subjecthood and positions them as “good 
Muslims” in India by virtue of being perceived as not staunchly Muslim, such a narrative 
also serves to undermine adherents’ own self-identification as devout Muslims.  The 
identity-narratives of adherents of shrine-based Sufism must therefore be understood as a 
response to these dual pressures, and as an assertion of not just a Muslim identity, but an 
assertion of their identity as Indian Muslims.  
Adherents of shrine-based Sufism find themselves in a complex web of identities.  
As Muslims, they are called to legitimize their position within the fold of Islam and 
justify their modes of practice and belief by newer reformist groups; as Indians, their 
sense of national belonging is often questioned in a part of the world where matters of 
religion have fundamentally shaped its political geography.  To adherents of shrine-based 
Sufism, these are identities that are not separate, but intertwined.  And it is to these 
identities that need not be simplified and ought not to be unraveled, that they continually 
assert a right.    
ADDING OTHER VOICES  
I have mentioned that most of my research was carried out among adherents of 
shrine-based Sufism.  I found it challenging to give equal emphasis to work among 
members of Sufi reformist groups for various reasons: in Gulbarga, it was my need to 
build a close relationship with the Sufi shrine community without being seen to fraternize 
with their antagonists; and in Delhi, I could not make any headway as a Hindu woman 
solely through personally introducing myself to Tablighi Jama’at initiates, and contacts to 
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facilitate introductions were very hard to come by.  I was able to compensate for this 
dearth of material from within reformist groups through encounters and engagement with 
lay Muslims with reformist ideologies.   
Looking ahead to research beyond this dissertation, a priority will certainly be to 
balance my already substantial ethnographic work among adherents of shrine-based 
Sufism with research among Sufi reformist groups.  This would include a concerted effort 
to find ways to access interlocutors who are active members of these groups – both 
members of the structural hierarchy as well as lay initiates.  Some of the contacts I was 
able to make during the last few weeks of my research (and thus was not able to follow 
up on) are ones who could potentially facilitate such introductions and meetings.  I am 
especially keen to explore the women’s study-groups that are an important part of the 
Tablighi Jama’at’s work.    
Reformist narratives of religious identity too are subject to similar pressures to 
religious and national subjecthood as those of shrine-based Sufism, though their 
responses to these pressures are different.  As Muslims in a country where they are in a 
minority, reformists are no less aware of the weight of religious subjecthood in India.  
Their staunchly a-political stance (which contrasts with the highly political nature of 
reformist Islam in Pakistan), their very public statements against Islamic extremism and 
militancy, and their close involvement with the Indian state regarding rulings on Muslim 
personal law
65
 are all shaped by the complex relationships that minority religious groups 
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While India has a uniform penal code for all citizens, there is no such uniformity in the realm of personal 
law.  In this system, Muslims are granted their own civil code, under which polygamy is legal; adoption 
and inheritance laws too differ, as do laws pertaining to divorce.  This system has come under harsh 
criticism, and is a cause taken up by Hindu nationalist political parties who call for a uniform civil code.  
However, the implementation of such a uniform civil code is highly unpopular among most Muslims, and 
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in India have with the state.  I will explore reformist narratives further in the next stage of 
my research.  
I am also keen to include the voices of more women of both Sufi reformist and 
shrine-based Sufi persuasions.  Looking back at my fieldwork, I am not surprised that so 
many of my interlocutors are men.  My attendance of the girls’ religious school in 
Gulbarga did allow me to build some close relationships with female adherents and 
teachers, and one of my other main interlocutors in Delhi was also a female adherent.  
However, since the institution of the Sufi shrine – very much a male bastion – was the 
main springboard for my research, nearly all my primary interlocutors are men.  As I 
return to the field for my follow-up research, I hope to make up for this lacuna in the 
voices I have represented through my work.  
On a similar vein, my focus on the Sufi shrine meant that I was not able to 
develop relationships with adherents who only occasionally visit the Sufi shrine.  To be 
sure, most of my interlocutors were lay adherents and not ritual specialists or scholars.  
They were adherents of shrine-based Sufism who worked at clerical and managerial tasks 
at the shrine, or whose own personal interest had led them to become spiritually involved 
with the Sufi shrine.  However, a vast number of adherents are members of the rural poor 
who are able to visit the Sufi shrine only occasionally.  These folk are often the target of 
very aggressive proselytizing by reformist groups, and I believe it would greatly enhance 
my research to be able to include their voices in this work as well.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
is also opposed by others who believe that changes in laws have little effect on the way Indians conduct 
their daily lives (As a case in point, the banning of dowry under the Hindu Marriage Act has not in the least 
bit abated the giving and taking of enormous dowries in India).  There have been many highly controversial 
cases that have brought these separate civil codes under scrutiny.  Many of these high-profile rulings and 
acts, such as The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986, have pitted the Indian state, 
women’s rights groups, and conservative Muslim groups against each other.  
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RESPONSES AND COUNTER-RESPONSES IN ACADEMIA 
This dissertation is certainly part of a larger movement within academia that has 
sought, especially over the past decade, to humanize Muslims and add nuance to public 
discussions of Islam.  I have added my voice to this movement by presenting the 
interconnectedness of Muslim identity with national identity in a country that is not 
generally considered part of the “Muslim world”, and consequently by expanding and 
problematizing the construction of the “Muslim world”.   
Having said this, I think it important to note that academia is also currently 
experiencing a backlash of sorts against the lionization of shrine-based Sufism in the 
popular media and in foreign policy circles.  Throughout these past seven years of work 
towards a doctoral degree,   I have often encountered cynicism among academics towards 
Sufis (and towards liberal/progressive Muslims) who deploy narratives of pluralism.  
Expressed in the form of questions at conferences or as comments during conversations 
about research topics, I encounter resistance from academics to the notion that such 
narratives could possibly be authentic, or truly meant.  It is as though a demand is being 
made that claims to religious identity and legitimacy be remote from one’s socio-political 
milieu; that the moment they are acknowledged as responses to lived and messy realities, 
they lose the patina of credibility.   
I find such cynicism disturbing, and I hope that this dissertation will introduce an 
added dimension of complexity to our discussions of Sufism.  I hope that through this 
dissertation I have been able to show that responses to various pressures to their religious 
identity as Muslims are not merely a matter of expediency and calculated strategy for 
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adherents of shrine-based Sufism.  The self-identification of adherents as staunchly 
Indian and devoutly Muslim comes from a deep interconnectedness that they experience 
between these markers of identity.   
REVISITING AUTHENTICITY AND BELONGING 
Even though a majority of Muslims the world over practice some mode of shrine-
based Sufism (I estimate this on the basis of the fact that Muslims in North and Sub-
Saharan Africa, and South, Southeast and Central Asia primarily adhere to shrine-based 
Sufism), the prevailing hegemony is that of anti-shrine reformism.  This hegemonic 
rhetoric seeks to position shrine-based Sufism as having deviated from Islamic texts, 
Islamic law, and from the origins of Islam in the 7
th
 century CE.  Adherents of shrine-
based Sufism in India respond to this attack on their legitimacy as Muslims by asserting 
the essentially Islamic nature of their beliefs and practices.  They reaffirm their roots at 
the point of Islam’s inception, and establish their core values as contemporary reflections 
of Quranic teachings and the life of Muhammad.   
The hegemony of Hinduism in the Indian nation-state imposes the link of being 
Hindu with being Indian.  While this hegemony cannot be denied, challenges to it are 
strong enough to not be ignored.  Many other religious identities vie for a link with the 
Indian nation.  Religious and linguistic minorities and members of indigenous 
communities are just some of these.  While adherents of shrine-based Sufism are granted 
such an association by secularists and spiritualists in India, it is not often on the terms 
that the former desire.  For my interlocutors re-forging these links, and reconstructing the 
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historical narratives that frame these links is an important part of claiming both a Muslim 
identity and an Indian identity.   
I would like to conclude this dissertation with an account of a personal encounter 
with one of my interlocutors that brought home just how important the enmeshing of a 
national and religious identity is for adherents of shrine-based Sufism.  During the latter 
half of my fieldwork, I got to know an aged Sufi scholar in Delhi, Nizami Sahab.  Some 
of my conversations with him brought home the deep ties that Muslims have to India as a 
political and an ethical entity; his narratives also conveyed the strong kinship that 
adherents of shrine-based Sufism feel between their mode of Islamic practice, and the 
historical and the contemporary landscape of India.   
Nizami Sahab lives very close to the shrine of Nizamuddin Auliya, and was 
himself a descendent of the saint.  I did not get to see him frequently, but on the few 
occasions that I was able to visit him at his home, our meetings lasted for many hours.  
His home was an old set of buildings that had been added to in a haphazard fashion over 
the decades.  It stood in an open flag-stone courtyard with green and blue wooden doors, 
a swing and an old gnarly tree.  Nizami Sahab is a tall lean man of more than eighty years 
who walks with only a slight stoop and the aid of a cane.  Whenever I saw him, he always 
wore a loose white tunic and pajamas, and a tall mustard hat that was a marker of his Sufi 
order.  Nizami Sahab’s father had been acknowledged as a Sufi master by his peers and 
followers, and Nizami Sahab, too is regarded a Sufi scholar.  Many eminent and 
committed Sufis I had met during my fieldwork had insisted that I meet him and talk to 
him; and I was privileged enough to able to do so.   
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Nizami Sahab is a sharp man with keen, expressive eyes.  Whenever we met, he 
spoke untiringly and lucidly of innumerable issues, and I was happy to listen.  On one 
such occasion (a meeting that lasted six hours!), he spoke to me of his family’s history in 
great detail.  He brought out old photographs, maps and deeds.  He showed me copies of 
what seemed to be old documents – from around the time of the British in India.  They 
were deeds and titles written in beautiful Persian hand.  He told me that these were deeds 
that granted all the lands around the shrine of Nizamuddin Auliya to his family.  He said 
that his family had arrived in India ages ago, before the first Muslim rulers had arrived.  
The Hindu rulers at the time had said that they would consider the Ka’ba a temple, the 
Quraish (the tribe of Muhammad) as Brahmins, and Muhammad as the head of their clan; 
thus, his family would be accepted as a part of their society.  He then said, “If India is not 
our home, then what is?”   
The photographs he showed me were in sepia and black & white.  They were 
from the early to mid-twentieth century, and were images of important gatherings of 
prominent members of India’s movement for independence.  There were photographs of 
his father seated among eminent personalities of whom I had read in my school 
textbooks.  All of these were photographs that were taken in that very same courtyard 
through which I had just entered his home.  He told me that his father had been a staunch 
opponent of the creation of Pakistan.  He added, “Ours is the tradition of India,” and 
recalled that centuries ago, it was here that his family had found refuge on leaving the 
Middle East.  
Nizami Sahab told me of his father’s association with such figures as Jinnah and 
Gandhi.  When Gandhi had emerged from one of his many long fasts, Nizami Sahab’s 
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father had visited him at his bedside, seating himself on the floor beside Gandhi.  On a 
later occasion, Gandhi had visited Nizami Sahab’s father in that very house.  Gandhi had 
sat at the threshold by the shoes outside, waiting for entry.  Nizami Sahab’s father had 
gone to greet and welcome Gandhi in person.  Gandhi had then said that both he and 
Nizami Sahab’s father were men who would readily sit amidst the dust, and would not 
feel low for it; but the dignity of this was something the world did not understand.     
Listening to Nizami Sahab tell me of his family’s legacies and looking at these 
images and these documents, the historicity of where I was and who I was with became 
evident to me.  I also found Nizami Sahab’s narratives to be poignant.  They spoke of an 
irrevocable connection that he, like so many others, feels towards the Indian nation and to 
the geography of where they call home.  His Muslim ancestors had made a home in India 
and had in turn shaped the Indian nation in a multitude of ways.  The waves of Muslims 
who had found their way to India, either fleeing conquest, or leading it, and had made the 
Subcontinent the locus of the Islamicate world for centuries; the mode of Islam that he 
practiced was now irrevocably Indian, as India itself was unquestionably and deeply 
shaped by the roots that Muslims that had grown in its soil.  The centuries old titles and 
deeds that Nizami Sahab showed me reflected a sense of belonging to the landscape and 
geography of the very neighborhood that he lived in; the photographs of eminent leaders 
of the freedom movement and the tales of their many meetings in the courtyard of his 
home were expressive of his belonging to the political entity that was the Indian state; 
and there was, of course the overwhelming feeling that as a Muslim he was an inalienable 
part of the Indian zeitgeist, past and present.   
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